Light cruiser Chapaev.

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Light cruisers of the Chapaev type (project 68-K) - 5 units

It was planned to build 17 cruisers, but by June 1941 only 7 were laid down (project 68). After the war, they were completed according to Project 68-K (corrected) with enhanced anti-aircraft weapons and new artillery fire control systems.

ZHELEZNYAKOV (serial number 545). Laid down on October 31, 1939 at plant No. 194 and on September 25, 1940, was included in the list of Navy ships, launched on June 25, 1941, but on September 10, 1941, construction was suspended and mothballed. Completed after the Great Patriotic War, entered service on 19.4.1950 (according to other sources: 29.7.1 950) and on 7.9.1950, having raised the Naval flag, became part of the 4th Navy. 30.7.1951 was transferred to the Northern Fleet, 7.8.1 968 - to the LenVMB and 28.5.1 973 - to the DKBF. In the period from 10.14.1 957 to 5.8.1 961 took place in Leningrad major renovation. 1 8.4.1 961 was withdrawn from combat service and reclassified as a training KRL. 26.6 - 1.7.1 972 paid a visit to Stockholm (Sweden) and 20 - 24.7.1974 to Gdynia (Poland). 10/21/1975 disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, 1 5/3/1976 disbanded and in 1976 - 1977. cut into metal at the Glavvtorchermet base in Liepaja.

KUIBYSHEV (serial number 1 088). Laid down on 31.8.1 939 at plant No. 200 and on 25.8.1940 was included in the lists of Navy ships, launched on 31.1.1 941, but in the summer of 1941 it was suspended by construction, on 14.8.1 941 it was towed from Nikolaev to Poti and 10.9.1 941 mothballed. It was completed after the Great Patriotic War, entered service on April 20, 1950 (according to other sources: July 29, 1950) and on August 6, 1950, having raised the Naval flag, it became part of the Black Sea Fleet. 15 - 18.10.1953 visited Constanta (Romania), 19 - 22.1 0.1 953 - to Burgas (Bulgaria) and 8 - 1 0.1 0.1 957 - to Split (Yugoslavia). 1 8.4.1 958 was withdrawn from combat service and reclassified into a training KRL, and 24.4.1 965 was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, 12/20/1965 disbanded and subsequently on at the Glavvtorchermet base in Sevastopol, cut into metal.

CHAPAEV, from 10/29/1960 - PKZ-25 (serial number 305). Laid down 8.1 0.1 939 at plant No. 1 89 and 25.9.1 940 entered the list of Navy ships, launched 28.4.1941, but suspended construction on 10.9.1941 and mothballed. Completed after the Great Patriotic War, it entered service on May 1, 1950 (according to other sources: May 27, 1950) and on September 19, 1950, having raised the Naval flag, it became part of the 4th Navy. On July 30, 1951, it was transferred to the Northern Fleet. 18.4.1 958 was withdrawn from combat service and reclassified into a training KRL, 6.2.1 960 was disarmed and reorganized into PKZ, and 1 2.4.1 963 was excluded from the lists of Navy watercraft due to transfer to the OFI for dismantling and implementation, on October 29, 1963, it was disbanded and in 1964, at the Glavvtorchermet base in Murmansk, it was cut into metal.

CHKALOV, from 29.1 0.1958 - KOMSOMOLETS (serial number 306). Laid down on 31.8.1 939 at plant No. 1 89 and 25.9.1 940 was included in the lists of Navy ships, but on 10.9.1941 it was suspended by construction and mothballed on the slipway. Completed after the Great Patriotic War, lowered on October 25, 1947, entered service on October 25, 1950, and on April 22, 1951, raising the Naval flag, it became part of the 8th Navy. From December 24, 1955, he was a member of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, from May 28, 1973, to the LenVMB, and from January 28, 1976, to the DKBF. 1 On April 8, 1958, it was withdrawn from combat service and reclassified as a training KRL. 15 - 1 8.10.1953 visited Gdynia (Poland), 8-12.5.1964 - to Copenhagen (Denmark), 28.6 - 1.7.1965 - to Stockholm (Sweden), 29.7 - 2.8.1969 .- in Helsinki (Finland) and 3 - 9.10.1 969 - in Rostock (GDR). 27.9.1 979 disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to OFI for dismantling and sale, 31.12.1979 disbanded and in 1980 at the Glavvtorchermet base in Liepaja cut into metal.

FRUNZE (serial number 356). Laid down on August 29, 1939 at plant No. 198 and on September 25, 1940, it was added to the list of Navy ships, launched on December 30, 1940, but in the summer of 1941 it was suspended by construction, and on August 9, 1941 it was towed to Poti and mothballed. In 1942, the rear part of the ship was separated and welded to the hull of the damaged Project 26-bis Molotov cruise missile. Completed after the Great Patriotic War, it entered service on 1/19/2/1950 (according to other sources: 3/28/1951) and on 4/8/1951, having raised the Naval flag, it became part of the Black Sea Fleet. 15 - 18.10.1953 paid a visit to Constanta (Romania) and 19 - 22.10.1953 - to Burgas (Bulgaria). On April 18, 1958, he was withdrawn from combat service and reclassified into the training KRL, and on February 6, 1960, he was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, on March 14, 1960, he was disbanded and in 1960 - 1961 at the Glavvtorchermet base in Sevastopol, it was cut into metal.

The creation of Project 68 cruisers is inextricably linked both with the evolution of domestic naval thought and with the growth industrial opportunities young USSR. To understand how their appearance and tactical and technical characteristics were formed, it is necessary to make at least a brief excursion into the history of domestic military shipbuilding.

The first Soviet shipbuilding programs, adopted in 1926, 1929 and 1933, were formed under the influence of the theory of small naval warfare, which fully corresponded to the economic and shipbuilding capabilities of the Land of the Soviets. Ships laid down before the revolution were completed, and the existing battleships of the RKKF were modernized. However, new construction was supposed to be limited to leaders, destroyers, submarines and other types of light ships, which, in cooperation with land-based aviation, were supposed to destroy enemy fleets that had invaded the coastal waters of the USSR. It was assumed that light forces, capable of quickly concentrating in the right place and at the right time due to their high speed, would be able, in cooperation with aviation and ground artillery, to deliver a combined strike, i.e. simultaneously attack a squadron of heavy enemy ships with heterogeneous forces and thereby achieve success.

To prevent its own light forces from getting bogged down in the enemy's destroyers and light cruisers, the fleet needed a number of light cruisers capable of paving the way for their torpedo-carrying ships through the cover of the enemy squadron. Such cruisers had to be very fast to interact with the 37-40 knot leaders of the Leningrad (Project 1) and Gnevny (Project 7) types and have sufficient firepower to quickly disable enemy light cruisers. The light cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis, discussed by the author in the previous series of articles, became precisely such ships.

However, back in 1931 I.V. Stalin at a meeting of the Defense Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR said:

"Start construction large fleet it is necessary from small ships. It is possible that in five years we will be building battleships.”

And, apparently, since then (or even earlier) he has not parted with the dream of an ocean-going fleet. Therefore, in the spring of 1936, the first program of “large naval shipbuilding” was developed in the USSR, which included plans to create a powerful linear fleet. It must be said that this program was created in an atmosphere of strict (and not entirely clear) secrecy: expert theoreticians of naval construction (such as M.A. Petrov) and fleet command were not involved in its creation. In essence, their entire participation in the development came down to a short meeting held by I.V. Stalin with the leadership of the UVMS and commanders, at which Stalin asked questions:

“What kind of ships and with what weapons should we build? What kind of enemy will these ships most likely have to face in a combat situation?”

The commanders' answers, of course, turned out to be completely different; it would be difficult to expect anything else: if the commander Pacific Fleet proposed to concentrate on large ships (which were needed in his theater), then the commander of the Black Sea Fleet wanted to build many cruisers and destroyers torpedo boats. Stalin's reaction was quite predictable: “You yourself still don’t know what you need.”

