New look of the domestic aviation industry. Kolpakov S.K.
Many people know, and some even remember, that there was a time when aviation, aviation industry in our country was given the closest attention. Considerable funds and resources were allocated for the creation and development of new aviation technology. And not only the military, the development priority of which was always necessary, but also civil and small aviation. Not a single, perhaps, direction in aviation was left without attention, thanks to the most famous engineering schools and design bureaus.
Eminent design bureaus created aircraft and helicopters for various fields of activity. Particular attention was paid to technology, the so-called dual purpose. For example, major civil aircraft in the USSR were developed on the basis of strategic bombers. This made it possible not only to significantly reduce R & D costs, but also to obtain a fleet of unified equipment.
Aircraft factories could change their profile from military to civilian products and vice versa in a short time. In the production of general-purpose equipment, preference was given to the universality of the use of one or another type of aircraft, which could be used in various areas of the national economy, and not just for military purposes.
Retired Flag Officer
Of course, this did not apply to highly specialized military aircraft, fighter-interceptors, fighter bombers, etc. To a greater extent, this applied to transport aircraft and helicopters. Likewise, civilian aircraft and helicopters could be used for various military purposes.
I think that there is no need in this article to mention that such a high-tech industry as the aircraft industry provided a constant incentive for the development of other sectors of the national economy, even those that, it would seem, are remotely related to the development of the aircraft industry. Suffice it to mention here what a leap Soviet industry gave a copy of the American B-29 aircraft, and how many and many industries had to be “pulled up” to the world level.
Tu-4, an analogue of the American strategic bomberB-29.
But, unfortunately, this attitude of the country's leadership towards the aviation industry seems to be a thing of the past. This does not apply to domestic military aviation, the need for which does not need to be proved and explained even to pro-Western Russian politicians and legislators.
Strange metamorphoses
And here recent history civil aircraft industry in our country is replete with sharp turns, turns and incomprehensible jumps.
November 28, 1991 by decree of Boris Yeltsin, the Ministry of Civil Aviation was abolished, its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Transport of the RSFSR.
It seems that this was the beginning of a long series of strange metamorphoses taking place with the civil aircraft industry in Russia. As a result of the infusion of the former MGA into the Ministry of Transport, the department of state policy in the field of civil aviation began to deal with civil aviation issues. That is, civil aviation has lost its exclusive positions and advantages over other modes of transport, and has become one of the 13 departments of the Ministry of Transport.
The same fate befell another key ministry - the Ministry of Aviation Industry. Having already gone through a series of abolitions and mergers, this ministry was nevertheless revived for the third time, on March 8, 1965. But, again, in the ill-fated 1991, the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR was transferred to the Ministry of Industry of the RSFSR. That is, it also lost its exclusive position.
November 28, 1991 by decree of Boris Yeltsin, the Ministry of Aviation Industry was abolished, its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Industry of the RSFSR.
Then endless renaming and other perturbations began with the Ministry of Industry itself.
Now the aircraft industry is in charge of the Aviation Industry Department within the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation.
What happened in the end: Ministry of Civil Aviation- as a single body in charge of everything that was connected with the very concept of "civil aviation", it went through the following stages of "development": (and in quotation marks, because it is very difficult to call it development, rather it is a slow degradation and extinction).
Air Transport Department of the Ministry of Transport Russian Federation – 1991
Federal Aviation Service of Russia - 1996
Federal Air Transport Service of Russia - 1999
State Civil Aviation Service of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation - 2000 (structural subdivision of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation)
Federal Air Transport Agency - 2004 (Rosaviatsia, which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation)
At the same time, the functions of the previous service (the State Service of the Civil Aviation Ministry of the Ministry of Transport) were distributed between the Federal Air Transport Agency, Rostransnadzor and the Ministry of Transport of Russia. And if in the usual world practice it is customary to unite all interested structures into a single unit in charge of all the core issues, then here we have a completely opposite trend.
Now there is such a "picture" Rosaviatsiya deals with:
Organization of the execution of federal target programs and the federal targeted investment program;
Provision of public services of public importance on the conditions established by federal legislation to an indefinite circle of persons, including for the following purposes: implementation of a set of measures to organize the provision of international and domestic flights; implementation of a set of measures aimed at ensuring the protection of transport infrastructure facilities and vehicles from acts of unlawful interference;
Publication of individual legal acts on the basis of and in pursuance of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, acts and instructions of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation.
Rostransnadzor carries out:
functions of control and supervision (including) in the field of air transport (civil aviation).
Moreover, this supervision is carried out in such a way that circulars and orders, orders and regulations, can be the same for air and for sea and for inland water (as well as urban electric, automobile, etc.). At the same time, the features of air transportation and aircraft operation are not taken into account at all.
And there is another structure that deals with GA issues: Department of State Policy in the field of civil aviation in the structure of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. The department has the following departments:
Department of Regulatory legal support and development of the activities of the civil aviation organization
Air Communications Division
Flight Standards Division
Department of technical standards and requirements
Department of Air Navigation Support
The head of all this huge transport economy is the Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Yuryevich Sokolov, an economist by basic education (Department of Economics, Leningrad State University, 1991).
This is what concerns civil aviation in general, its regulation and organization in our country.
The disease progresses
As you know, all enterprises of the aviation industry, factories, design bureaus were united into UAC (United Aircraft Corporation, it was established in February 2006).
The State (Rosimushchestvo) owns 90.3% of UAC shares, that is, the State has a decisive voice in resolving all major issues related to the planning and production of domestic military and civil aviation equipment.
The diagram below shows the dynamics of the production of civil aircraft in the USSR\RSFSR\RF since 1969. A sharp drop in output in the early 90s and a complete decline in output after 1997 are clearly visible. The increase in the production of civilian aircraft is insignificant, it becomes noticeable only in 2009-2010. and then due to the start of production of the SSJ-100.
As we can see, instead of providing support to domestic manufacturers of aviation equipment, a competent policy in the field of civil aircraft construction, the Russian leadership supports and in every possible way encourages the import of used Boeing and Airbus aircraft into the country. It is they who currently make up the main fleet of domestic carriers.
With the advent of the UAC (recall, the beginning of 2006), there was no jump in the production of aircraft for civil aviation either. Of course, planes are not created in one day, but after all, UAC was not created from scratch! By the time of the merger, most Russian aircraft design bureaus had their own developments in new technology or in deep modernization of existing ones.
But strange and not very consistent projects are emerging in the aviation industry. Powerfully lobbied in the government for the project of the purely military corporation Sukhoi, the SSJ-100 aircraft, instead of the almost completely domestic Tu-334. Even the Ukrainian engine D-436, which is being produced for it, was created with the participation of Russian developers. This lobbying was not difficult to foresee, given that the KLA was for a long time led by the former General Director of the Sukhoi Design Bureau M.A. Pogosyan, who simultaneously remained the Chairman of the Board of Directors of OAO Sukhoi Design Bureau.
The SSJ100 aircraft is certainly good in its niche, but even with a stretch it cannot be called a domestically developed aircraft, just look at the picture.
Look carefully at the picture, all the main systems of the aircraft are of foreign design. Of the domestic products, only "iron" remained: the center section, wings, parts of the fuselage, and pylons.
It is possible to list for a long time the “strange things” happening in the domestic aviation industry, starting with the abolition of the Ministry of Aviation Industry itself. One can give examples of outright sabotage in the industry of our civil aircraft production, about open lobbying of foreign aircraft, about the abolition of duties on their import to the Russian Federation, about receiving “kickbacks”, it is better to give some figures.
About $45 billion was spent on the purchase of Boeing and Airbus aircraft by domestic airlines, plus planned contracts for another $30 billion.
Thus, there are more than 250 seats in the aircraft category, and the funds actually spent for the purchase of 70 Boeings and 20 Airbuses (about $9 billion) could have been used to build 148 modernized Il-96s. The $30 billion spent on the purchase of almost 350 aircraft of these consortiums would make it possible to replenish the domestic fleet with 450 Tu-204/214 aircraft. In the 75-150 seat category, about five billion dollars was spent on the purchase of Bombardier, ATR-42 and other foreign aircraft, instead of building more than a hundred An-148, An-140 and Il-114.
And one more quote from an article by Pyotr Zakharov in the Military Industrial Courier "Flights and Kickbacks":
At the same time, a whole staff of lured experts is working on the idea of belittling the merits of domestic aviation equipment produced in wide cooperation, sowing in the public mind an inferiority complex of the “Made in Russia” brand. But don't we own the world's best Il-96 wide-body airliner, which is part of the presidential aviation detachment? Wasn't it the Tupolev company that certified the Tu-334-100 aircraft a decade and a half ago, created in accordance with the presidential program "Development of civil aviation technology in Russia until the year 2000"? Doesn't there exist a regional An-148, well-loved by passengers and pilots, adapted to the very imperfect domestic airfields, regularly carrying out missions of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and other special departments? Is it impossible to put other types and sizes of vehicles on the wing - Tu-204/214, Il-114, An-140 (the latter is indispensable for transportation in the Far North and southern temperature extremes)? Or is the country deprived of the potential and groundwork for the production of the entire line of new helicopters (from light Ansat type to world record holders in terms of payload) and remotorization on the advanced technological basis of the Mi-8/17/171?
As they say, comments are superfluous. And I would like to finish my review in more joyful colors, but so far it does not work out.
The restoration of the country's technological sovereignty requires the immediate eradication of bureaucratic inertia and pure sabotage from the aviation industry. The Russian aviation authorities - now we can talk about it with confidence - are not interested in the development of domestic aircraft and engine building. It is more profitable for them to deal with Western "partners". Cynicism in relation to the domestic aviation industry is not limited to the provision of explicit and implicit preferences to foreign manufacturers while ignoring the engineering developments of their own firms and schools.
The aviation industry is one of the branches of mechanical engineering engaged in the production of both the aircraft themselves and all the parts and equipment necessary for them.
The origin of the aviation industry in Russia
Speaking about the aviation industry of the USSR, it is impossible not to mention its origins, dating back to the first decade of the 20th century. The first aircraft produced by the aviation industry were airships. Gradually started in a small amount manufacture aircraft and aircraft engines.
But the development of the aviation industry in the Russian Empire progressed at a slow pace. There were only a few small factories and workshops that were directly involved in the manufacture of aircraft. The development of the aviation industry was negatively affected by the need to purchase many parts abroad (especially expensive aircraft engines) and a weak material part.
Only with the outbreak of the First World War in this industry there has been progress. An order was received from the military department for the production of a large batch of aircraft. But, despite some improvements in the aviation industry, this industry was not going through better times and far behind many European countries.
This situation continued until the October Revolution and the coming of the Bolsheviks to power in Russia.
The aviation industry of the USSR as an independent industry was formed in early 1937. It was withdrawn from the People's Commissariat of Defense, which was part of it as one of the departments, and transformed into an independent People's Commissariat of the USSR aviation industry.
For several pre-war years, mass production of various types of aircraft and all the parts necessary for them was organized. Much attention was also paid to scientific and design work. New types of aircraft, aircraft engines, etc. were developed and tested. Particular attention was paid to the quality and reliability of aircraft, their flight characteristics and armament.
The aviation industry of the USSR in the prewar years was in great need both for experienced specialists and for the necessary components and materials, for example, aluminum. However, it was still possible to establish mass production of aircraft. A considerable part of the parts for aircraft still had to be bought abroad.
War years
The outbreak of the Great Patriotic War made significant adjustments to the work of the aviation industry of the USSR. Part of the aviation enterprises were evacuated inland, new factories were created. The mass production of aircraft began. Despite the difficult situation, the aviation industry was able to record short time to increase the number of aircraft produced so much that the backlog in combat aviation from the air force of fascist Germany was eliminated. The production of new types of aircraft, developed taking into account the combat experience of Soviet aviation, was created and began in a short time.
By the end of the war, the aviation industry of the USSR was the most powerful in Europe. Produced aircraft were in no way inferior (and in many ways superior) to their foreign counterparts. The Soviet aviation industry, with its hard work, made a huge contribution to the victory over the enemy. Many aviation enterprises were awarded orders for labor achievements.
Postwar years
In 1946, the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry of the USSR, like all other People's Commissariats, was transformed into a Ministry.
After the war, it became clear that the future of aviation lay with jet engines. Within a few years, the first Soviet combat jet aircraft were created, tested and mass-produced. Huge scientific and design work was carried out to create not only the flying vehicles themselves, but also all their components.