But it should be noted that even if the sailors did not know what kind of ships they needed, they were eager to find out: by the beginning of 1936, designs were being worked out (of course, at the very early stages - pre-design / preliminary design) of three large artillery ships. Then it was assumed that the RKKF would need two types of battleships: for closed and open sea theaters, so projects of battleships of 55,000 tons (project 23 “for the Pacific Fleet”) and 35,000 tons (project 21 “for the Red Banner Baltic Fleet”) of standard displacement were considered, and also a heavy cruiser (project 22). It is interesting that the latter was supposed to have the ultimate, but at the same time still “cruising” characteristics - 18-19 thousand tons, 254 mm main caliber artillery and 130 mm universal guns, however, the construction of small battleships in France (“Dunkirk”) and in Germany (“Scharnhorst”) led our sailors astray. A heavy cruiser with 254 mm artillery would represent the top of the cruising “food pyramid” without yet turning into a battleship, but that is precisely why it could not possibly withstand the Dunkirk or Scharnhorst, which extremely upset the leadership of the UVMS. As a result, the development task was almost immediately adjusted: the cruiser’s displacement was allowed to be increased to 22,000 tons and the installation of 250 mm, 280 mm and 305 mm main caliber artillery on it was worked out. Forced to orient the designed ships to confront battleships, albeit small ones, both design teams, TsKBS-1 and KB-4, which carried out preliminary development of the heavy cruiser, reached 29,000 and 26,000 tons of standard displacement, respectively. Within these weight limits, the teams obtained fairly fast (33 kts), moderately protected (up to 250 mm armored belt and up to 127 mm armored deck) ships with nine 305 mm guns in three turrets. But they, of course, have already ceased to be heavy cruisers, representing small battleships or, perhaps, battlecruisers.

The “large maritime shipbuilding” program made its own adjustments to these views: although it was developed by Namorsi V.M. Orlov and his deputy I.M. Ludri, but of course, the last word belonged to Joseph Vissarionovich. It is likely that it was the secretive nature of its development that led to a number of frankly strange decisions regarding the number and types of ships planned for construction and their distribution among theaters. In total, it was planned to build 24 battleships, including 8 type “A” and 16 type “B”, 20 light cruisers, 17 leaders, 128 destroyers, 90 large, 164 medium and 90 small submarines. At the same time, at the time of the formation of the “large marine shipbuilding” program, I.V. Stalin considered it highly desirable for the USSR to join the system of international treaties, so it was decided to abandon further development of the 55,000-ton battleship, limiting itself to ships of 35,000 tons that fit the “Washington” standard and became “type A battleships” of the new program.

Accordingly, heavy cruisers were “reclassified” as “type B battleships.” On the one hand, it seemed that such an approach was fully consistent with the wishes of the UVMS, which was working on the simultaneous construction of two types of battleships. But it should be taken into account that the “small” battleship UVMS with its 35,000 tons of displacement and 406-mm main caliber artillery should have become no weaker than any battleship in the world, and the “large” ship for the Pacific Ocean was created as the strongest battleship in the world . Now, instead, it was planned to create only 8 full-fledged battleships and as many as 16 “B” type ships, which, having a 26,000-ton displacement and a 305-mm main caliber, “stuck” somewhere in the middle between a full-fledged battleship and a heavy cruiser. What problems could they solve? Namorsi V.M. Orlov also wrote the following about them in 1936:

“The ship should be able to destroy all sorts of cruisers for many years, including ships of the Deutschland type (pocket battleships. - Author’s note).”

A little later, he put forward a demand for them to fight battleships of the Scharnhorst type and battlecruisers type "Congo" at favorable heading angles and distances. However, in this form, the “battleship” part of the program raises many questions. In total, in the world (if you do not take into account the exotic Spanish or Latin American dreadnoughts) there were only 12 relatively medium-sized battleships that a B-type battleship could fight, without much hope of success: 2 Dunkirk, 4 Giulio Cesare", 2 "Scharnhorst" and 4 "Congo". Why was it necessary to “in response” build 16 of our own “twelve-inch” ships? It was planned to have only 4 full-fledged battleships of type “A” on the Black and Baltic Seas - this would hardly be enough to withstand the fleet of any first-class naval power. For example, by the time the Black Sea four A-type battleships were commissioned, the Italian fleet, which, as was then believed, could well have entered the Black Sea for unfriendly purposes, could have had a much larger number of ships of this class. If initially the UVMS intended for the Pacific Ocean the most powerful type of ship (a 55,000-ton battleship), now there should have been no full-fledged battleships there at all - only 6 ships of type “B”.

Thus, the implementation of the “large naval shipbuilding” program, although it was supposed to put at the disposal of the Country of Soviets a powerful military fleet of 533 warships of 1 million 307 thousand tons of total standard displacement, did not ensure its dominance in any of the four seas. theaters And this, in turn, meant that if the theory of a “small war” was coming to an end, then it was too early to abandon the tactics of a combined strike. Even after the implementation of the shipbuilding program of 1936, the possibility of the appearance of enemy squadrons, obviously superior to our fleet in the number of heavy ships, could not be excluded. In this case, a classic battle automatically led to defeat, and all that remained was to rely on the same “strike with light forces in the coastal areas.”

As a result, it turned out a little strange: on the one hand, even after the adoption of the “large naval shipbuilding” program, the cruisers of projects 26 and 26 bis did not become obsolete at all, because a tactical niche for their use remained. But, on the other hand, since it was now planned to create full-fledged squadrons in all four theaters (even for the Northern Fleet it was planned to build 2 B-type battleships), the need arose to create a new type of light cruiser for service with the squadron. And all these considerations found their way into the shipbuilding program of 1936: out of 20 light cruisers intended for construction, 15 were to be built according to project 26, and the remaining 5 were to be built according to the new “squadron escort” project, numbered 28.

Thus, the leadership of the UVMS demanded, and the designers began to design a new cruiser, not because Project 26 turned out to be something bad: in fact, the creation of a new type of ship, which later became the light cruiser of Project 68-K Chapaev, began long before , how cruisers of the Kirov or Maxim Gorky types could demonstrate at least some shortcomings. But Kirov-class cruisers were created within the framework of the “small naval war” paradigm and were not very suitable for escorting a squadron. Of course, there is never too much speed, but for operations with heavy ships, 36 knots of Project 26 still looked excessive. But additional speed units are always obtained at the expense of some other elements, in the case of Project 26 - the abandonment of the second command and rangefinder point, and so on. The task of quickly eliminating light cruisers was no longer set. Of course, it’s nice to be able to quickly disassemble an enemy light cruiser into frames and other hull parts, but the main enemy of the “accompanying” cruiser was leaders and destroyers, and against them faster-firing artillery was required than 180-mm cannons. In addition, the defense had to be strengthened: while the “cruiser-raider” of Project 26, during a concentrated or combined attack, had every opportunity to determine the battle distance and its heading angle towards the enemy, the light cruiser-defender still had to be located between the attackers and their target, leaving the choice of combat distance/course angles to the enemy. Moreover, it should be assumed that if the attack of the enemy’s light forces is also led by light cruisers, they will try to engage ours in battle; in this case, it is important not to be distracted, but to destroy the enemy destroyers, without being too afraid of 152-mm shells. And, in addition, it is possible for enemy leaders and destroyers to break through to “pistol” distances, from which their artillery, which has already grown to 138 mm (for the French), acquires significant armor penetration.

In addition to protection and artillery, fuel reserves also required changes. Project 26 cruisers were created for operations in the limited waters of the Black and Baltic seas and were not supposed to go far from the shores of the Pacific Ocean, and therefore had a limited range: according to the project, within 3,000 nautical miles with a full (not maximum) fuel supply (which in fact it would be slightly higher, in 1936, Of course, they couldn’t know). At the same time, for the newest A-type battleships, they planned to provide a range of 6000-8000 miles and, of course, Project 26 cruisers could not accompany such ships.