The aviation industry of the USSR in the post-war years was second only to the US aviation industry. This is due to the minimal US losses during the war years. In addition, from the defeated Germany and Japan, the United States got a huge amount technical documentation. Many German and Japanese aircraft designers who emigrated to the United States began to work in their aircraft industry.
Over time, the aviation industry of the USSR began to produce not only various types of aircraft and all the parts necessary for them, but also such a new type of aircraft as a helicopter. A significant contribution was made to the field of space and rocket technology.
From 1965 to 1985, the Soviet aviation industry experienced the greatest upsurge in its work. Many samples of military and civil aircraft were developed and put into mass production. The development and testing of promising models of aircraft was constantly taking place. This period is rightfully considered the "golden time" for the Soviet aviation industry.
Perestroika years
The perestroika that began in 1985 played a fatal role in the Soviet aviation industry. A whole series of experiments and innovations that took place in the management of industry ended in failure. The development of many promising models of aircraft was stopped and many samples of modern, only recently developed aircraft were removed from mass production. At the end of 1991, the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR was liquidated. This ended the glorious history of the Soviet aviation industry and began the history of the Russian aviation industry.
On November 10, 1917, at the direction of V.I. Lenin, the Bureau of Aviation and Aeronautics Commissars was formed under the Military Revolutionary Committee, which began the selection and registration of aviation personnel and the organization of the collection, accounting and protection of aviation property left over from the old regime.The Bureau of Commissars was the first revolutionary body for the construction of the Soviet air fleet and the aviation industry.
On December 20, 1917, the All-Russian Collegium for the Management of the Air Fleet of the Republic was established. The board united all branches of aviation and aeronautics, carried out management of aviation enterprises.
By order of the People's Commissariat of War No. 385 of May 24, 1918, at the direction of V.I. Lenin, the Main Directorate of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet (Glavvozdukhflot) was established, which manages the country's military air forces and aircraft repair enterprises.
According to records, in September 1918, the air squadrons of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet (RKKVF) had 266 serviceable and 59 defective airplanes. In addition, there were 169 serviceable aircraft in the central warehouses and air parks. Thus, excluding aircraft factories and flight schools, the Red Air Fleet had 435 combat-ready aircraft.
On December 1, 1918, V.I. Lenin supported the initiative of N.E. Zhukovsky and his student A.N. Tupolev to establish the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute - later famous TsAGI, which led the country's aviation science.
At the final stage of the civil war, the existing plants of the Russian military industry were allocated by the Soviet government to a special production group subordinate to the Main Directorate of the Military Industry (GUVP) of the All-Russian Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) of the RSFSR. The GUVP included: the Promvoensovet, central administration artillery factories and the Main Directorate of United Aviation Plants (Glavkoavia). As of January 1, 1921, 62 enterprises were subordinate to the GUVP VSNKh, which employed about 130 thousand people. By a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of November 12, 1923, the entire military, including aviation, industry was transferred to the all-Union jurisdiction.
Until 1939, the state administration of the aviation industry was distinguished by the frequent transfer of the industry from one department to another and the reform of the structure. All production of aviation equipment was concentrated in the design bureau, where prototypes of aircraft were developed and produced. There was practically no serial production of aircraft, with the exception of aircraft produced under foreign licenses (including the DC-3 Dakota).
In 1930, the industry contained factories: Aircraft building - 7, Engine building - 4, Repair - 6, Utility - 5, Experimental - 3.
Over the years, the aviation industry was led by the following state structures:
1925 - 1930 State Aviation Industry Trust - Aviation Trust of the Main Directorate of the Metallurgical Industry of the Supreme Council of National Economy.
1930 - 1934 All-Union Aviation Industry Association (VOA) of the Supreme Economic Council.
1934 - 1936 The Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry (GUAP) of the Narkomtyazhprom.
1936 - 1939 The First Main Directorate (aircraft) of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry.
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS AND MINISTERS OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
(1888-1941) - People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1939 - 1940.
(1904-1975) - People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1940 - 1946.
Khrunichev Mikhail Vasilievich(1901-1961) - People's Commissar (Minister) of the USSR aviation industry in 1946 - 1953.
(1907-1977) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1953 - 1977.
- Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on aviation technology in 1957 - 1965.
(1916-1981) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1977 - 1981.
SILAEV Ivan Stepanovich(1930-) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1981 - 1985.
Systsov Apollon Sergeevich(1929-2005) - Minister of the Aviation Industry of the USSR in 1985 - 1991.
Kolpakov Sergey Konstantinovich,
General Director of the Interdepartmental Analytical Center
The recent history of Russia, with its inherent traditions and ambitions of a major aircraft building power, would be incomplete without an analysis of what has been happening in the aviation industry since the late 1980s. In the USSR, this industry has traditionally been viewed as a factor of national security, an important source of national income, a highly skilled employment area, and a means of maintaining the image of a scientifically and technologically advanced country. The problems and successes of the industry are acquiring a national scale, attracting increased attention from government bodies, political forces, the media, and the public. The domestic aviation industry was deeply involved in the economic, social and even political processes and upheavals that took place in our country in its recent history.
Late 1980s - 1991
In the last years of the existence of the USSR, the aviation industry retained its previously created ability to develop and mass-produce all the main types of civil and military aircraft, including almost the entire range of materials and components for aircraft and helicopters. The lag in the tacit Soviet-American competition for world leadership in the aircraft industry, which was outlined by the end of the 1980s, has not yet acquired open forms and was visible only to specialists. The number of people employed in the aviation industry exceeded 2 million people. The Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) controlled about 250 enterprises directly involved in the development and production of aviation equipment. Long technological chains of its creation went beyond the formal boundaries of the industry and involved numerous enterprises of related industries in the mass production of aircraft and helicopters.
The industry was focused primarily on the development and production of military aircraft. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the USSR annually produced hundreds of military aircraft and helicopters to equip the Armed Forces and export them. But also in the civilian segment in Soviet years serial production was organized: up to 150 aircraft and about 300 helicopters were produced per year. The production of civil aviation equipment provided not only domestic needs, but also export deliveries - mainly to the socialist countries.
Despite the serial production of civil aviation equipment, the main thing was that the aviation industry belonged to the military-industrial complex, which largely determined the processes that took place in the industry in the last 3-5 years of the existence of the USSR. Deep economic crisis, the growing external debt, the budget deficit and, as a result, the inevitable reduction in military spending led to a significant reduction in the state defense order. Changing the military-strategic picture of the world, the destruction of the Warsaw Pact and the system of satellite countries former USSR sharply reduced the export of weapons and military equipment. Under the threat of the destruction of the scientific, technical, production and personnel potential of the defense industries, as well as the possible social consequences of this, decisions were made to re-profil the military industries. A conversion campaign has begun in the country, covering all branches of the defense industry, including aviation.
The party and economic leadership of the country sought to give the conversion the appearance of a gesture of goodwill, a peaceful initiative in line with the policy of "détente" and "new political thinking". In December 1987, M. S. Gorbachev called for the organization international conference on "economic conversion", at which, according to the idea of the initiators, all countries with a developed military industry were to acquaint each other with their conversion plans. A year later, speaking at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, M. S. Gorbachev spoke about the readiness Soviet Union develop a conversion program, prepare in the course of 1989, as an experiment, plans for the conversion of two or three defense enterprises, publish the experience of employment of specialists from the military industry, the use of its equipment, buildings and structures in civilian production. And he again called on all states, primarily major military powers, to submit their conversion plans to the UN, to entrust a group of scientists with an in-depth analysis of conversion problems in general and in relation to individual countries and regions for a subsequent report to the UN Secretary General and consideration at a session of the General Assembly.
In September 1990, the first "Program for the conversion of the defense industry and the development of civilian production in the defense complex for the period up to 1995" was approved. It provided for huge capital investments to more than double the output of civilian products at defense industry enterprises, primarily through the conversion of armaments and military equipment production. Initially, the Program was implemented, although not completely, thanks to budgetary financing of defense enterprises that received state orders for the production of civilian products. The goal of sustaining and deepening conversion through market sales of conversion products was more of a slogan than a reality.
Since the country's leadership expected to get a return on conversion as soon as possible, and in the aircraft industry, the cycles of development and pre-production, testing and certification did not fit into short-term guidelines, it could only be a question of deploying the production of those aircraft, the development of which was in the final stage. At the turn of the 1980s-1990s, their choice was not wide. Test flights of prototypes of civil aircraft Tu-204 (first flight January 2, 1989), Il-96 (September 28, 1989) and Il-114 (March 29, 1990) began. Accordingly, cases of transferring production from military to civil aircraft turned out to be rare. One example is the conversion of the Ulyanovsk Aviation Plant to the production of the newly developed Tu-204 civil aircraft. Prior to this, the plant was engaged in the production of super-heavy An-124 Ruslan military transport aircraft.
Basically, the enterprises of the aviation industry received conversion tasks for the production of medical equipment, consumer goods, technological equipment for the processing industries of the agro-industrial complex, light industry, trade and public catering. For example, the Sukhoi Design Bureau received state orders and budget funding for the development of technological equipment for processing fruits, packaging sugar and cereals, as well as for the development of washing machines. Industry enterprises dynamically increased the share of such products: from 30 to 45% in 1989-1991.
Despite the decrease in the output of military aircraft and the increase in the share of non-aviation products in the structure of production, the serial production of aircraft and helicopters continued. The collapsing administrative and economic system, even in the face of a comprehensive economic crisis, found funds to finance defense industry enterprises, not only for conversion, but also for specialized topics.
In the pre-reform years, the production of aircraft ranged from 100 to 200 units per year (of which 60-70 were for civil purposes), and helicopters - from 300 to 400 units per year ( rice. one) .
Source: Association "Union of Aviation Engine Building".
Picture 1. Production of aircraft and helicopters in the USSR in 1981-1990, pieces
Behind the relatively favorable figures for the production of aircraft, helicopters and non-core conversion products, one can not notice that the aviation industry, despite the privileged position of the defense industry, was not an enclave protected from the impact of the economic crisis and the decaying management system. The latter manifested itself, in particular, in the emergence of the Russian vertical of power, which was increasingly asserting itself in the operational management of enterprises and in lawmaking.
In 1990, the Ministry of Industry of the RSFSR arose, until the end of 1991 it acted in parallel with the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR. The heads of enterprises were forced to choose who to consider more important. On one side of the scale were the popularity and authority of Russian leaders - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and Prime Minister I.S. financing.
A similar duality developed in the field of legislation. For industrial enterprises, the most noticeable were the inconsistencies of the Soviet Law "On state enterprise” and the Russian Law “On Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activities”, as well as the Soviet and Russian laws “On Property”, adopted in March 1990 in the USSR and in December of the same year in the RSFSR.
Notable innovations in the management of aviation enterprises were the councils of labor collectives and the election of general directors. Spontaneous and organized privatization of enterprises began. Spontaneously, without management "from above", self-supporting divisions, centers of scientific and technical creativity of youth, cooperatives were born at aviation enterprises and around them, which instead of the parent enterprise received state and extra-budgetary funding.
At the same time, the aviation industry has become a pioneer among the defense industries in organized denationalization. By a special resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Saratov Aviation Plant and the Saratov Electric Unit Production Association were transformed into collective enterprises. During the formation of collective enterprises, production assets depreciated by 70% or more were transferred to the ownership of labor collectives free of charge; production assets acquired at the expense of profits received during the period of work on self-supporting basis; subsidiary plots, infrastructure; objects of the social sphere, housing stock, which was on the balance sheet of enterprises. The rest of the property was to be transferred with payment in installments at the residual value.
Subsequently, no payment by installments followed, and the collective enterprises were transformed into joint-stock companies without state participation. Saratov Aviation Plant, having become the first privatized enterprise in the industry, clearly demonstrated that privatization in itself does not guarantee effective management and increasing competitiveness. 10 years later, the governor of the Saratov region, D. F. Ayatskov, due to the disastrous financial and economic situation of the plant, raised the issue of returning it to state ownership.
"Perestroika", "detente", "new political thinking" as a general foreign policy background contributed to the organization of the first projects of international cooperation in the aviation industry. So, at the end of 1989, the Ilyushin Design Bureau and the American companies Pratt & Whitney and Rockwell Collins agreed to create passenger and cargo modifications of the Il-96 aircraft with engines and avionics produced by these companies. The corresponding agreement was signed in June 1991 at the Paris Air Show. It was planned to certify Westernized modifications (Il-96 M/T) according to American airworthiness standards for subsequent promotion to the world market. This project, unlike many similar attempts of that time and subsequent years, was brought to at least an intermediate result - obtaining an American certificate for a cargo modification of the Il-96T. However, the aircraft did not find demand on the market, not a single aircraft was sold, and design developments were later used to create the Il-96-400T cargo aircraft.
Thus, in the late 1980s, the Soviet aircraft industry, taking advantage of its special status and the corresponding budget support, retained the ability to develop and produce aircraft of various types and purposes, despite the deep economic crisis in the country.
1990s
After the collapse of the USSR, large aircraft manufacturing enterprises turned out to be outside Russia: Aviation scientific and technical complex(ANTK) named after O. K. Antonov in Kyiv, Kyiv Aviation Plant "Aviant", Kharkov State Aviation Production Enterprise (KhGAPP), Tashkent Aviation Production Association named after V. P. Chkalov (TAPOiCH), Zaporozhye Machine-Building Design Bureau "Progress" named after Academician A. G. Ivchenko (SE "Ivchenko-Progress") and the Zaporozhye plant "Motor Sich", the Tbilisi Aviation Plant, etc. On the territory of Russia at the time of gaining state independence, there were 214 enterprises of the industry, including 28 research institutes, 72 design bureaus and 114 serial factories that were previously under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Aviation Industry of the USSR, that is, almost all organizations and institutions of industry science, the main share of the design and production potential of the Soviet aircraft building complex.
A misleading impression may arise that the consequences of spinning off a small share of the aircraft manufacturing enterprises of the former USSR in the conditions of their obvious redundancy were not particularly noticeable. But this is not so, if only because, as a result of the division of the Soviet aviation industry, Russia completely and for a long time lost the potential to create military transport aircraft. The design base of almost all the aircraft that were in service with the military transport aviation of Russia ended up in Ukraine. There were designed and in most cases produced light (An-26, An-32, An-74), medium (An-12) and super heavy (An-22, An-124) military transport aircraft. The production facilities of the Tashkent Aviation Production Association, which ensured the production of the Il-76 heavy military transport aircraft (the only military transport aircraft developed in Russia among those in service with the Air Force), ended up in independent Uzbekistan. Russia has not yet been able to restore the independent production of military transport aircraft.
The exit of the Antonov Design Bureau from the unified aircraft industrial complex led to serious problems related to the interstate nature of relations in the production of An-38 in Novosibirsk, An-140 in Samara, and An-148 in Voronezh. The "Ukrainian factor" affected the cooperation and competition of the Russian civil aircraft industry with the Chinese and Iranian aircraft construction complexes being created. Deployment in Tashkent of serial production developed in Russia passenger aircraft IL-114 also became a matter of international relations.
So far, it has not been possible to compensate for the loss of the Zaporizhzhya Aircraft Engine Building Complex (Ivchenko-Progress and Motor Sich), which supplies helicopter and aircraft engines to Russia. Less significant for the military-industrial potential of Russia, but very politically sensitive, was the loss of the Tbilisi Aviation Plant, which produced the legendary attack aircraft of the Afghan war - the Su-25. Immediately after secession, Georgia began to independently repair the numerous fleet of these aircraft that ended up in the CIS countries and the former Warsaw Pact, and, together with Israel, began a project to modernize this model. The participation of the Sukhoi Design Bureau in this project was hampered by the instability of Russian-Georgian relations. And after the Russian bombing of the factory airfield during the operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008, this opportunity turned out to be completely lost.
As for the Belarusian enterprises, their separation did not create visible problems. The existence of the Belarusian part of the Soviet aviation industry is only occasionally reminded by the initiatives of the allied Russian-Belarusian government. One of them is the failed project for the deep modernization of the Tu-134 passenger aircraft at Minsk aircraft repair plant, which has been the main repair base for this aircraft since Soviet times.
Thus, the separation of the Ukrainian and Uzbek parts of the aircraft building complex of the former USSR turned out to be the most sensitive for the Russian aviation industry. This separation was not properly understood and legally formalized, especially in terms of rights to the results of intellectual activity. The train of unresolved problems that arose as a result of illusions about the de facto unity of the aircraft manufacturing complex and the inevitability of its imminent de jure reunification is still dragging on.
Whatever the consequences of the division of the Soviet legacy, it was undeniable that Russia in the early 1990s became the owner of one of the world's largest aircraft manufacturing complexes. On its territory there were only about 30 assembly plants that ensured the final production of aircraft, helicopters and engines. Therefore, it is not surprising that the preservation and development of the national aviation industry was immediately declared a state priority in independent Russia. It was believed that this industry should become the locomotive of high-tech economic development.
The implementation of such an ambitious task was first led by the Ministry of Industry, and after its disbandment in 1992, by the newly formed Roskomoboronprom (since 1993 - Goskomoboronprom, since 1996 - the Ministry of Defense Industry). In 1997, the Ministry of Defense Industry was also liquidated, the management of the industry was transferred to the Ministry of Economy, and in 1999 - to Rosaviakosmos. It is not surprising that with such variability of state administration bodies, the sectoral industrial policy and its reform in the conditions of the most acute economic crisis were not really carried out. Enterprise management turned out to be concentrated in the hands of directors, and then owners, who often combined both roles in one person.
Production and supply of aircraft to the market in the 1990s
Despite declarations about the priority status of the aircraft industry for the country, its high competitive positions and the expectations of sustainable development associated with this, with the start of economic reforms, the decline in production in the industry became landslide. Almost all of the 1990s, the production of military and civil aviation equipment, as well as non-aviation products (mainly consumer goods, the production of which was mastered in the Soviet period), was declining. Growth began only in 1998, mainly due to the revival of the output of military products ( rice. 2).
Source
Figure 2. Dynamics of production of aircraft industry products in comparable prices, 1992 = 100%
In 1997, the total volume of production fell to 21.7% of the 1992 level, and military aviation equipment - by 4 times. The minimum output of civil aviation equipment fell in 1998, having fallen by 8 times compared to 1992, and for civilian non-aviation products - by 6 times. Conversion products could not compete with imported products that filled the domestic market as a result of the liberalization of foreign trade.
The main reason for the decline in the production of military aircraft was the reduction in military spending in the country's budget. The deep economic crisis and the threat of a social explosion in the country required the minimization of spending on the purchase of weapons and military equipment; in 1992, compared to 1991, they were cut immediately by 67%. In subsequent years, budget expenditures on the items of technical equipment of the Armed Forces (R & D and purchases) continued to decline.
The sharp drop in military purchases in the 1990s was partly dampened by the export deliveries of Su-27 and MiG-29 combat aircraft in various modifications and Mi-8, Mi-17 and Ka-32 helicopters. However, a large-scale resumption of export deliveries of military aircraft began only a few years after the collapse of the USSR. In the first half of the 1990s, the world market was flooded with offers of Soviet military aircraft and helicopters that were being withdrawn from service in the former Soviet republics and countries that were previously part of the Warsaw Pact. Only in 1995 did Russia manage to turn the tide and for the first time after several years of decline increase the export of aviation weapons. Prior to that, it was limited to the supply of approximately 30 Su-27 fighters to China as part of fulfilling obligations under contracts concluded back in the Soviet period. These aircraft were produced by the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association named after Yu. A. Gagarin (KnAAPO) and the Irkutsk Aviation Plant.
In the mid-1990s, the export of aircraft equipment intensified, several big deals. In particular, in 1994-1995 28 MiG-29 fighters were delivered to Hungary, in 1995 to Malaysia - 18 such machines (the first delivery of combat aircraft to this country). At the same time, the first post-Soviet contracts were signed to continue deliveries of Su-27 fighters to China. Moreover, one of them, concluded in 1996, provided for the supply of not finished aircraft, but vehicle kits for their subsequent licensed assembly in China. Deliveries began in 1998 and continued until 2003.
In 1996, a truly breakthrough long-term contract was concluded with India for the supply of 90 Su-30MKI aircraft (deep modernization of the Su-27UB combat trainer) and another 140 vehicle kits for licensed assembly of this aircraft at the facilities of the Indian aircraft manufacturing corporation Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The "motor" of the deal was the first in Russia private aircraft building corporation "Irkut", created on the basis of the Irkutsk Aviation Plant - the manufacturer of the two-seat combat training modification of the Su-27. For the first time in the domestic system of military-technical cooperation, the contract provided for the installation, at the request of the customer, on Russian combat aircraft of Israeli and Western European elements of on-board equipment. Later, on the basis of the machine for India, modifications were created for Malaysia (Su-30 MKM) and Algeria (Su-30 MKA).
In the civilian segment of the aviation industry in the first half of the 1990s, the decline in output was even sharper than in the military segment. In 1991, 62 aircraft were produced (without light ones), in 1992 - 81, in 1995 - 22, in 1996 - 5, helicopters in 1991 - 249, in 1992 - 337, in 1995 - 80, in 1996 - 65 ( rice. 3). Against the background of a general decline in production in the industry, the share of civilian aircraft production decreased from 30 to 15% in 1991-1998.
Source
Figure 3 Production of civil aircraft (without light ones) and helicopters in 1989-1998, pieces
The decline in production did not begin immediately. In 1991-1993, there was a short-term surge in deliveries of newly produced aircraft and helicopters. Purchases of new passenger and cargo aircraft during these years exceeded even the annual deliveries of the 1980s, a period of record volumes of air traffic and its growth rates. Against the backdrop of an intense decline in demand for air transport services, the purchase of new aircraft in the early 1990s seems like a paradox. But he has an explanation.
In 1992, the decentralization of the country's air transport system took place. Aeroflot was divided into 269 independent airlines, which were previously its structural divisions - joint aviation squadrons and separate air squadrons. Independent airlines were also created on the basis of airlines that had aircraft own production. At the same time, a privatization program was launched in Russia, which provided that labor collectives and the management of newly formed airlines will have the opportunity to acquire the assets of enterprises on preferential terms in the course of privatization.
At that time, the centralized system still functioned properly. public procurement aircraft at the request of airlines (budget funding for the purchase of civil aircraft actually ceased in 1994, and the public procurement system was completely abolished in 1996). Thus, the possibility of acquiring aircraft at the expense of the state budget and expecting to receive it in the future as part of property complex, privatized under a preferential scheme, sharply increased the activity of management in the acquisition of aircraft.
However, the surge in orders for new aircraft did not last long. The collapse in deliveries occurred in 1994, when the redundancy of the fleet of Russian airlines became apparent. It was caused not only by accelerated purchases of new aircraft, but also by a sharp drop in air traffic, the emergence of other sources of replenishment of the Russian aircraft fleet, and a slowdown in the rate of decommissioning of obsolete aircraft.
Fall in air travel. In 1990, the volume of passenger air transportation reached a record level - more than 94 million passengers, and since 1991 it began to fall ( rice. 4). In 1992, air transportation decreased immediately by 31%, in 1993 - by 35%. Subsequently, the rate of reduction decreased, but the decline continued. The lowest levels of air travel in post-Soviet history were recorded in 1999 and 2000, with less than 22 million passengers, about the same as in 1970. If it were not for the freedom of Russians to travel abroad, which led to the growth of air travel on international airlines, the overall decline would have been even more dramatic.
Source: State Research Institute of Civil Aviation, Transport Clearing House.
Figure 4 Dynamics of passenger air transportation in Russia in 1980-2000, million people
The decline in passenger traffic on domestic routes in 1991-1999 occurred as a result of a sharp decline in real money incomes of the population, a rapid increase in air fares (especially compared to ticket prices for alternative modes of transport), and a reduction during the crisis business activity and "regionalization" economic relations enterprises.
New sources of replenishment of the Russian aircraft fleet. Russian airlines, experiencing financial difficulties due to the fall in air traffic, began to replenish their fleet in more economical ways: they imported foreign aircraft on a leasing basis, re-exported used Soviet-made aircraft, and purchased official aircraft from the fleets of departments and enterprises.