Consequently, the domestic fleet needed a light cruiser of a different concept and a different project. This is how the history of the creation of cruisers of the Chapaev type began, but before moving on to its description, it is still necessary to fully understand the question of how it happened that these cruisers almost completely “squeezed out” ships of the Kirov and Maxim Gorky type. from shipbuilding programs.

So, on June 26, 1936, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution on the construction of the “Large Sea and Ocean Fleet.” But already the next year, 1937, this program has undergone significant adjustments. In the summer of 1937, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N.I. Yezhov announced:

“...the military-fascist conspiracy also has branches in the leadership of the Navy.”

As a result, a “cleaning” of the ranks of the navy began, and the creators of the “large naval shipbuilding” program, Namorsi V.M. Orlov and his deputy I.M. Ludri were repressed. We will not, of course, try to pass a verdict on the purges of 1937-38; this is a topic for a separate large study; we will limit ourselves to just stating that the shipbuilding program of 1936, created by “wreckers,” simply had to be revised. And so it happened: in August 1937, the USSR government issued a decree on the processing of the shipbuilding program.

Without assessing the repressions, we must admit that the shipbuilding program only benefited from the revision they initiated. The number of battleships was reduced from 24 to 20, but now they were full-fledged battleships: the design of the A-class battleship showed that the combination of 406 mm artillery and protection against a 406 mm shell at a speed of about 30 knots could not be accommodated in either 35 or 45 thousand tons. At the beginning of 1937, it became known that Germany and Japan would subsequently lay down ships with a displacement of 50-52 thousand tons. In response to this, the government allowed the standard displacement of the “A” type battleship to be increased to 55-57 thousand tons. At the same time, the “B” type battleship in the design process had already exceeded 32 thousand tons, but still did not meet the customer’s requirements, nor the views of the designers, so this project was declared sabotage. As a result, the leadership of the UVMS decided to build type “A” ships with 406 mm artillery and a displacement of 57 thousand tons for the Pacific Ocean and type “B” battleships with the same protection, but with 356 mm guns and significantly smaller sizes for other theaters . Theoretically (without taking into account the economic capabilities of the country), this approach was much preferable to the battleships of 35 and 26 thousand tons of the previous program. Moreover, it very quickly became clear that the “B” type battleship was trying to approach the “A” type battleship in size, without having its efficiency, which is why at the beginning of 1938 the “B” type battleships were finally abandoned in favor of the strongest ship type “A”, which was supposed to be built for all naval theaters.

But the changes were not limited to battleships alone: ​​it was proposed to include ships of new classes in the shipbuilding program that were not in the old one, namely: 2 aircraft carriers and 10 heavy cruisers. Accordingly, the updated program had two fundamental differences, which put a final end to the further construction of Project 26 and 26-bis cruisers:

1. The developers of this program believed that its implementation would allow the RKKF to have parity with potential opponents in every naval theater. Thus, a situation was no longer predicted in which the task of confronting enemy formations of heavy ships would be assigned exclusively to the light forces of the fleet. Accordingly, the tactical niche of Project 26 and 26-bis cruisers had to disappear.

2. The program provided for the construction of not only “classic” light cruisers, but also ultra-powerful heavy cruisers, which were supposed to become the strongest in their class. Their displacement was planned at 18-19 thousand tons (according to the initial estimate), the main caliber was 254 mm artillery, the armor was supposed to protect against 203 mm shells, and all this was supposed to reach a speed of 34 knots. The capabilities of heavy and light cruisers completely covered the entire range of tasks that could be assigned to a cruiser-class ship, and there was no need for an additional type of ship.

Thus, the RKKF had to receive classic light and very powerful heavy cruisers in sufficient quantities, and the need for an “intermediate” ship, which was the Project 26 cruisers, disappeared. According to the new program, only 6 of them were supposed to be built (actually the laid down ships of projects 26 and 26-bis), and at this point their construction should have been stopped. However, it was supposed to return to the issue of resuming the construction of cruisers of the Maxim Gorky type once again, after testing the first ship of the series, but this did not happen.

Subsequently, heavy cruisers evolved into Project 69 Kronstadt, suspiciously similar to the “wrecker” B-class battleship, but that’s a completely different story. As for the “squadron escort” light cruisers, the history of their creation began at the end of August 1936, when Namorsi V.M. Orlov formulated the tasks for this type of ship:

1. Reconnaissance and patrol.

2. Combat with light enemy forces accompanied by a squadron.

3. Support for attacks by friendly destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats.

4. Operations on the enemy’s sea lanes and raiding operations on its coast and ports.

5. Mine laying of active minefields in enemy waters.

The leadership of the UVMS demanded that the new ship (passed according to documents as “Project 28”) be “packed” into a standard displacement of 7,500 tons, i.e. slightly more than the “allowed” displacement of the cruiser “Kirov”, which at that time was planned at the level of 7170 tons. At the same time, the sailors “ordered” an absolutely enchanting range - 9-10 thousand nautical miles. The preliminary design of the ship was to be carried out (in parallel) by the designers of TsKBS-1 and Leningradsky design institute.

The new ship was designed on the basis of the Project 26 cruisers. The length of the Kirov hull was increased by 10 meters, the width by a meter, while the theoretical drawing practically repeated that of the Project 26 cruiser. The armor of the sides, traverses and barbettes was somewhat strengthened - from 50 to 75 mm, and the front of the turret - even up to 100 mm, but the vertical armor of the conning tower was reduced from 150 to 100 mm, and the 50 mm armored deck was left as is. Of course, the main innovations affected the main caliber: 180-mm guns gave way to six-inch guns; instead of three three-gun turrets of the MK-3-180, they planned to install four three-gun turrets, thereby increasing the number of barrels to twelve. At the same time, the long-range anti-aircraft caliber was preserved in its “pristine” form - six single-gun 100-mm B-34 mounts, located in the same way as on the Kirov cruiser. But according to the project, the new ship was finally supposed to receive high-speed anti-aircraft guns, albeit in very moderate quantities: two “nests” (46-K) with quadruple 37-mm mounts, and a total of 8 barrels. Their placement is of interest: on the bow and stern superstructure, so that both “nests” could be fired at any side, and one at the bow or stern of the ship. The number of machine gun mounts remained the same as on the Kirov - four, but they were supposed to be paired, causing the total number of 12.7 mm barrels to double compared to Project 26, from four to eight. As for the torpedo and aircraft armament, it remained unchanged: two 533-mm three-tube torpedo tubes and two KOR-2 aircraft.

Power plant was supposed to completely duplicate the turbines and boilers intended for serial ships of Project 26: the lead Kirov received a power plant made in Italy, but other ships of this type were its modernized version, mastered by domestic production. With all the above “innovations”, the cruiser’s standard displacement should have reached 9,000 tons, while they hoped to maintain the speed at 36 knots, but the cruising range, of course, turned out to be significantly lower than in the technical specifications: instead of 9-10 thousand miles only 5.4 thousand miles.

In general, it can be stated that the designers were unable to “fit” the Project 28 cruiser into the original technical specifications, and as a result, its future fate was in question. It is not known what decision the UVMS leadership would have made, but 1937 had just begun... The next stage in the creation of light cruisers of the Chapaev type began after Namorsi V.M. Orlov was removed from his post and arrested, and the program he presented for “large marine shipbuilding” was audited to identify “sabotage” elements in it. Of course, the Project 28 cruiser did not escape this fate: on August 11, 1937, at a meeting of the Defense Committee (DC) under the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR, it was ordered to study the issue of the type of promising light cruiser with a different set of weapons, including nine 180 -mm, twelve, nine and six 152-mm guns, and also consider the feasibility of further construction of Project 26-bis light cruisers instead of designing something new. Moreover, only two days were given to revise the technical specifications for the light cruiser!

They didn’t meet the “two days” deadline, but on October 1, 1937, the Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the design of a new ship, which had a number of significant differences from the Project 28 cruiser. The number of main caliber turrets was reduced from four to three, so the cruiser was supposed to have nine 152 mm guns. Six single-gun 100-mm guns were replaced with four turret-mounted “sparky” guns. The total number of 37-mm machine gun barrels increased from 8 to 12. The speed was allowed to be reduced to 35 knots, but the armor belt had to be increased from 75 to 100 mm. The range was slightly reduced: now the cruiser was required to travel only 4.5 thousand miles with a maximum fuel supply, but there was a small nuance. Usually the range was set for full speed and for economic speed - everything is clear with both. If the full speed in this case is maximum speed ship, which it could maintain for a long time, then the economic progress was the speed at which fuel consumption per mile traveled was minimal. However, the range of 4.5 thousand miles was determined for a certain “cruising speed” (often this is understood as economic speed, but, apparently, not in this case). The economic speed for our cruisers was defined as 17-18 knots, but for some reason the cruising speed for the new ship was 20 knots. The standard displacement was set within the same limits as before: 8000-8300 tons.

At the same time, the Defense Committee determined the following procedure for work on the cruiser: before October 5 of the current year, the leadership of the naval forces of the Red Army was obliged to submit tactical and technical specifications for the ship; on October 10, 1938, a preliminary design was expected, so that already on August 31, 1938, it would be possible to lay down new cruisers of this type. At the same time, a decision was made (presumably due to the danger of disruption of work on the cruisers of the new project. - Author's note) to lay down two cruisers of Project 26-bis in 1938 (the future Kalinin and Kaganovich).

Of course, the defense committee did not take the characteristics of the new cruiser out of thin air, but according to the proposals of the sailors. But it is still surprising that the defense committee approved (at least partially) the performance characteristics of a ship for which there was no tactical and technical specification!

However, already on October 29, 1938 it was approved. The new head of the Red Army MS M.V. Viktorov set the following requirements for the new ship:

1. Actions as part of a squadron to launch light forces into an attack.

2. Support for ship patrol and reconnaissance.

3. Protecting the squadron from attacks by light enemy forces.

As you can see, the tasks of the new cruiser (its project was soon assigned the number 68) were significantly reduced in comparison with the initial TTT (tactical and technical requirements), on the basis of which the previous project 28 was developed. Interestingly, the ships of project 68 were no longer intended to operate on communications enemy: now the leadership of the Red Army MS saw in them a specialized cruiser for service with the squadron, and nothing more.

As for the performance characteristics of the cruiser itself, they were practically no different from those determined by the defense committee: all the same 3*3-152 mm guns, etc. The only innovation was some clarifications on anti-aircraft artillery. Thus, initially it was planned to install 100-mm cannons in BZ-14 mounts, similar to those intended for Project 23 battleships, but then it was decided that they were too heavy and would unnecessarily increase the cruiser’s displacement, which is why the decision was made to design lightweight 100-mm installations. The composition of the anti-aircraft guns was determined: twelve barrels were supposed to be placed in six twin installations. The standard displacement remained at the level of 8000-8300 tons, the armor of the sides and deck was 100 and 50 mm, respectively, but very powerful artillery protection was provided: the towers were up to 175 mm, and their barbettes were 150 mm. It must be said that the sources available to the author do not indicate exactly when the decision was made to provide such strong protection for artillery, so it cannot be ruled out that such protection was already included in the decision of the defense committee before the appearance of Viktorov’s TTZ.

The design of the new cruiser was entrusted to the chief designer of ships of project 26 and 26-bis A.I. Maslov (TsKB-17), obviously it was best choice of all possible. In March 1938, the preliminary design was ready, but with two deviations from the original TTT. And if the reduction in cruising range (4,500 miles not at cruising (20 knots), but at economic speed (17 knots) was acceptable, then the increase in standard displacement to 9,450 tons against the maximum permitted 8,300 tons was not.

During the preliminary design of the light cruiser, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was created, which was supposed to be responsible, among other things, for plans for the construction of the naval forces of the USSR. It was there that the preliminary design of the new cruiser was sent for approval, but Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy I.S. Isakov considered that the project required reworking. The main complaint was that the Project 68 cruiser turned out to be larger than its foreign “colleagues”, but at the same time inferior to them in armament. Therefore, Isakov suggested two possible options project improvements:

1. Installation of a fourth 152-mm turret; it was proposed to compensate for the weight by reducing the armor thickness of the barbettes and conning tower (from 150 to 120 mm) and the frontal plates of the main caliber turrets (from 175 to 140 mm), reducing the economic range to 3,500 miles.

2. Leave the main caliber 3*3-152 mm, but at the expense of other load items, find a weight savings of 1500 tons. Leave the power plant the same - thereby achieving an increase in speed.

A month and a half later, TsKB-17 presented an adjusted cruiser design. A 4th main caliber turret was added, the thickness of the barbettes was reduced to 120 mm, the speed was reduced by half a knot (to 34.5 knots), and the standard displacement increased to 10,000 tons. Such a ship I.S. Isakov was quite satisfied; his only demand was to return the 150 mm thickness of the barbette. In this form, Project 68 was presented to the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The latter, at a meeting on June 29, 1938, approved Project 68 without changes, and at the same time already put an end to plans for the construction of cruisers of the Maxim Gorky type:

“Allow NKOP to lay down two light cruisers of Project 26-bis at the Amur shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, after which the construction of ships of this type should be stopped.”

Noteworthy is the fact that this decision was adopted even before the completion of testing of the lead ship of Project 26, the light cruiser Kirov. A fact that once again indicates that the cessation of construction of Project 26 and 26-bis cruisers occurred due to a change in the concept of fleet construction, and not at all due to the identification of certain shortcomings that were revealed during testing and/or operation.

At the beginning of December 1938, TsKB-17 presented technical project 68: the displacement increased again (to 10,624 tons), the speed was supposed to be 33.5 knots. This was the result of a more accurate calculation of weights: at the preliminary design stage, the weight characteristics of many units supplied by contractors were not known, and, in addition, in a number of cases, the designers clarified their own calculations.

The Navy Shipbuilding Directorate, having examined the submitted project, issued the following verdict:

“The technical design of the KRL has been developed on the basis of a preliminary design and an approved assignment quite completely and satisfactorily; it can be approved for the release of working documentation for it in order to ensure the construction of ships according to this project. The slightly larger displacement compared to the KRL of foreign fleets is explained mainly by the high requirements for it in terms of the quality of artillery weapons and armor.

In addition, the project contains a number of qualities that are not measured by conventional indicators, such as the number and caliber of guns, armor thickness, speed, etc. (requirements for cellars, artillery firing angles, chemical protection, communications, electrical equipment, etc.). This allows us to conclude that the KRL pr. 69 will, of course, be stronger than all the KRL foreign fleets armed with 152-mm artillery, and will be able to successfully fight also with lightly armored heavy cruisers of the “Washington” type.”

How justified was it? Let's try to figure this out in the next article.

To be continued…

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The development of Project 68 cruisers began in Leningrad Central Clinical Hospital-17 in 1938. According to TTZ Tactical and technical assignment they were intended to operate as part of a squadron, launch light forces into an attack, support ship patrols and reconnaissance, as well as protect the squadron from enemy light forces.

As part of a ship's boiler-turbine power plant ( EU Power plant) included 6 main water-tube boilers KV-68 and two main turbo-gear units (GTZA) type TV-7 with a total power of 110,000 hp, as well as corresponding auxiliary mechanisms, devices, pipelines and systems. EU Power plant was located in eight compartments in the middle part of the hull and consisted of two autonomous echelons.

The main caliber guns were designed especially for these cruisers - 152 mm B-38 cannons and three-gun turret mounts MK-5, universal 100 mm two-gun mounts B-54 and twin anti-aircraft mounts 66-K.