The existing customs barriers turned out to be "transparent" for aircraft of the world's largest manufacturers - Boeing and Airbus. None of the 46 foreign-made aircraft imported into Russia in the 1990s under a leasing scheme was subject to customs payments. The fact is that the version of the Customs Code that was in force at that time made it possible to organize a preferential import regime for aircraft by combining the possibility of temporary importation, an unlimited extension of the period of temporary importation, and complete exemption from customs duties for temporarily imported goods. The Customs Code allowed the State Customs Committee and the government to make individual decisions on extending the period of temporary importation and exempting temporarily imported goods from customs duties, which in fact meant a legalized opportunity to provide airlines with individual conditions for the import of foreign aircraft. In May and September 1994, by government decrees, Aeroflot was completely exempted from paying customs duties and taxes on A310 and B767 aircraft temporarily imported into Russia. In December 1994, the Transaero airline also took advantage of this precedent. In total, in 1994-1997, the government issued seven such orders.
From the beginning of the 1990s, the former socialist countries and the Baltic republics began to abandon the use of Soviet aircraft, switched to the use of Western-made aircraft. The reverse importation of Soviet-made aircraft, which was quite suitable for operation and had a significant resource reserve, began, not controlled by the Russian aviation authorities. In the 1990s, about 70 trunk lines alone were returned to the country. passenger aircraft. Re-export continued on an ever-increasing scale in subsequent years.
The fleet of Russian airlines was also replenished by transferring official aircraft into commercial operation. In the USSR, official aircraft were actively used by the Soviet nomenklatura - from directors of large enterprises to commanders of military districts. Aircraft of this category entered the secondary market in the early 1990s, this channel operated until 1997 and ensured the supply of approximately 100 main-class aircraft.
Decreased rate of decommissioning of obsolete aircraft. In the 1990s, the rate of decommissioning of aircraft was far behind the planned ones, since, on the one hand, the intensity of their operation decreased, on the other hand, it was widely practiced to extend the resources of the existing fleet. All subjects of the aviation market were interested in the extension - airlines that did not have the funds to renew the fleet, aircraft developers who made money on the paid procedure for extending resources, the manufacturers themselves, for whom the repair of old aircraft during the sales crisis became almost the only source of financial income.
Thus, different channels for replenishing the fleet and the delay in decommissioning aircraft that have exhausted their assigned service life made it possible not only to maintain the list of aircraft (in 1991, about 1,500 mainline aircraft), but even to slightly increase it. Against the background of a three-fold reduction in air traffic and the poor financial and economic condition of airlines, this meant an extreme decrease in demand for new domestic aircraft, the threat of which was not taken into account. But it was the lack of demand that became one of the main problems of the industry in the 1990s, another problem was with the supply.
Programs and projects for the creation and promotion of new aircraft on the market
Funding for new generation military aircraft projects in the 1990s was extremely scarce due to budgetary constraints. Budget R&D programs were aimed mainly at the modernization of mass-produced aircraft. New developments were practically not funded. Companies were able to allocate promising developments fighters of the new generation part of the income from export contracts. The most striking result of such developments was the flights of the experimental Su-47 Berkut aircraft (former designation S-37), which was developed at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, began in September 1997. The main feature of the Berkut's aerodynamic layout was the swept back wing. At the same time, the Mikoyan Design Bureau throughout the decade carried out similar developments of a new generation fighter. The MiG 1.44 experimental vehicle was launched in February 2000.
In the 1990s, the task of promoting new competitive technology to the aviation market was assigned primarily to the civilian sector. The prospect of the predominance of civilian products over the military in the structure of the future production of the industry was fully consistent with the foreign policy course proclaimed by the new Russian government. The leaders of the industry and the economic bloc of the government saw two directions for the withdrawal of the civil sector of the aviation industry from the crisis: the creation and launch in mass production competitive technology of a new generation and building a system that would facilitate its promotion to the domestic and world markets. Both directions provided state support.
In order to create competitive aircraft in 1992, the government developed and since 1993 began to implement the "Program for the Development of Civil Aviation Engineering in Russia until 2000", subsequently extended until 2001. In 1996, she was given the status of "presidential". The program included 32 projects for the creation and modification of civil aircraft and helicopters, 28 projects for the development and modernization of aircraft engines, 19 projects for research and experimental work. Technological re-equipment of production, expansion, reconstruction and construction of industrial facilities were also envisaged. As a result, by the year 2000 it was necessary to create a new generation of aircraft corresponding to the world level.
The very number of projects shows that the Program was formed without regard to the state budget and the financial and economic situation of airlines, which had to invest their own funds in projects. In addition, the depth of the narrowing demand for new domestic aviation equipment was not properly understood and taken into account, the range and terms for the creation of equipment included in the Program were based on too optimistic assessments of domestic needs and export opportunities.
The program was not fulfilled in all the main indicators, the forecasts of the annual volumes of deliveries of civil aircraft to Russian aviation enterprises and for export included in it differed from the actual figures by dozens of times. The main reason for the non-fulfillment of the Program was considered to be the lack of budget financing. For its implementation in 1992-1999, less than 13% of the budget was allocated and loans were provided for 38% of the funds provided for by the Program. Annual budget assignments were reduced by 2-6 times relative to program assignments.
But the reasons were not only in the lack of state funding and the virtual absence of financing from the enterprises' own and borrowed funds, but also in the refusal to concentrate limited financial resources on the most important projects. Hence the indefinite delay in the implementation of projects for the creation and commissioning of aircraft, which, it would seem, had real chances of being promoted to the market, at least the domestic one.
A typical example: the project of the Tu-334 aircraft, which was supposed to replace the Tu-134, a mass-produced short-haul aircraft of the previous generation. The development of the Tu-334 at the Tupolev Design Bureau began in the Soviet period. According to the rules of that time, the Kyiv Aviation Plant (now Aviant) was determined by directive to be the main production plant for this project. It started pre-production. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian and Ukrainian authorities considered it expedient to continue the project in cooperation, which was recorded in the intergovernmental agreement of September 8, 1993. The preparation of production in Kyiv was agreed to be carried out at the expense of the Russian budget.
In parallel, within the framework of the conversion program, preparations began for the mass production of the Tu-334 aircraft at the Taganrog TAVIA plant, which was supposed to become the second assembly plant under the project. The Ministry of Industry was instructed to ensure the start of production of aircraft from 1994. To prepare for mass production, the unfinished fuselage of the aircraft in 1992 was transferred from the experimental production of the Tupolev Design Bureau to Taganrog. Work in Taganrog to complete the construction of the aircraft lasted about five years, was not completed and stopped in 1997 due to lack of budget funding.
In October 1999, the head organization for the Tu-334 project was determined Military-industrial complex"MAPO" (now the Russian Aircraft Corporation "MiG"), to which all rights to the results of intellectual activity created during the development of the aircraft at the Tupolev Design Bureau were transferred. Transferring rights and responsibilities, the government instructed Rosaviakosmos to start producing aircraft in 2002. In accordance with the new scheme for organizing the project, RAC MiG began building the first model of the Tu-334 aircraft for this aviation complex. To ensure the work, a fuselage was delivered to Moscow from Taganrog, which at one time arrived there from the experimental plant of the Tupolev Design Bureau.
Looking ahead, we note that in 2001, RAC "MiG" decided to transfer the production of aircraft from Moscow to the Lukhovitsky Aviation Production and Testing Complex (LAPIK). To do this, the construction of a production building began there. However, to start production of the aircraft at the new assembly site, technological preparation was required. For these purposes, the government allocated funding under the targeted investment program. The relevant government decree provided for the start of serial production of the Tu-334 aircraft in 2004.
In 2003, for the failure to launch the mass production of the Tu-334 aircraft, the general director of the RAC "MiG" was relieved of his post, and the responsibility for the new organization of mass production was assigned to the Gorbunov KAPO in Kazan, where in 2005 all that same fuselage. The start of production of the aircraft was postponed to 2007, but this did not happen in 2009 either. For flight tests, two experimental samples are used, assembled at the experimental plant of the Tupolev Design Bureau and at the Kiev Aviant plant.
Budget financing of the civil aviation industry was carried out within the framework of not only the "Program for the development of civil aviation technology in Russia until 2000", but also three short-term programs for the conversion of the defense industry, the program "National Technological Base", the Federal Targeted Investment Program (FAIP), and other programs for the conversion into aviation industry were directed primarily to the development and preparation for the production of the same civil aircraft that appeared in the "Program for the Development of Civil Aviation Engineering". But the mechanism of budget financing was used differently - conversion loans, which were provided to enterprises through authorized banks. Conversion loans were also issued for the implementation of projects that did not have an aviation focus, but made it possible to at least partially load aircraft manufacturing enterprises and retain personnel. For example, at the aircraft plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur (KnAPO), on the basis of the workshop for testing equipment of the Su-27 fighter, the production of LG TVs was organized.
In addition to budget financing, aviation industry enterprises received temporary exemptions from taxes (tax credits), customs duties for imported equipment and components. Practiced restructuring and writing off debts to budgets of different levels, gratuitous transfer of rights to use the results of intellectual activity obtained in the course of fulfilling government orders for the development of civil aircraft, and other measures.
Support for civil aviation was not limited to the federal level. The subjects of the Federation also practiced various mechanisms to support and stimulate sales. For example, the government of Tatarstan financed the program for the creation of a 50-seat regional Tu-324 aircraft at the Tupolev Design Bureau and the preparation of its production at the Gorbunov KAPO. The government of Tatarstan proposed and the Russian government approved a pilot project financing scheme.
In accordance with it, KAPO named after Gorbunov was given the status of an oil exporter, which made it possible to purchase oil produced in the republic and export it as part of "deliveries for federal state needs." Foreign exchange earnings as the difference between the proceeds from the sale and the costs of oil production and transportation went to the budget of Tatarstan and were distributed by a group specially created under the republican government to manage the creation of the Tu-324 aircraft. In 1996-1997, 4 million tons were exported annually, the official exporter was KAPO named after Gorbunov. However, in 1998, only oil producing companies retained the right to export oil. This mechanism ceased to operate, and other sources of extrabudgetary funding for the project were not found, and it was frozen.
In order to promote civil aviation equipment on the market, the Government Decree of July 7, 1998 introduced compensation to the Russian aviation industry for the loss of potential orders from preferential (with exemption from customs duties) imports of foreign aircraft into the country. Obtaining privileges for the import of foreign aircraft was to be accompanied by the conclusion of agreements between airlines and manufacturers on the purchase of domestic aircraft for an amount up to three times higher than the customs privileges granted to airlines. This ruling turned out to be ineffective. Investment agreements with Aeroflot and Transaero were signed but not fulfilled. The main reason was that the aviation industry could not offer ready-made aircraft to airlines, and they did not finance the preparation of their production. As a result, Aeroflot and Transaero continued to import foreign aircraft on preferential terms on individual government orders without investing in the domestic aviation industry. Only in 2001 this practice was stopped.
Foreign manufacturers used leasing to supply foreign-made aircraft to Russian air carriers. This mechanism was seen as an opportunity to facilitate the promotion of Russian aircraft on the domestic market. Therefore, by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On additional measures for the development of civil aviation of the Russian Federation" dated June 7, 1996, the creation of a leasing system for new generation domestic aviation equipment was declared "one of the main directions of state policy in the field of civil aviation development." However, in fact, the development of leasing began only in the 2000s.
Institutional changes
Privatization. The mass privatization of aviation enterprises was carried out in accordance with the “State Program for the Privatization of State and municipal enterprises in the Russian Federation”, approved at the end of 1993 by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation. True, individual cases of privatization took place before the approval of the State Program. As already mentioned, the decision to privatize two Saratov enterprises was made back in January 1991 by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. At the end of 1991, the Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex was privatized. Its property was transferred free of charge to the Aviastar joint-stock company, whose shareholders were the enterprise's labor collective and the Volga-Dnepr joint-stock company, a cargo airline based at the factory airfield.
In the course of mass privatization in the aviation industry, 224 enterprises, or 71% of all enterprises, were corporatized with varying degrees of state participation. Approximately 42% of privatized enterprises were corporatized without fixing shares in federal ownership, including the backbone open joint-stock companies A.S. Yakovlev Design Bureau, Lyulka-Saturn, Perm Motor Plant, Rosvertol, Gidromash . The controlling state block of shares was retained only in seven joint-stock companies, or in 3% of the newly formed ones. With the consolidation of a blocking stake in federal ownership (25.5% plus 1 share), 87 enterprises (39%) were corporatized, less than 25.5% of shares - 20 enterprises (9%), "golden share" - 16 enterprises (7% ).