The armor was strengthened compared to cruisers of the 26 Kirov type: the side in the citadel area had an armor thickness of 100 mm; traverses - bow 120 mm and stern 100 mm; main artillery barbettes - 130 mm, etc. In addition, the conning tower was protected by 10 mm bulletproof armor.

According to the five-year plan for military shipbuilding for the period 1938-1942, it was planned to lay down 17 cruisers of Project 68. In fact, only 7 were laid down. With the beginning of the war, 5 cruisers launched were mothballed; two (“Ordzhonikidze” and “Sverdlov”), after the capture of Nikolaev by the Germans, were dismantled by the occupation authorities for metal, since their technical readiness did not exceed 20%.

During the war, the shortcomings of pre-war projects, including the 68th, became clear: unusable anti-aircraft weapons, outdated artillery fire control devices, insufficient communications equipment, lack of radar and hydroacoustics, and the presence of open combat posts. Assignment to develop a modernized project Navy Navy originally issued in March 1944, and in April of the following year Central Clinical Hospital Central Design Bureau-17 received detailed TTZ Tactical and technical assignment to adjust the light cruiser project. This primarily affected anti-aircraft weapons.

To balance the additional load in the modernized project, designated 68K, it was decided to abandon aircraft weapons and 12.7 mm machine guns. This did not produce significant results, since simultaneously with the increase in combat qualities, a number of tactical and technical elements deteriorated. The increase in the number of crew led to a deterioration in living conditions - in particular, the bunk beds in the crew quarters were replaced with three-tier bunks. To correct the situation, it was necessary to remove torpedo tubes, paravanes, bomb launchers, reduce the number of 37-mv machine guns to 28, and make a number of other changes.

Taking into account the deterioration of shipbuilding parameters, it was proposed to complete only 5 pre-war cruisers according to the amended project 68K, build another 7 ships according to the 68-bis Sverdlov project, and starting from 1949, lay down 18 light cruisers according to project 65, TTZ Tactical and technical assignment which was issued back in September 1945. The latter existed in two versions - with 152 mm and 180 mm artillery, but in 1947 I.V. Stalin personally ordered: “Adopt the main caliber of 152 mm for light cruisers, speed up the completion of Project 68K cruisers in every possible way, stop the development of the new Project 65 , free up design forces to complete the technical project 68-bis Sverdlov and develop the preliminary design 82.”

Many thanks to Sergei Sannikov for the materials provided.

Laid down on October 31, 1939 CVD Shipyard No. 194; included in the lists Navy Navy September 25, 1940; suspended by construction and mothballed on September 10, 1941; completed after the Second World War and put into operation on April 19, 1950 (according to other sources, July 29, 1950); joined the 4th Navy Navy 7.9.1950; 30.7.1951 transferred to KSF Krasnoznamenny Northern Fleet ; 7.8.1968 transferred to LenVMB; 28.5.1973 transferred to DKBF; 10/14/1957 - 8/5/1961 underwent major repairs in Leningrad; 18.4.1961 withdrawn from combat service Navy Navy Navy Navy October 21, 1971; disbanded 15.3.1976; in 1976-77 cut into metal at the Glavvtorchermet base in Liepaja.

Cruiser pr. 68-K "Kuibyshev"

Project 68 cruisers were supposed to become one of the best, (and most likely, the best) light cruisers in the world. But they were unlucky - seven ships, laid down in 1939-1941, could not have time to enter service before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and after it began their construction was frozen. And when the question arose about their completion, the sailors wanted to take into account as much as possible the military experience acquired at such a high price.

However, it should be noted that even before the start of the war, various options for adjusting Project 68 were considered. Having fears that domestic developers of artillery systems would once again delay the delivery of the main and anti-aircraft calibers to the fleet, and taking into account the temporary warming of relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany, People's Commissar of the Navy N .G. Kuznetsov in July 1940 approved the TTZ for the rearmament of one cruiser with German artillery and fire control systems. The project was named 68-I (“foreign”). It was planned to install twelve German 150-mm guns (we were talking about 150-mm/55 SK C/28) in the German turrets and replace the two-gun 100-mm B-54 turrets with deck-mounted 105-mm LC/31 mounts. This installation was originally created for an 88-mm gun and had separate vertical guidance of the barrels. Subsequently, the Germans moved away from this, “placing” both 105-mm guns in one cradle, thereby achieving a weight savings of 750 kg, and the new installation was called LC/37. It was already being produced by the time of the negotiations, but, apparently, in this case the Germans preferred to equip their fleet with them rather than sell them to a potential enemy.

However, the question of 150-mm German guns disappeared at the end of 1940. Firstly, it turned out that these guns, turrets and fire control systems for them were not yet in the metal, and they would have to wait for their manufacture, which completely made the deal meaningless. It was believed that the domestic B-38 and SLA should be better than the German ones, and the delivery times were comparable. And, in addition, the very first calculations showed that German technology was noticeably heavier than Soviet technology, requiring more space and electricity, as a result of which the light cruiser’s displacement had to increase by 700 tons, which was also considered unacceptable.

So, the German main caliber was abandoned almost immediately, but the 105-mm universal gun was a different matter. Here the benefits of the acquisition were undoubted, including the fact that the German installations were stabilized, but we did not yet know how to do this. In addition, replacing the B-54 with the LC/31 had virtually no effect on the ship's displacement, since the mass of the installations was comparable. Therefore, it was decided to purchase four such installations along with two fire control posts and install them on the Valery Chkalov, laid down on August 31, 1939. True, this did not end well, since the Germans still did not deliver anything, and the Soviet shipbuilders had to make changes to the project, which delayed the launch of the Chkalov.

An even more radical option was being developed on the initiative of TsNII-45 - the light cruiser Chapaev was supposed to become a small aircraft carrier: 10,500 tons of displacement, 33 knots, 30-32 aircraft and even two catapults. However, work on a domestic aircraft carrier did not receive development in those years.

The first “Preliminary technical specification for adjusting the project, in relation to mothballed ships of the 1st series, based on conclusions from the combat experience of Navy ships in the current war” was issued in September 1942, the second - in March 1944. Moreover, the main requirement of both was all-round strengthening the anti-aircraft weapons of light cruisers. The number of 100-mm guns should have been increased to 12, and instead of the originally planned four two-gun B-54s, it was now necessary to install six new stabilized S-44 mounts. Instead of six 37-mm “spark” 66-Ks, it was necessary to install twenty of the latest B-11s, thereby increasing the number of 37-mm barrels from 12 to 40! In another option, it was proposed to install only a dozen B-11s, but they should be supplemented with four quadruple 23-mm 4-U-23 installations (created on the basis of the VYa air cannon).

TsKB-17, which designed the Project 68 cruisers, carried out the corresponding studies, but it was not possible to accommodate such firepower while retaining four three-gun MK-5 main caliber turrets. As a result, TsKB-17 specialists proposed their own version of a radical restructuring of the cruiser’s artillery armament. The designers guaranteed the placement of not even 12, but 14 100-mm ZKDB cannons and 40 barrels of 37-mm machine guns, but subject to the replacement of a dozen 152-mm guns with nine 180-mm guns in three MK-3-180 turrets. And then the fun begins...

And again - 180 mm. Thoughts about rearmament.

The above proposal from TsKB-17 was made in 1944, when all the features of the operation of domestic 180-mm artillery were identified and taken into account. And there is no doubt that if our 180-mm B-1-P was a completely unusable weapon, as many modern sources like to describe it as, the fleet would immediately refuse such a proposal. However, the Main Directorate of Shipbuilding supported TsKB-17, and the Operations Directorate of the Main Naval Staff noted that replacing the MK-5 with the MK-3-180 with the above-described strengthening of anti-aircraft weapons: “for tactical reasons, it would be the most appropriate solution to the issue of choosing an artillery weapon option new light cruiser."

The return to the 180mm caliber is certainly very interesting. In the first part, we described in detail why 152-mm guns were much more suitable for the tasks of the Project 68 cruiser compared to 180-mm caliber, and suddenly... But in fact there is no contradiction here. The fact is that 152-mm guns larger than 180-mm corresponded to the tasks of a cruiser for service with a squadron, and we were going to build a Large Fleet - but at the end of the war, in 1944-45, it was quite obvious that there would be no such “Large” fleet We won't have any in the near future. Back in 1940, the construction of heavy warships was significantly limited: by order of the NKSP No. 178 of October 22, 1940, based on the decree of the USSR Government “On the military shipbuilding plan for 1941” plans to create a large fleet were largely curtailed.

Thus, of the six battleships and heavy cruisers under construction, it was necessary to focus on completing the construction of only three (the battleship "Soviet Russia", the heavy cruisers "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol"), the construction of two battleships should have been "limited" and another one - "Sovetskaya Belorussia" - disassemble on the slipway. But the construction of light cruisers was supposed to continue - six more light cruisers of Project 68 should have been laid down by the end of 1941. As for the post-war programs, they had not yet been drawn up, but it was clear that the war-weary country would not be able to immediately begin creating an ocean-going fleet. Thus, it turned out that the light cruiser would become the main ship of the USSR Navy in the coming years, despite the fact that there would be no “squadrons” in which it was intended to serve. And this returned the fleet, if not to the theory of small naval warfare, then to actions against the superior forces of the enemy fleet off our coasts, for which the 180-mm caliber was better suited than six-inch guns (see series of articles on Project 26). Well, taking into account the fact that the required air defense could only be provided by placing 180-mm cannons on the ship, the TsKB-17 option was indeed optimal.

(The project of such a ship with 180 mm artillery is in Word of Warships - cruiser pr. 65 Dmitry Donskoy)

And yet, the Chapaev-class cruisers did not receive the MK-3-180, however, for reasons not of a tactical, but of a production nature: it was possible to resume production and ensure the delivery of 180 mm guns and turrets a year later than the 152 mm B-38 and MK -5. As expected, this would delay the commissioning of the newest light cruisers, while the fleet needed them extremely urgently.

As a result, the modernization under Project 68-K was of a much more “gentle” nature: its main directions were strengthening anti-aircraft weapons, although not to the extent originally planned, and the second was equipping cruisers with various types of radar stations. The remaining decisions, for the most part, turned out to be a consequence of the above.

Modernization of anti-aircraft weapons and fire control systems.

The long-range anti-aircraft caliber was now represented by four two-gun 100-mm SM-5-1 installations, and it must be said that this artillery system provided everything that domestic anti-aircraft gunners could dream of during the war. Externally, the SM-5-1 was very similar to the German 105-mm LC/37 installation; they had much in common: both installations were stabilized; both had remote control - i.e. the vertical and horizontal aiming angles could be set directly from the command and rangefinder point (in the SM-5-1 the D-5S system was responsible for this), both guns were placed in the same cradle.

But there was a difference - the German installations were deck-based, and the domestic SM-5-1 were turret-based. They, of course, were not fully automated, but still the supply of shells to the fighting compartment using elevators looked noticeably more progressive - the crew only had to transfer the shot to the swinging tray, the rest of the operations were carried out automatically. In addition, the crew was protected from shrapnel. The weight of the projectile of the Soviet artillery system is not significantly higher - 15.6-15.9 kg versus 15.1 kg of the German one, but the initial speed (1000 m/s) exceeded that of the “German” by 100 m/s. The vertical and horizontal guidance speed of the SM-5-1 was also higher than the German one - 16-17 degrees / s versus 12 degrees / s.

The ZKDB fire was controlled by two SPN-200-RL, each of which, in addition to optical surveillance equipment, had its own Vympel-2 radar station. In addition, each SM-5-1 installation was equipped with its own Stag-B radio rangefinder. Of course, not everything worked out right away - the same “Vympel-2” turned out to be an unsuccessful radar, which was eventually “demoted” to radio rangefinders. But unable to provide tracking of an air target in three coordinates. However, during subsequent modernizations (early 50s), more advanced radars “Anchor” and “Anchor-M” were installed on the ships, thanks to which, for the first time in the USSR, it was possible to solve the problem of combining the instrumental method of firing anti-aircraft artillery with automatic tracking (in three coordinates) air targets.

As for ammunition, the SM-5-1, along with high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation ammunition for firing at sea or coastal targets, used two types of anti-aircraft shells: containing 1.35 kg of ZS-55 explosives weighing 15.6 kg and equipped with a ZS- radio fuse 55R, which had a slightly larger weight (15.9 kg), but, alas, significantly lower explosive content - only 816 grams. In addition (possibly due to the difference in mass), the initial speed of the ZS-55R was 5 m/s lower and amounted to 995 m/s. Unfortunately, the author of this article was unable to find out the date of entry of this projectile into service.

In general, we can say that the SM-5-1 and the universal artillery fire control system used on the Project 68-K cruisers brought it to a completely new level compared to the original, pre-war version.

The situation with 37 mm machine guns has also improved significantly. Although instead of 20 installations we had to limit ourselves to fourteen, the new B-11 assault rifles were very successful. Their ballistics corresponded to the 70-K, with which our fleet went through the entire war, but unlike its “ancestor,” the B-11 received water-cooled barrels, which approximately doubled the number of shots that the machine gun could fire before the barrel overheated critically. The B-11's guidance was only manual, but the installation was stabilized. Unfortunately, reliable stabilization of such machines turned out to be beyond the capabilities of the domestic industry, so during service it was usually turned off (“pinned”). The anti-aircraft guns did not seem to have their own control points, although the literature mentions the presence of a certain MZA-68K control system, although the author was unable to find what it was. But it is reliably known that the Zenit 68K control system, which controlled the fire of universal 100-mm artillery, also issued target designation for anti-aircraft guns. It is not entirely clear how effective such target designation could be at that technological level, but it should still be noted that, unlike optical means (stereo range finders), one radar can observe and control the movement of several targets. At the same time, it is reliably known that the main-caliber launcher of Project 68-K cruisers could provide simultaneous fire at four different targets.

There were no other anti-aircraft weapons on the Project 68-K ships - 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns were abandoned due to low combat effectiveness.

Scheme of the light cruiser pr. 68-K "Komsomolets"

As for the radar weapons, they were planned to be quite diverse for the Chapaev-type cruisers: according to the original plan, it was supposed to install radars for monitoring the surface (“Reef”) and air (“Guys”) situation, but this did not exhaust their capabilities. For example, "Reef" could detect targets of the "cruiser" type at a distance of 200-220 kbt, "torpedo boat" - 30-50 kbt, splashes from falling 152-mm high-explosive or fragmentation shells - from 25 to 100 kbt, and could be used for issuing target designation for main caliber artillery. "Guys-2", although it was considered a surveillance aircraft, capable of detecting a flying aircraft starting from a distance of 80 km, could also provide a control center for universal artillery.

In addition, of course, there were artillery radars - to control the fire of 152-mm artillery, two Redan-2 radars were used, located on the roofs of both control towers. Redan-2 carried out all the necessary measurements, determining both the distance to the target and the distance to the splashes from the falling shells and the distance between the target and the splashes. Unfortunately, these radars also turned out to be not very good, and in the early 50s they were replaced by the new “Zalp” radar, which did an excellent job of its “responsibilities.” In addition, the elevated turrets of the cruisers received a Stag-B radio rangefinder, capable of “seeing” a destroyer-type target from 120 kbt and tracking the target starting from a distance of 100 kbt, while the error in determining the distance did not exceed 15 meters. The lower turrets did not receive Stag-B, apparently because the muzzle gases from turrets No. 2 and 3 could damage them when firing at sharp bow (stern) corners.

How effective were domestic radar weapons? In this regard, the shooting that took place on October 28, 1958, in which the cruisers Kuibyshev and Frunze took part, is very indicative. The shooting was carried out at night and exclusively according to radar data; the shield was towed by the Project 30-bis destroyer "Buiny", which was completely shaded, so that the cruisers could not use optics to observe the towing ship.