Decisions on the corporatization scheme were often the result of discussions between the liberal State Property Committee and the conservative State Committee for Defense Industry, which were not always amenable to logical explanation. So, the reasons why the Yakovlev Design Bureau was corporatized without state participation, the Tupolev Design Bureau - with a state share of less than 50%, the Sukhoi Design Bureau - with the state retaining a controlling stake, and the Mikoyan Design Bureau remained completely in state ownership are not fully understood.
Ownership relations in the aircraft industry proved to be very unstable. Shortly after the initial distribution of shares, the buying and resale of non-state blocks began. So, in the Sukhoi Design Bureau, during the initial distribution of shares, a package of 50% minus 1 share was sold to employees of the enterprise at a nominal value. By 1997, ONEXIMbank and Inkombank bought out approximately 40% of the shares from the non-state stake from members of the labor collective.
Others also bought stakes in aircraft manufacturing enterprises commercial structures, sometimes with not quite transparent goals. In October 1993, several Russian citizens and immigrants from Russia registered Nick & C Corp. in San Francisco, which in 1994-1995 bought stakes in about 20 aviation industry enterprises, first at voucher auctions, and then from members of labor collectives. Among these enterprises were such large open joint-stock companies as the Moscow Scientific and Industrial Complex Avionika, the Tushino Machine-Building Plant, Pribor and VASO. Shares under commission agreements were bought up by intermediary firms and transferred to this company. The Ministry of Defense Industry (then the state agency for managing the aviation industry) and the management of the enterprises themselves questioned the legality of the transactions, which led to conflicts and litigation. The Moscow Arbitration Court and the Federal Arbitration Court of the Moscow District confirmed the legitimacy of transactions with VASO shares. However, in December 1997, the Supreme Arbitration Court, having considered the protest of the Deputy Attorney General, ruled that the transactions for the purchase and sale of VASO shares were invalid and ordered Nick & C Corp. to return the shares to the Russian Federal Property Fund, and RFBR - to pay her the cost of the package in the amount of 365 million rubles.
The report of the Accounts Chamber noted that the imperfection of the legislation created conditions for large-scale buying up by foreign firms (including direct competitors) of shares in aviation industry enterprises: Tupolev ASTC - 26.7% of shares, Aviastar - 35%, Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant - 41 .3%, Perm Motors - 13.2%, VASO - 23.3%, Signal - 35.7%, Rosvertol - 37.1%. These facts provoked a response from the influential lobby of "statists", at the insistence of which the Law "On State Regulation of the Development of Aviation" dated January 8, 1998 No. 10-FZ was adopted, which limited the participation of foreigners in the share capital of aircraft manufacturing enterprises to the level of 25% minus 1 action and allowed only citizens of the Russian Federation to enter the governing bodies.
However, it was not the number of privatized enterprises, not the depth of privatization, and not the composition of new owners that became the main result of the privatization of aviation industry enterprises in the early 1990s, but the weakening and even liquidation of formal and informal associations of design bureaus and manufacturing enterprises that developed and produced aircraft of a certain brand. Separately privatized design bureaus and manufacturing enterprises acquired different owners, whose motivations often did not coincide with the plans for the development of assets and business. Relations between the Yakovlev Design Bureau and the Saratov Aviation Plant, the Sukhoi Design Bureau and the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, the Tupolev Design Bureau and factories in Ulyanovsk and Kazan, the Mikoyan Design Bureau and the Nizhny Novgorod Sokol plant can be cited as examples of weakened or destroyed ties as a result of separate privatization.
Joint ventures. The Russian aviation industry opened up to extensive contacts with foreign firms already in the late 1980s, and in the early 1990s there was a boom in the creation of joint ventures (JV). The reasons for this are easier to understand when viewed through the prism of the plans and expectations of the JV partners.
The interest of the Russian participants was explained by the difficult situation that developed in the industry in the early 1990s as a result of a sharp reduction in defense orders, a drop in demand for civilian products, a crisis of non-payments, including for products for state needs, as well as a depreciation of working capital in conditions of high inflation. Enterprises were in dire need of investment and distribution channels. They hoped that the JV would help attract foreign investment and provide access to world markets. With this in mind, for example, Rybinsk Motors created in 1996 a joint venture with the engine building department of General Electric to produce units for the CFM-56 aircraft engine, one of the most in demand on the world market, in Rybinsk. Investments and sales of products were to become the responsibility of the American partner.
Russian participants were also attracted by Western technologies. By that time, it became obvious that ensuring that the new Russian aircraft and helicopters put into operation meet the high requirements for reliability, economy, comfort and environmental friendliness is a necessary condition for maintaining the domestic market for the Russian aviation industry, not to mention the external one. The use of Western technologies seemed to be the clearest way to meet these requirements, allowing to improve consumer properties. domestic technology, strengthen it competitive advantages. Therefore, around the Tu-204 project, which was considered the most promising in the first half of the 1990s, about 10 joint ventures were created, which were supposed to improve the consumer properties of the aircraft by introducing Western technologies into the design of various components and systems - from brakes (Russian-American JV "Rubiks") to the interior of the cabin (Russian-British JV "AVINTKO").
The desire of the leaders of Russian aircraft manufacturing enterprises to organize joint ventures controlled by them was also due to the fact that they negatively assessed the activities of foreign economic intermediaries, believed that they did not know the world market for aviation products well enough and were not interested in selling them at a profit for the manufacturer. Having organized a joint venture, they hoped, with the help of a Western partner, to more easily enter the world markets for products, technologies and services. For example, the All-Russian Institute of Aviation Materials (VIAM) created three joint ventures there to promote its products and technologies in the United States.
And Western firms were attracted to Russia by a capacious and previously almost closed sales market for them. In the early 1990s, it seemed that the Russian aircraft and air transportation market would emerge from the crisis in the near future and develop at a rapid pace. Large Western firms sought to gain a foothold on it, the organization of a joint venture was considered very promising in the face of a reciprocal desire Russian enterprises to cooperation and declarations of the Russian government on supporting projects of defense enterprises with potential foreign partners.
In addition, some Western countries expressed their intention to allocate significant financial resources to promote conversion in Russia, which were to be used to support joint projects of defense enterprises and their Western partners. Funds for these purposes, although not in the originally planned volumes, were allocated within the framework of government and interstate programs (the Nunn-Lugar program in the USA, the Western European TACIS program, etc.). This encouraged Western companies to participate in conversion assistance programs in Russia. They were also interested in technologies previously closed to the outside world, accumulated by the Russian aviation industry over the long years of its isolated development, as well as scientific and engineering personnel of aviation enterprises. Access to them, facilitated by the crisis state of the industry, was considered by foreign companies as a way to gain competitive advantages.
That is, the initial expectations of both sides from the implementation of joint programs and projects did not quite coincide. Perhaps that is why, after the increased activity of the early 1990s in the creation of joint ventures, a period of awareness of market and economic realities began. Most of the joint ventures created without a deep study of the economic feasibility of this step and an adequate forecast of the development of business conditions in Russia ceased to exist.
In 1998 came new stage in the history of the few surviving aircraft-building joint ventures. They found themselves in a new legal situation due to the fact that the Law “On State Regulation of Aviation Development” came into force, according to which, as already mentioned, the share of foreign participants in the share capital of an aviation organization could not exceed the level of 25% minus 1 share and foreign citizens could not enter into its governing bodies. In May 2002, this prohibition in a more stringent formulation was duplicated in the Regulation on Licensing Activities for the Development, Production, Repair and Testing of Aviation Equipment. The developers of these documents sought to prevent hostile buying of large blocks of shares in aviation industry enterprises, but by not singling out the category of joint ventures created to implement joint projects, they de facto put a barrier to their existence.
The inability to have even a blocking stake in the share capital of a joint venture and the ban on representation in its management bodies categorically did not suit foreign participants in aircraft manufacturing alliances, which led to the closure of the joint venture. So, for example, the Russian-Western European joint venture Euromile, founded in 1994 to create a medium transport helicopter Mi-38 with foreign equipment, ceased its activities. In this closed joint-stock company, the Moscow Helicopter Plant named after M. L. Mil, the Kazan Helicopter Plant and the Western European helicopter company Eurocopter had equal shares. When in 1998 Eurocopter was asked to reduce its share in the authorized capital from 33 to 25% minus 1 share and withdraw its representatives from the management bodies, it did not agree and withdrew from the shareholders of the joint venture.
The surviving international alliances were forced to resort to subterfuge or prove the incompetence of the requirements of this law in relation to joint ventures created before its adoption. One of them was the joint venture "Science - Hamilton Standart", successfully functioning to this day. It was created to provide civil aircraft manufacturers with heat exchangers for air conditioning systems in Russia, but managed to restructure the sales system in such a way that it became a supplier of heat exchangers for all the world's largest aircraft manufacturers (Boeing, Airbus, Embraer, Bombardier). The ban on the creation of a joint venture with a foreign stake larger than the blocking one was lifted only in 2008.
Structural transformations
The 1990s are characterized by two opposite vectors of structural transformations - disintegration and the creation of integrated structures.
Disintegration. The disintegration of the aircraft industry complex was facilitated by privatization, during which design bureaus, assembly plants and main suppliers of components were corporatized separately. In addition, subsidiaries continued to be created around the main enterprises, using the resources of the parent company. A typical example is Sukhoi Advanced Technologies JSC (PTS), later - Aircraft Building Advanced Technologies CJSC. The company was formed in the early 1990s to spin off the Su-26, Su-29 and Su-31 light sport aircraft business. The Sukhoi Design Bureau and PTS JSC were in close contact. The subsidiary was actually managed by the General Director of the OKB, being at the same time its main shareholder. The enterprise was located in the same building as the head design bureau, the aircraft were assembled at the experimental design bureau, and the design documentation for sports aircraft was transferred from the head design bureau to the subsidiary by order of the general director. Another example: a subsidiary was formed at the Tupolev Design Bureau, which, for a fee, extended the life of the Tu-154 aircraft, which were in operation around the world in many.
The fact that disintegration does not make it possible to ensure the competitiveness of the industry became obvious already in the first half of the 1990s. However, natural in conditions of developed market economy there were no mergers and acquisitions - the new owners and managers of enterprises were not ready for this. At first, the initiative for integration came from the state administration, but their weakness did not contribute to the speed of integration.
Integration. Awareness of the need to organize integrated structures in the industry coincided with the campaign launched in the country to create financial-industrial groups (FIGs). FIGs were considered, among other things, as a tool to overcome the shortage of budget financing of industrial programs and projects through the creation of integrated structures that united industrial enterprises and financial institutions. The start of the creation of FIGs was given on December 5, 1993 by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the Creation of Financial and Industrial Groups in the Russian Federation” No. 2096. The decree defined the essence and features of FIGs as a set of legal entities that form effective and sustainable cooperation aimed at developing priority areas of industrial production . To stimulate the creation of FIGs, the Decree, and then the Law “On Financial and Industrial Groups” of November 30, 1995, promised benefits and preferences to the participants of these associations, which in practice were never provided.
The campaign for the creation of FIGs did not bypass the aviation industry either. By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated May 18, 1995 No. 496, the FIG "Russian Aviation Consortium" was formed. It united developing and serial aircraft-building complexes (Ulyanovsk Aviation Industrial Complex Aviastar and A.N. Tupolev Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex), engine-building enterprises (Perm Motors and Aviadvigatel), aircraft operating companies (Aeroflot and Research and Production Center "Universal") and financial institution(Promstroybank). The share of each participant in the authorized capital was 15%, and only Promstroibank - 10%. The goal was to create and market, with the assistance of Aeroflot as a launch customer, new generation aircraft Tu-204, Tu-334, Tu-330, Tu-230. It was planned to equip them with engines, mainly created by the Perm Engine Building Complex.
However, the artificiality of such an association soon became clear. Aeroflot withdrew from FIGs, the Central Bank annulled the license of Promstroybank, and enterprises realized the ephemeral nature of plans to receive extra-budgetary financing in an amount sufficient to accelerate the refinement of existing and development of new aircraft, pre-production, mass production and marketing. In 1996, the FIG, without even partially realizing its plans, was transformed into a rather small joint-stock company.
Despite the fact that superstructural structures such as FIGs did not show viability, the relevance of creating integrated structures did not decrease; on the contrary, it increased over time. The third Federal Target Program, developed in 1997, became not just a conversion program, but the "Defense Industry Restructuring and Conversion Program for 1998-2000". In 1998, the government approved the “Concept for the Restructuring of the Russian Aircraft Industry Complex”, which provided for the creation of “no more than five or six” industry corporations based on the results of the restructuring of the industry, formed to promote certain families of aircraft and helicopters to the market. It is curious that in the early version of the Concept it was envisaged the creation of two or three integrated structures, and in the final version (obviously not without the influence of the management of the main enterprises of the industry) there were six of them, the names of which were easily guessed - "Tupolev", "Ilyushin", "Dry" , "Mikoyan", "Mil", "Kamov". The first projects for the creation of integrated structures that appeared after that fit into the framework of just such a concept of forming the structure of the industry.
The results of the Russian aircraft industry by the end of the 1990s can hardly be considered successful. Conversion, privatization, liberalization economic activity, structural transformations did not stop the negative trends that emerged in the late 1980s. The aviation industry, especially in the civilian segment, was in a deep systemic crisis.
By formal features the aviation industry after the start of market reforms was the object of increased attention from government bodies. But the economic policy pursued was not distinguished by either efficiency or realism. The combination of weak state administration and the influence of the industry lobby reduced it mainly to the adoption of numerous decrees, plans and programs that provided for the continuation of the Soviet practice of state subsidies. Respectively main goal disparate economic entities of the industry was striving to gain access to the subsidized channel of state financing, and not to gain a competitive position in the aviation market. The scarcity of this source and the lack of an effective management policy led to a significant weakening of the industry, even in comparison with the early 1990s.
However, the possibility of reviving the industry was not irretrievably lost, which in the 2000s provided a certain rise in production and the basis for further reform.
2000s
In the 2000s, the volume of production of the aviation industry began to grow from year to year, which was facilitated by the overall growth of the economy and the associated possibility of increasing budget financing for the industry. The disintegration of aircraft manufacturing enterprises was stopped. The long-awaited unification of industry enterprises led to an increase in the role of the state as the owner of aircraft building assets, which in fact meant a partial renationalization of the industry.
The structure of government departments that managed the enterprises of the industry and their associations, as in the 1990s, continued to change. So, until 2004, the aviation industry was under the control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency. During the administrative reform of 2004, the operational management of the industry was entrusted to the newly formed Federal Agency for Industry - Rosprom, and the development of industrial policy - to the updated Ministry of Industry and Energy of Russia. Artificially formed (at least in terms of aircraft manufacturing) dual power with actual duplication managerial functions ended in 2008, when Rosprom was liquidated, and state management of the aircraft building complex was transferred to the reformed Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg of Russia), which included the formation of a specialized Department of the Aviation Industry (as a result of the disaggregation of the Department of Defense Industries).
Production and delivery of aircraft equipment to the market in the 2000s
The positive dynamics of aircraft output, which began after the default of 1998, continued throughout the next decade ( rice. 5, the level of production in 1992 in value terms is taken as a reference point). Having started the rise from 23.5% of the production volume in 1992, in 2009 the industry only approached (90.7%) the production level of the first year of economic reforms.
Source: Research Institute of Economics of the Aviation Industry.
Figure 5 Dynamics of the relative change in output in value terms, reduced to comparable prices, 1992 = 100%
The upward trend continued due to the increase in the production of both military and civilian products, although the share of military products prevailed in the structure of production throughout the period under review. Such an output structure was provided mainly due to the export deliveries of military aircraft. Their temporary decline in 2004-2005 immediately caused a decline in the overall dynamics of production, which, however, did not change the generally positive dynamics of the industry's income over the past decade.
The export of military aircraft grew mainly due to the supply of Su-30 front-line aircraft in various modifications. China and India remained their main consumers. But in contrast to the 1990s and earlier, these countries have begun to move from purchasing ready-made aircraft to purchasing technological kits for licensed assembly on their territory. New major importers of finished Su-30 aircraft in the 2000s were Algeria (28 aircraft), Venezuela (24 aircraft) and Malaysia (18 aircraft). Small batches of these aircraft were also ordered by other countries. In some years, production heavy fighters Su-27 and Su-30 reached 50 aircraft per year.
In the early 2000s, exports of MiG-29 fighters resumed (after a pause in the late 1990s). It all started with small shipments to Sudan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Eritrea. In 2004, an important contract was signed with India for the development and production of 16 ship-based MiG-29K aircraft. This contract was part of a wider deal to acquire the modernized aircraft carrier cruiser Admiral Gorshkov (new name Vikramaditya) from Russia. The first flight of the Mig-29K aircraft took place in 2007, its production was organized at a new production site - an aircraft factory in Lukhovitsy near Moscow, counting on the continuation of deliveries to India (to equip an aircraft carrier already built in-house) and on the start of deliveries under the state defense order for the Naval Aviation fleet of Russia.
With the export of MiG-29 aircraft, there was a precedent for the return of already delivered aircraft. The contract with Algeria for the supply of 34 MiG-29 fighters was signed in 2006. In 2007, having received the first 15 machines and having discovered the facts of completing the aircraft with used components, Algeria suspended the contract. In 2008, the fighters were returned to Russia. Presumably, the returned aircraft were repaired and entered service with the Air Force.
Another serious failure of the system of export deliveries of military aircraft was the refusal to fulfill the contract for the supply to China of 34 Il-76 heavy military transport aircraft and four tanker aircraft based on them (Il-78), signed in September 2005. Already after the conclusion of the contract by Rosoboronexport, it became clear that the Tashkent plant TAPOiCH, where the aircraft were supposed to be assembled, was not able to fulfill the terms of the contract. This was another reason for making the final decision to transfer the production of the Il-76 aircraft to Ulyanovsk (Aviastar-SP).
The state defense order for the aviation industry was reduced mainly to the modernization of aircraft. As for the supply of newly produced aircraft to equip the Armed Forces, the contracts concluded in the early 2000s began to be implemented only after 2005, and with significant delays. First of all, we are talking about contracts for the supply of Yak-130 combat training aircraft and Su-34 front-line bombers (modification Su-27). The first Su-34 was officially handed over to the Air Force in August 2007. At the end of 2009, 4 Su-34 aircraft participated in flight tests conducted at the Lipetsk Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Flight Personnel. By this time, the aircraft had not yet entered the combat units of the Air Force, contrary to previously announced plans. Also, deliveries to the Air Force of serial samples of the Yak-130 aircraft, the first military aircraft fully developed in new Russia(previously, aircraft developed in the Soviet period were modernized).
A radical change in orders for aviation equipment under the state defense order occurred only in the summer of 2009, when at the MAKS-2009 aviation and space show a contract was signed between the Russian Air Force and the Sukhoi company in the amount of more than 80 billion rubles for the supply of 64 front-line fighters (48 - Su-35, 12 - Su-27 SM, 4 - Su-30 M²) .
Two competing helicopter complexes Mil and Kamov entered the 2000s with competing programs for the creation of Mi-28 and Ka-50/52 combat helicopters. In 2003, the Ministry of Defense selected the Mi-28 helicopter for procurement under the state defense order. At the same time, it was decided to purchase a small amount of the Ka-50 Black Shark helicopter and its two-seat modification, the Ka-52 Alligator. Large-scale public procurement of combat helicopters until 2009 did not begin. Export deliveries of military helicopters are provided mainly through the production of modified versions of helicopters of previous generations - the Mi-8 (in the export designation Mi-17), as well as the Mi-24 and its modern modification Mi-35.
The production of civil helicopters for 1999-2009 increased 3 times - from 40 to 124 ( rice. 6). And in the production of civil aircraft, the expected turning point did not happen, they were still produced in single copies. But the reasons have changed (recall: in the 1990s, this was due to the redundancy of the fleet of Russian airlines, which arose as a result of a sharp reduction in air travel and a large-scale return of Soviet-made aircraft to the country). In the 2000s, the domestic market for passenger air transportation, on which domestic aircraft manufacturers primarily counted, did not decline, but grew - on average, about 11% per year, which significantly exceeded the average rate of development of the world market. Air transportation by Russian airlines grew 2.5 times in 2000-2008 - from just over 20 million to almost 50 million passengers a year ( rice. 7).
Source: Research Institute of Economics of the Aviation Industry, Interdepartmental Analytical Center.
Figure 6 Production of civil aircraft (without light ones) and helicopters in 1999-2009, pieces
Source: Transport Clearing House.
Figure 7 Dynamics of passenger air transportation in Russia in 1998-2008, million people
But the domestic aviation industry failed to take advantage of this window of opportunity. She lost the domestic market to foreign manufacturers - mainly Boeing and Airbus. In 2000-2008, about 280 foreign-made mainline passenger aircraft were delivered to Russian airlines at an ever-increasing annual rate ( rice. eight). At the same time, the aircraft industry did not receive offset compensation (very common in world practice) in the form of loading national aircraft manufacturing capacities in exchange for a concession to the domestic market.
Source: State Research Institute of Civil Aviation.
Figure 8 Dynamics of deliveries of foreign-made long-haul aircraft to Russian airlines, units
The state still played a significant role in providing orders for even a small (single) production of civil aircraft. Thus, out of eight Il-96 aircraft produced and delivered in 2000-2009, three were delivered to the special flight detachment "Russia" under the state order of the presidential administration, the production of three more aircraft for Cuba was financed from a syndicated loan, in essence, state-owned banks (Vneshtorgbank, Vnesheconombank and Roseximbank), backed by 100% government guarantees. In 2004, the delivery of two Il-96 aircraft to KrasAir under a leasing scheme took place only due to the filling of the lessor's authorized capital (Ilyushin Finance Co) from budgetary funds and partial compensation (also from the budget) of lease payments from the lessee.
Similar state support was provided for the promotion of the Tu-204/214 family aircraft to the market. The production of Tu-214 aircraft in Kazan was partially provided by orders from the presidential administration - first aircraft in passenger modification, and then special aircraft on the Tu-214 platform. Since 2007, deliveries to Cuba of Tu-204 aircraft manufactured in Ulyanovsk in cargo and passenger modifications began, the production of which was financed according to a scheme worked out in a deal with Il-96 aircraft.
Deliveries of Tu-204 aircraft to Cuba somewhat revived the final production at the Ulyanovsk Aviastar-SP. However, not Cuban, but domestic orders, placed under the scheme of state-supported leasing, have become decisive in the production of Tu-204 aircraft in the past decade. Small batches of Tu-204 aircraft were delivered to Vladivostok-Avia (six aircraft in a shortened version of Tu-204-300), as well as to the Russian charter airline Red Wings (eight aircraft in the Tu-204-100V modification). It was this airline that in 2009 made public and initiated a public discussion of the problems of reliability of Tu-204 aircraft and the low level of their after-sales service.
In 2008, a notable event took place: a cargo aircraft of the Tu-204/214 family, equipped with Rolls-Royce engines, Honeywell avionics and an “English” cabin (modification Tu-204-120CE), was certified according to the standards of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) . The certification process has been dragging on since 1998. Obtaining a European certificate made it possible to deliver the first aircraft in the Tu-204-120CE modification to China, since the presence of such a certificate was mandatory requirement Chinese customer, which in 2001 placed an order for five such aircraft (plus an option for another 10 aircraft). As of the end of 2009, the operation of the aircraft was not started due to the customer's claims to the aircraft and its after-sales service system. Accordingly, the delivery of other aircraft ordered by China was delayed.
It should be noted that this was already the second attempt to organize export deliveries of Tu-204 aircraft with foreign engines and avionics (modification Tu-204-120). Prior to this, five such aircraft had already been delivered to Egypt in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But this deal was out of the ordinary. commercial activities. It was organized and conducted by a prominent Egyptian businessman Ibrahim Kamal and Sirocco Aerospace Int, a leasing company he created. Sirocco financed the completion of the aircraft from the backlog created at the Ulyanovsk plant in the Soviet era, the supply of foreign components, the certification of the modification according to Russian airworthiness standards and the recognition of these standards in Egypt, the organization of the Air Cairo airline, to which the aircraft were delivered, as well as maintenance in Egypt Russian crews and technicians. And even paid off the debts of the Ulyanovsk plant for utility bills. All this was done in exchange for the exclusive rights granted to it by the Russian government to promote Tu-204 aircraft in foreign configuration on the world market. The Sirocco company counted on the massive demand for these aircraft, but its hopes did not materialize. At the end of 2009, China was the only customer for the Tu-204-120 modification. Since the middle of the decade, the prospects for promoting the Tu-204 / 214 family aircraft to the market have been associated with a new modification of the Tu-204 SM, in which the main innovation is the PS-90A2 engine, modernized as part of a joint project of the Perm Engine Building Complex and the American company Pratt & Whitney. The engine was certified in December 2009 .