The cruisers, traveling at a speed of over 28 knots, detected the target from a distance of 190 kbt and set out on a combat course, and when the distance was reduced to 131 kbt, they began shooting. "Kuibyshev" fired two sighting salvos, waited for the shells to fall, fired another third sighting salvo, and then both cruisers opened fire to kill. The shooting lasted 3 minutes (unfortunately, it is unclear in the source whether the killing fire lasted 3 minutes or the entire shooting, including zeroing) and ended when the target shield was separated from the cruisers by 117 kbt. 3 shells hit the target, including two in the panel and one in the shield body. The command rated the shooting as “excellent”, and we have no reason to reduce the rating received by the cruisers - for such distances and relatively light 152-mm guns, this is a truly brilliant result.

Since we are talking about the main caliber, we note that control of a dozen 152-mm guns was assigned to the new Molniya-ATs-68K launcher, which was a significant modernization of the Molniya-ATs, which was installed on 26-bis cruisers, including the capable take full account of the data provided by the radar, combining them with data from optical surveillance devices. The duplication of fire control systems would probably make even the German heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type blush with envy. Ships of the "Chapaev" type had two automatic firing machines, two reserve automatic firing machines and four turrets (in each turret).

The radar armament of cruisers was constantly being improved. So, for example, starting in 1958, the air surveillance radar on all cruisers (with the exception of Frunze) was replaced with a new one - “Fut-B”, as a result, the aircraft detection range increased from 80 to 150 km. And in general, it can be stated that the Project 68-K cruisers had fairly modern radar equipment that was quite adequate to the tasks facing ships of this type.

Of course, the list of new equipment was not limited to radar and anti-aircraft weapons and fire control systems alone. For example, the ships received a wider range of radio stations and receivers, Burun-K radio direction finders, a Tamir-5N hydroacoustic station, but the most interesting innovation was the equipment of the Zveno combat information post. Surprisingly, but true - in 1949, NII-10 developed a prototype of modern automated control systems and was intended to coordinate the work of shipborne means of illuminating the surface and air situation and reflecting it on special tablets and - most interestingly - to guide its own aircraft and torpedo boats. The Zveno equipment was capable of simultaneously processing data on 4-5 surface and 7-9 air targets, directing a group of fighters to one air target and two groups of torpedo boats to one surface target.

Light cruisers pr. 68-K "Zheleznyakov" and "Kuibyshev", graphics by S. Balakin

(Please note the differences between classmates: different bow shapes - a sloping deck in the bow of the Kuibyshev, also of the Chapaev (wrong in the game), and a different number of 37-mm B-11 machine guns on the aft superstructure - 6 "Zheleznyakov" and 4 at "Kuibyshev", see diagram of "Komsomolets" above)

But all these advantages of the modernized cruisers turned out to be purchased at a very high price. We had to abandon aircraft and torpedo weapons (but in our game there are torpedo tubes on the 68-K!), but even taking this into account, the overload reached 826 tons, as a result of which the standard displacement was 11,450 tons, the draft increased by 30 cm, the margin of combat survivability and longitudinal stability decreased, although, in fairness, it should be pointed out that even in this condition the ship retained superiority in these indicators over the cruisers of Project 26 and 26-bis. Full speed dropped to 32.6 knots (with boost - 33.5 knots). It should be noted that, despite the overload of the cruiser, they managed to exceed the design specifications in terms of cruising range. According to the project, the range with maximum fuel reserve at economic speed was supposed to reach 5,500 miles, but in fact for cruisers it ranged from 6,070–6,980 miles.

The height of the freeboard still turned out to be insufficient - already at 4-5 points of sea when moving against the wave, the optics of the bow 152-mm towers, the wallpaper of the stabilized anti-aircraft artillery aiming posts and B-11 machine guns located in the area of ​​the bow superstructure were splashed and flooded.

But the most unpleasant thing was the explosive increase in crew size - after all, all the additional weapons and equipment required personnel for their maintenance. Initially, according to the pre-war project, the crew was supposed to be 742 people, but during the post-war redesign of the ship, this number was supposed to increase by almost 60% - to 1184 people! As a result, it was necessary to simplify the equipment of living quarters, eliminate lockers (!), use three-tier collapsible bunks for the team, while the bed nets were stored outside the living quarters - there was simply no space left inside them. In addition, if there was a wardroom for the officers, the sailors were forced to be content with tank food in the cockpits. On the other hand, one should not think that the designers completely forgot about the crew - the Chapaevs were distinguished by a developed “municipal” infrastructure, incl. large supplies of fresh water and provisions, refrigeration units, adequate medical and bath and laundry units, etc. A similar problem was observed on the American Cleveland-class light cruisers - with a similar standard displacement, the crew size was 1,255 people and living conditions were perhaps the worst among all American cruisers.

In addition, the Project 68-K cruisers had other, not so obvious, but unpleasant shortcomings in everyday use. For example, the electrical power system operated on direct current, which was considered an anachronism for the 50s, there were no active stabilizers, there was no system for collecting and purifying water, which is why the cruiser was forced to simply dump all the dirt into the sea, which created certain difficulties both when returning in their own and when entering foreign ports. Project 68-K ships were characterized by an increased level of noise (including due to the need for powerful ventilation systems for the increased crew); the lack of wooden covering on the upper deck and forecastle made it difficult for personnel to work on them. It seems like little things, but the overload of the ship no longer allowed anything to be corrected.

"Chapaev" and his "peers"

It is very difficult to compare Project 68-K ships with cruisers of foreign powers for the simple reason that in the post-war world almost no one was involved in the creation of classic light cruisers. For what? A large number of them remained after the war, and the situation in the world changed so much that the huge cruising fleets of the USA and England turned out to be redundant and, in general, unnecessary. The same Americans massively put into reserve the Brooklyn and Cleveland class cruisers and even the later Fargo. Countries lost their fleets, France was in a rather deplorable economic state, and had neither the desire nor the ability to build a strong fleet.

We have already compared Project 68 with light cruisers of the Cleveland type, and we can only note that the superiority of Project 68-K in everything except anti-aircraft artillery only increased, and in terms of anti-aircraft guns the gap was no longer fatal. Much more interesting is the American "work on the mistakes" of the Clevelands - light cruisers of the Fargo type. These ships, having a displacement similar to the 68-K project (11,890 tons), had Cleveland weapons: 12-152-mm/47 guns, inferior in firing range, but superior in rate of fire to the domestic B-38, as well as 12x127- mm/38 universal guns, 24 barrels of 40-mm machine guns and 14 20-mm Oerlikons (twin). But if the Clevelands had many shortcomings, the Fargos were, for the most part, free of them, which is why they became full-fledged light cruisers. In addition, the series of these cruisers was laid down at the end of 1943, when the Americans were already fully armed with military experience and perfectly understood what they wanted from their light cruisers - therefore, although the Fargo entered service in 1945-46, “ Chapaevs" - in 1950, they can to some extent be considered as peers.

USS CL-106 Fargo diagram

Since the main caliber guns and armor of the Fargo corresponded to the Clevelands, they lost in an artillery battle to the Chapaev-class cruisers for the reasons stated in the previous chapter, but I would like to note that with the advent of artillery radars for the Americans, everything became only … worse. Now Soviet cruisers could conduct effective combat at a distance of at least 130 kbt (as demonstrated by the firing on October 28, 1958), while for American six-inch guns such distances were the maximum in range (with corresponding consequences for accuracy, etc.), so that the advantage of Soviet cruisers at increased combat distances became even greater than before.