Noteworthy is the deployment at two production sites in Russia of licensed production and supplies to the domestic market of aircraft developed in Ukraine (Antonov ASTC). One of the assembly sites was the Samara Aviation Plant Aviakor, which, after many years of organization of production, began a single production of the An-140 turboprop passenger aircraft. In 2006-2009, Yakutia Airlines, through the mediation of the Financial Leasing Company, delivered the first three production aircraft.
Another site was organized in Voronezh at the facilities of VASO, where the production of the An-148 regional jet aircraft began. The first two aircraft were delivered to the Rossiya State Transport Company in 2009 through the leasing company Ilyushin Finance Co. This fact deserves attention, if only because its An-148 deliveries began earlier than deliveries of another regional aircraft SSJ-100, which is the product of the most ambitious civil aircraft building project in post-Soviet Russia.
The small number of civil aircraft produced and delivered to the domestic market in the 2000s also included aircraft of the old generation. Thus, in 2000-2007, Samara Aviakor assembled and delivered four Tu-154M aircraft to customers, and in 2000-2004 the Saratov Aviation Plant - five Yak-42 aircraft. In addition, in 2000-2008, about 100 passenger aircraft of the previous generation, which were abandoned by foreign airlines, were reimported to Russia.
Thus, the breakthrough of Russian civil aircraft manufacturers to the domestic and world markets, which was expected in the 1990s, has not yet taken place. It became obvious that the aircraft developed in the 1980s (primarily the Tu-204/214, Il-96) could not ensure the achievement of the strategic goals of the development of the domestic aviation industry. Therefore, in the 2000s, projects and programs were launched aimed at creating products that are more in line with modern requirements the global civil aviation market.
Programs and projects for the creation and promotion of advanced aircraft on the market
In 2004, as part of a discussion about using the Stabilization Fund to increase budget funding for the real sector of the economy, the government launched a campaign to develop sectoral strategies. Industries that would present coherent development strategies within the popular at that time paradigm of “public-private partnership” could apply for an increase in budget funding. The aviation industry has also joined the campaign. By the end of the year, the "Strategy for the development of the aviation industry until 2015" was developed, which, after discussions and approvals at meetings of the government and the State Council, was approved on April 20, 2006 by order of the Minister of Industry and Energy. The strategy determined the product policy of the industry for the medium term and outlined the directions of its structural transformations. In the product part, the Strategy mainly provided for the continuation of previously launched programs and projects, in the structural part - the creation of integrated structures in the aircraft building sub-sectors, primarily in aircraft building, helicopter building and engine building. As expected, the adoption of the Strategy helped to increase budget funding for sectoral programs.
In the military segment The main program in the 2000s was the development of a new (fifth) generation fighter, usually called the Advanced Frontline Aviation Complex (PAK FA). Work on its creation was carried out earlier, but the experimental aircraft built at the Mikoyan Design Bureau (MiG 1.44) and the Sukhoi Design Bureau (Su-47 Berkut) became more “technology demonstrators” than prototypes of new generation combat vehicles. Both design bureaus claimed further funding for their work, but the victory in the competition for the creation of the PAK FA, held by the Ministry of Defense in 2002, was won by the Sukhoi aircraft building complex. The PAK FA project turned out to be perhaps the largest project of the Russian aviation industry in terms of funding in the 2000s, at least in its military segment.
In parallel with the development of this aircraft, the Sukhoi Design Bureau was engaged in a deep modernization of its main Su-27 combat vehicle, creating the Su-34 front-line bomber and the Su-35 multifunctional fighter. The latter is considered a 4++ generation aircraft, that is, a transitional aircraft between fourth and fifth generation fighters. Flight tests of the Su-35 fighter began in February 2008.
Noteworthy are projects aimed at reviving national independence in the creation of military transport aircraft. The Ilyushin aircraft building complex became the leader in the country in terms of military transport, carried out programs for the creation of light and medium military transport aircraft, organized the transfer to Russia of the production of the heavy military transport aircraft Il-76 with the simultaneous modernization of the technical person of this aircraft.
Of particular interest is the project to create a multi-purpose transport aircraft (MTS), since it is being implemented in cooperation with India. This is the first attempt to organize a military-technical cooperation project in which Russia is not an exporter of weapons or military R&D results, but acts as a partner in international cooperation in the development, production and marketing of a jointly created military aircraft. In 1998, the Indian government chose the Ilyushin Aircraft Building Complex as a partner of the national aircraft building corporation Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) for the implementation of a joint project based on the Il-214 medium military transport aircraft, which was at that time at the initial stage of preliminary design. The Russian side, in assuming the obligation to participate in a joint full-cycle project and finance it in equal shares with the Indian side, took certain political, legal and financial risks. First, there was no regulatory and legislative support for the implementation of joint full-cycle military-technical projects. Secondly, the State Armaments Program did not provide for the development of such a medium military transport aircraft, so it was necessary to attract extra-budgetary funds, which created a precedent in the creation of weapons and military equipment.
In 2000, the private corporation Irkut decided to join the project as a co-investor and co-developer, seeking to create a strategic alliance with the HAL Corporation, a key player in the booming market of the Asia-Pacific region. The alliance was to be based on the successful Su-30MKI project, developed within the framework of the MTS project, which could be followed by entry into each other's equity capital.
The Irkut Corporation proposed a kind of compromise to the government. It finances the Russian share of the MTS project (no money was provided in the budget for its implementation) and provides a design base to support the weakening design potential of the Ilyushin complex. To do this, the corporation absorbed the private design bureau Aviastep, turning it into its subsidiary Irkut-Aviastep. And after the corporation acquired the private Yakovlev Design Bureau, its design capacities began to be used in the MTS project.
In return, the government was required to provide state support for the initiative of the Irkut Corporation, which consisted in the rejection of some dogmas of the system of military-technical cooperation. It was proposed, firstly, to lift the ban on conducting all types of military-technical cooperation by enterprises with a state share in the share capital structure of less than 51% (in fact, on the participation of private capital in the implementation of such projects), secondly, to abandon the mediation of Rosoboronexport, thirdly, to obtain legally binding obligations from the Ministry of Defense to purchase a certain batch of MTS aircraft in the event that the terms of reference issued by it are fulfilled (it is necessary to obtain a loan on acceptable terms); its own or borrowed funds.
In March 2004, decrees of the president and the government were issued, in which the most pressing questions raised by the Irkut corporation were not taken into account. In 2005, the corporation withdrew from the MTS project. The Russian side lost the source of financing for the project, the cost of which by that time was estimated at $600 million.
It took two years to find a way out of the current situation and agree with the Indian side on the solution found: “the Russian side is financing the project at the expense of repaying the Indian debt to the Russian Federation,” which was recorded in the intergovernmental agreement signed in November 2007. But when discussing the budget for 2009, it turned out that, firstly, it is not clear how these budget revenues (repayment of the state debt) can be converted into budget expenditures (R & D financing), and secondly, an interdepartmental discussion has unfolded about the financing scheme for the Russian participants in the MTS project.
In the civil segment the continuation of the "Program for the development of civil aviation technology in Russia until 2000" was the Federal target program "Development of civil aviation technology in Russia for 2002-2010 and for the period up to 2015". From its predecessor, it inherited the ambitious goal of creating competitive aviation equipment for deliveries to the domestic and foreign markets, the multiplicity of projects included in it and optimism regarding the growth of the domestic aircraft sales market. The new program includes 25 projects for the creation and modernization of aviation equipment (16 aircraft and 9 helicopters), 27 engine building projects and about 20 projects for the creation of on-board radio-electronic equipment, an extensive list of measures for the technical re-equipment and development of production, according to promising R&D. In the period up to 2015, it was planned to ensure sales of domestic civil aviation equipment in Russia and for export in the amount of about 1 trillion rubles. To do this, according to the Program, Russian airlines were to purchase 1,400 aircraft and 1,150 helicopters, and the total volume of production, taking into account state needs and export deliveries, was 2,800 aircraft and 2,200 helicopters.
A new aspect of the FTP was the fact that for several aircraft development projects included in it, the developers (recipients of budgetary funds) were not determined a priori and had to be selected by competition. In mid-2002, Rosaviakosmos announced competitions for the creation of two new aircraft - regional and short-medium haul (BSMS).
The announcement of a competition for the development of a new regional aircraft, strictly speaking, contradicted the original version of the Program, according to which the competition was to be announced only in 2005 after the certification of the Tu-324 small regional aircraft, which was under development at that time, which was already discussed. However, despite the negative reaction of the authorities of Tatarstan, who participated in the financing of the Tu-324 project, and supporters of the "Tupolev" product line (Tu-324, Tu-334, Tu-204 / 214) as the main line for the development of the civil aircraft model range in Russia, competition took place. The victory in it, as expected, was won by the project to create an RRJ aircraft of the Sukhoi aircraft building complex. The Ilyushin aircraft building complex was also declared as a participant in the project in the bid, probably to give it additional weight.
The competition for the creation of BSMS was won by a joint project of the Yakovlev Design Bureau and AK Ilyushin, based on the project for the development of the Yak-242 aircraft as a development of the Yak-42 family. Subsequently, the Ilyushin aircraft building complex was excluded from the participants in both projects, which some time later received the names SSJ-100 and MS-21 and became the main civilian projects of the first decade of the 2000s.
The fact that the SSJ-100 and MS-21 projects became the main ones by the end of the decade did not happen right away. In 2002, the project to complete the development of the Tu-334 aircraft received absolute priority in terms of funding. This project, unlike previous years, was financed in the planned amount. However, the increase in budget support did not lead to the deployment of serial production of this aircraft, as has already been said.
The gradual redistribution of budgetary funding under the FTP in favor of new projects was not balanced. As the program continued and as a result of its several adjustments, including to bring it in line with the industry strategy adopted in 2006, the absolute priority of state support was given to the SSJ-100 project, which was implemented in broad international cooperation.
The concept of creating a regional aircraft in Russia with the participation of foreign partners has been discussed at the Sukhoi aircraft building complex since the late 1990s. Initially, the project was planned to be implemented jointly with the American company Alliance Aircraft Corp., created by immigrants from McDonald Douglas, which was recently acquired by Boeing. In the spring of 2000, at the Berlin Air Show ILA-2000, Alliance Aircraft and the Sukhoi Design Bureau signed an agreement to jointly develop, manufacture and market a regional aircraft, called the Starliner. To implement the project, a subsidiary company Sukhoi Civil Aircraft (SCA) was created at the Sukhoi Design Bureau. But already in the fall of 2000, the Sukhoi Design Bureau announced its withdrawal from the joint project due to the insignificant role that the American company assigned to it in the plans for the joint creation of the aircraft.
Soon, the Sukhoi Design Bureau agreed to participate in the regional aircraft project with Boeing, but a different model of cooperation was chosen. The project, named RRJ, did not have the status of a joint international project. The GSS company became its system integrator, and the venerable American partner only took over the provision of consulting services in the field of marketing, design, production and certification of the aircraft, work with system suppliers and after-sales support. The importance of consulting support was determined by the fact that the RRJ (after the name change - SSJ-100) became the first aircraft in the history of the Russian civil aviation industry, the design of which was carried out in international cooperation with future aircraft systems suppliers. In addition, during the design process, numerous consultations were held with potential customers of the aircraft.
Since November 2003, an advisory council of domestic and foreign air carriers and leasing companies began to work, which clarified market requirements for the aircraft. In September 2004, the GSS company applied for participation in the Aeroflot tender for the supply of a regional aircraft, which it subsequently won.
In parallel with the design work, technological re-equipment of aircraft manufacturers was carried out (primarily KnAPO). The first sample of the SSJ-100 aircraft, intended for static testing, was manufactured in 2006, at the beginning of 2007 it was already tested at TsAGI under the certification program. The first flight model participated in the roll-out ceremony in September 2007, and in May 2008 its first flight took place.