It is more difficult to assess the anti-aircraft weapons of the Fargo and Chapaev. The rhombic position of the American cruiser's universal 127 mm/38 guns gave it the best firing angles, while 8x127 mm barrels could be fired on board, while the Soviet cruiser had only 4x100 mm. At the same time, the American projectile benefited due to its higher explosive content - 3.3 kg, versus only 1.35 kg of the Soviet "weaving", which gave the American installation a significantly larger radius of destruction. In terms of fire control devices, the Chapaevs obviously did not have an advantage over the Americans (although, apparently, there was no significant lag either), but at the time the Chapaevs were put into service, there were no shells with radio fuse. Of course, Soviet artillery mounts also had certain advantages - the superiority in the initial velocity of the projectile (1000 m/s, versus 762-792 m/s) made it possible to reduce the approach time of Soviet projectiles, which increased the chances of hitting a maneuvering aircraft. The stabilization of the Soviet installation significantly simplified its aiming, due to which, perhaps, the real rate of fire could be higher than the American one (this assumption was not found in sources of such information). But, in any case, these advantages could not compensate for the lags in other parameters listed above. Thus, the American universal Fargo battery looks preferable.

As for anti-aircraft guns, here the Soviet and American cruisers are approximately equal - 40-mm and 37-mm shells had a similar lethal effect, and in general the capabilities of the B-11 were approximately equivalent to the twin 40-mm Bofors, and in terms of the number of barrels there was no American superiority. Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the difference in the quality of fire control of rapid-fire machine guns due to the author’s lack of data on Soviet launchers. As for the Oerlikons, in the 50s they were more of a psychological defense.

Thus, the American light cruiser Fargo was inferior to the domestic 68-K in artillery combat, but had some (not overwhelming) superiority in air defense. Soviet cruisers had the advantage in speed, and American cruisers had the advantage in range.

The very extravagant light cruisers of the Worchester class, which had as many as 6 twin-gun turrets with 152-mm guns, became a true contemporary (by the day they entered service) with the Chapaev-class cruisers. It will be really interesting to compare these ships.

USS CL-144 Worcester diagram

USS CL-144 Worcester, 1958

The Americans understood that, despite all the advantages that the excellent 127 mm/38 installation gave them, it was still too heavy for cruisers. Therefore, back in 1941, the idea was born of abandoning universal artillery on light cruisers, and using a universal six-inch caliber instead. For this, “very little” was needed - to ensure a significantly higher rate of fire for the guns, a large vertical aiming angle, and, of course, high aiming speed, both horizontally and vertically.

The same time-tested 152-mm/47 gun, which was still on the Brooklyn, was taken as the basis. Then they tried to create a turret installation for it, which had a slightly lower rate of fire (12 rds/min versus 15-20 rds/min), but in other respects (vertical aiming angle and vertical/horizontal aiming speed) corresponding to the 127-mm "spark". The result was a monster weighing 208 tons (we are talking only about the rotating part), while the three-gun turret of the Cleveland weighed 173 tons. Thus, the difference in the weight of the rotating parts alone is 4 turrets of the cruiser Cleveland and 6 two-gun turrets "Worchester" was 556 tons. Interestingly, the weight of the two-gun 127-mm Mark 32 Mod 0, which was installed on cruisers such as Cleveland and Fargo, was only 47.9 tons - i.e. six Worchester turrets weighed as much as 4 Cleveland turrets, plus eleven and a half two-gun 127 mm mounts. That is, giving up on versatility, the Americans could, at the same weight, get not only 12 six-inch guns for naval combat, but also 22 127-mm barrels, which would be much more useful for providing air defense than a dozen six-inch guns.” Worcester." But the most important thing is that the installations turned out to be not only heavy, but also unreliable, and during operation they were constantly plagued by mechanical breakdowns, which is why the planned rate of fire was 12 rounds/min. almost never achieved.

The Worchester booking scheme was similar to Brooklyn, Cleveland and Fargo, with all its shortcomings. True, the horizontal armor has been greatly strengthened, the Americans have brought it to 89 mm, which is completely indestructible for six-inch artillery, but two aspects should be taken into account here. Firstly, this reservation did not cover the entire deck, and secondly, unfortunately, Americans often tend to overestimate the characteristics of their ships compared to the real ones (remember the same “406 mm” armor belt of the Iowa battleships, which in fact turned out to be 305 mm ). Worchester-class cruisers are given a citadel of quite decent length (112 m) and thickness (127 mm) and an armored deck of 89 mm, and all this (except for the length of the citadel) significantly exceeds the domestic cruiser (133 m, 100 mm and 50 mm, respectively) . But for some reason, the armor weight of the Chapaev is 2,339 tons, while that of the Worchester is 2,119 tons.

To control the fire of the main caliber, as many as four Mk.37 directors with a round Mk.28 radar antenna were used. From an air defense point of view, this was a very good solution, but for an artillery battle with an enemy cruiser it was useless, since these directors were created to control anti-aircraft fire of 127-mm artillery and could not work effectively against surface targets at long ranges.

There was no universal artillery as such, and the role of anti-aircraft guns was played by 76-mm/50 two-gun (and on the lead ship of the series - single-gun) installations, despite the fact that the total number of barrels reached 24. They were inferior to the 40-mm Bofors in rate of fire (45-50 rounds/min versus 120-160 rounds/min), but the Americans managed to install radio fuses on their shells. Thus, enemy aircraft could be hit by shrapnel from a close explosion, while a Bofors aircraft could only be shot down by a direct hit. The real combat effectiveness of such a solution is unknown, but in general the 76-mm artillery system had a greater range and ceiling, and was obviously significantly better than the conventional Bofors. The fire control of the 76-mm artillery was carried out by four Mk.56 directors and nine Mk.51 directors.

On the one hand, the number of anti-aircraft fire control directors is impressive, and significantly exceeds that of the Soviet cruisers (which had 2 SPNs and 4 radio rangefinders, one for each universal-caliber turret), but on the other hand, in order to correctly compare the capabilities of the American and Soviet fire control systems, it is necessary to know their capabilities in detail. It is known, for example, that the best results were achieved if one US director controlled the fire of 1-2 127-mm installations, no more, but how were things going with domestic special forces? Unfortunately, the author does not have such data - and this is very important. In this case, assessing the quality of the LMS “by head” will be incorrect.

Perhaps we can say that the Americans tried to create a fairly highly specialized cruiser, “tailored” primarily for air defense formations, and capable (in theory) of effectively repelling attacks by enemy destroyers. However, the standard displacement of the ship reached 14,700 tons (which is almost 30% more than the Chapaev-class cruiser) and came very close to the heavy Des Moines (17,255 tons), despite the fact that the latter had comparable (and in fact - as if not the best) air defense (12x127-mm and 24 76-mm barrels of 76-mm anti-aircraft guns), but at the same time they carried nine powerful and fast-firing 203-mm guns, as well as more solid armor protection at the same speed. Accordingly, the air defense capabilities were significantly superior to those of the Chapaev, but at the same time, in an artillery duel, ships of the Worchester class still remained vulnerable to Soviet cruisers.

In general, the following can be said about the modernized 68-K project. The pre-war Project 68 turned out to be very good and had good reserves for modernization, but the need to install advanced radar and anti-aircraft weapons based on the results of military experience led to the complete exhaustion of the modernization potential of the Chapaev-class cruisers. Of course, the air defense capabilities of the cruisers increased by almost an order of magnitude compared to the original project, but still did not reach the wishes of the sailors (12x100 mm and 40x37 mm barrels). The Project 68-K cruisers turned out to be quite modern ships at the time of their entry into service, but they still had a number of shortcomings that, alas, could no longer be eliminated due to the limited size of the ships of this project. The Project 68-K cruisers entered service in a very timely manner - the Soviet post-war fleet desperately needed ships, and at first the capabilities of the Chapaevs met the fleet’s tasks, but there was no point in resuming further laying down of ships of this type - the fleet needed a more modern cruiser.

These were already different ships...

P.S. Anticipating unfounded accusations of plagiarism, we inform you that a series of articles on the cruisers of Project 68-K was written by Andrey Kolobov, published on the website topwar.ru, published with his permission, with additions and comments.