The volume of budgetary financing of the project under the FTP, which has been carried out since 2003, could not, and should not have covered all the costs of developing the aircraft. The SSJ project management managed to organize an unprecedented for Russia set of tools for financing the development and technological preparation for the production of the SSJ-100 aircraft. In addition to direct government funding for R&D, we managed to use a risk-shared partnership with PowerJet, a developer and supplier of aircraft engines, loans from Russian banks (VEB, VTB, Sberbank), including using the mechanism of state guarantees, credit lines from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Eurasian Development Bank, bond issue, investment in the authorized capital of the GSS company. The last instrument of financing was the result of the Italian company Alenia Aeronautica joining the project as a strategic partner. This became possible after the abolition of the 25% legislative restriction that existed since 1998 on the participation of foreign investors in the share capital of an aviation industry enterprise. To make such a decision, the personal participation of the leaders of Russia and Italy was required.
The SSJ-100 project has also become unprecedented in terms of the scale of international cooperation. About 40 suppliers of systems, components and assemblies from ten countries of the world became its participants.
At the turn of the decade, there was a delay of two or three years from the originally announced dates for the start of commercial sales. At the end of 2009, three prototype flight prototypes of the aircraft were still flying under the certification program. Delivery to the airline, as envisaged by the FTP, did not start. Despite this, it should be noted that the SSJ-100 project has already brought the civil segment of the Russian aviation industry to a new qualitative stage of development.
Outside of the Federal Target Program, the decade was marked by the start of the use of two new state assistance instruments promotion of new domestically produced civil aviation equipment on the domestic market - increasing the share capital of aviation leasing companies and subsidizing the interest rate of bank loans attracted by aviation and leasing companies for the purchase of domestic aircraft.
To stimulate aviation leasing, the government provided funding in the 2001 and 2002 federal budgets in the amount equivalent to $132.6 million to revitalize aviation leasing companies. In mid-2001, the Ministry of Economic Development held a competition for the selection investment projects aircraft leasing and leasing companies. The idea of the competition was that the state would buy a controlling stake in the leasing company that would submit an aircraft leasing project that would best meet predetermined criteria. These included: the share of the leasing company's own funds in the total volume of investments necessary for the implementation of the project, the volume of the manufacturer's repayable debt for mandatory payments to the budgets of all levels, the number of domestically produced aircraft purchased by the leasing company, etc.
Two leasing companies, Ilyushin Finance Co. (IFC) and Financial Leasing Company (FLC), were announced as winners, with approximately the same number of points. IFC received funding in the amount equivalent to $80 million to implement a leasing project for 10 Il-96 aircraft, FLC - $56.2 million to implement a leasing project for 10 Tu-214 aircraft.
The implementation of transactions for the state acquisition of blocks of shares in leasing companies required the re-registration of companies created in the form of closed joint-stock companies into open joint-stock companies, their valuation, additional share issues, the conclusion of agreements with the Ministry of Property for their acquisition, etc. This took the second half of 2001 year and most of 2002.
Meanwhile, new problems arose. The government, trying to bring the Aviastar-SP serial plant out of crisis, whose products were not initially included in the leasing projects selected at the competition, suggested that IFC include the purchase of Tu-204 aircraft produced at this enterprise in its leasing project. At the same time, the Ministry of Finance was instructed to allocate 1.5 billion rubles from the federal budget to the Ministry of Property for the purchase of an additional issue of shares of IFC. Having received these funds, IFC began a long contractual campaign with potential customers for Tu-204 aircraft. Only at the end of December 2002, IFC transferred the first payment to VASO to pay off the debts of this enterprise, as stipulated by the terms of the tender. And then under severe pressure from the government, which sought to prevent the deployment of a strike by the VASO labor collective in protest against delays in the expected financing of the production of the Il-96 against the backdrop of Aeroflot signing an agreement with Airbus for the supply of a large batch of aircraft of the A320 family.
Government spending to subsidize the interest rate of a bank loan for the purchase of aircraft was first included in the 2001 budget. The Ministry of Transport became the manager of these funds. In the same year, the government determined the procedure for compensating part of the cost of paying interest on loans received to finance the cost of acquiring domestic aircraft. The conclusion of agreements with airlines began at the end of 2001. In June 2002, this budgetary support for airlines was supplemented by the reimbursement of part of the cost of paying lease payments for Russian aircraft. For these purposes, the 2002 federal budget provided for 500 million rubles. Budgetary funds were distributed according to the competition. Until the end of 2002, the Ministry of Transport was developing a regulation on the competition and collecting applications from applicants. The mechanism for subsidizing interest rates and lease payments continues to operate.
Institutional and structural changes
In the early 2000s, two approaches to structural reforms in the aircraft building complex emerged. The carriers of one of them were sectoral government bodies, and the other - private structures that were formed in the industry as a result of institutional and structural reforms of the 1990s and gained political weight by the early 2000s, gained experience in structural transformations and had financial opportunities.
Since 1998, in accordance with the "Concept for the Restructuring of the Russian Aircraft Industry Complex", government bodies have pursued a policy of gradually creating integrated structures within the framework of traditional aircraft building complexes. This policy was also enshrined in the Federal Target Program "Reforming and developing the military-industrial complex (2002-2006)". It planned the creation of integrated aircraft complexes "Tupolev" and "Ilyushin". In the Tupolev complex, the Tupolev Design Bureau (OKB) was to be united with the Ulyanovsk, Kazan, Taganrog and Samara serial plants, and in the Ilyushin aircraft building complex, the Design Bureau with the Voronezh and Tashkent serial plants. Only at the second stage of the implementation of the Program, further mergers were envisaged - the creation of two aircraft and helicopter complexes. One of them (SVSK-1) was planned as part of the Tupolev, MiG and Kamov aircraft building complexes, the other (SVSK-2) - as part of the Ilyushin, Sukhoi and Mil complexes. The composition of the participants showed the intention of the developers - to create multi-profile associations competing with each other for the development and production of military and civil aircraft and helicopters.
The experience of the 1990s showed that different categories of owners with differing positions and interests on merger issues, different organizational and legal forms of enterprises planned for merger, the weakness and volatility of the state administration system, and the lack of obvious motivations for enterprise managers will make the process of implementing the goals of the FTP endless. This motivated the private owners of aircraft manufacturing assets to take the alternative initiative of creating a united aircraft manufacturing company controlled by private shareholders.
The main initiators were the Irkut corporation, the Kaskol group of companies and the Yakovlev Design Bureau. They were supported by other private structures that had ownership and influence in the aircraft industry - the National Reserve Bank with its subsidiary leasing company Ilyushin Finance Co, the Volga-Dnepr company, private shareholders of Ilyushin JSC.
The government supported this initiative and decided to include state assets in the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) being created. This decision was confirmed in the "Strategy for the development of the aviation industry for the period up to 2015", where one of the most important tasks was the formation of a new organizational structure of the industry, involving the elimination of the disunity of aircraft building complexes and the unification of aircraft building assets and businesses in a limited number of large companies (aircraft building , helicopter building, engine building, etc.), capable of pursuing a policy of creating and promoting competitive products on the markets.
The process of creating the UAC was not fast. The concept was being coordinated, the “interested departments” presented their conclusions ... Meanwhile, the actual merger continued, in February 2005, the heads of Sukhoi, MiG, Irkut, Ilyushin, Yakovlev, Ilyushin Finance Co. "Financial Leasing Company" signed an agreement on the formation of a consortium of enterprises of the aircraft building complex. Consortium ( non-profit partnership) formed a management company to prepare the creation of a holding company. The preparatory work carried out by her made it possible to sign on February 20, 2006 the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the open joint-stock company United Aircraft Corporation” No. 140, according to which the consolidation of aircraft manufacturing assets was to take place in two stages.
At the first stage, the authorized capital of the UAC provided for the introduction, as a contribution of the Russian Federation, of state blocks of shares in the Sukhoi aviation holding company and the KnAPO and NAPO plants included in this holding, the Tupolev joint-stock company, the Ilyushin interstate aircraft building company, the Nizhny Novgorod aircraft building plant " Sokol, leasing companies IFC and FLC, foreign trade association Aviaexport. A closed list of joint-stock companies was also determined, whose shares could be contributed to the authorized capital of UAC as a contribution of non-state shareholders. In part, these were the same companies, and in part the shares of key aircraft manufacturing enterprises, in the structure of the share capital of which there were no state stakes (Irkut, Yakovlev Design Bureau, Sukhoi Design Bureau, Beriev Design Bureau, Aviastar-SP and VASO plants, etc.).
At the second stage, the Decree ordered the corporatization of federal state unitary enterprises RAC "MiG" and KAPO named after Gorbunov, with the subsequent contribution of 100% of the shares of each of them to the authorized capital of UAC in the order of payment by the state for an additional issue.
According to the Decree, the share of the state in the authorized capital of UAC could not be less than 75%. Hopes for a more balanced public-private partnership did not materialize. In practice, the share of the state, even before the corporatization of federal state unitary enterprises and the introduction of their state stakes in the authorized capital, exceeded 90%.
For the operational management of the united enterprises within the UAC, according to the concept of its creation, business units were created according to the areas of activity. Their composition was revised several times, and on November 19, 2009, the UAC board of directors made the final decision to form three business units: UAC-Combat Aircraft, UAC-Commercial Aircraft and UAC-Special Aircraft.
Similar integration processes took place in other sub-sectors. So, in December 2006, JSC Russian Helicopters was formed, which included Mil Design Bureau, Kamov Design Bureau, Kazan Helicopter Plant, Rosvertol, Kumertau Aviation Production Association, Arsenyev Aviation Company Progress, etc. In April 2008, the the United Engine Corporation was formed, which included the Rybinsk NPO Saturn, engine-building design bureaus and factories in Perm, Samara, Ufa, etc. On the basis of aviation industry enterprises specializing in the field of aviation armament, the Tactical Missile Armament Corporation was created. And the state corporation "Russian Technologies" forms instrument-making holdings on the basis of aircraft instrument manufacturing and aircraft assembly enterprises.
In conclusion, we note that over the first decade of the 2000s, the face of the aviation industry has changed significantly. Scattered enterprises were assembled into large branch corporations, and state ownership became absolutely predominant. The budget financing of projects and programs of the aircraft industry has increased many times over. The dynamics of the production of aircraft and especially helicopters has become positive. Despite the fact that the emerging integrated structures have not yet become full-fledged corporations, and the long cycles of development and preparation for the production of aviation equipment have not yet ended with the introduction of new generation products to the market, the degradation of the industry has been stopped. Whether the transformation of the aviation industry into a globally competitive industry will follow, the next decade will show.
The breadth of the range of state support measures can be judged from paragraph 3 of Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated July 2, 1996 No. 786: Agree with the proposal supported by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation to buy out Nigerian debt on agreed terms and send part of these funds for sale program for the production of civil aircraft of the joint-stock company Aviastar (item not implemented).
Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On additional measures for state support of civil aviation in Russia" dated July 7, 1998 No. 716.
Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On some issues of regulating the temporary import of foreign-made aviation equipment" dated August 2, 2001 No. 574.
Report of the Accounts Chamber "On the results of a thematic audit of the legality of privatization, management efficiency and state support for aviation industry enterprises in the post-privatization period of 1992-1999" // Bulletin of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation. 2000. No. 8 (32). pp. 215-232.
Evaluation of the IFK company by a foreign auditor after the tender showed that the funds allocated by the state are enough to buy out only a 38% stake in its shares, and not a controlling stake, as was stipulated by the terms of the tender.
Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation "On measures of state support for the renewal of the fleet of sea, river, aircraft and their construction" dated April 9, 2001 No. 278.
Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation “On the procedure for reimbursement to Russian airlines of part of the costs of paying lease payments for Russian-made aircraft received by them from Russian leasing companies under leasing agreements, as well as part of the costs of paying interest on loans received in 2002 from Russian credit institutions for acquisition of Russian aircraft” dated June 26, 2002 No. 466.
JSC Russian Helicopters was established as a 100% subsidiary of the United Industrial Corporation Oboronprom.
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On further development Open Joint Stock Company United Industrial Corporation Oboronprom dated April 16, 2008 No. 497.
Russia has been actively trying to recreate the domestic aviation industry over the past 10 years. What was done for this? What was done right and what was wrong? What role does the United Aircraft Corporation play? What should be expected in the future from the Russian aviation industry? What else needs to be done?
The collapse of the domestic aviation industry is the most striking indicator of the "success" of market reforms in Russia in the form of the loss of technology in the most knowledge-intensive sector of the manufacturing industry. To lose completely the remnants of independent technology center in the aircraft industry in the once most advanced aviation power in the world, which was the USSR (recall that in 1991 the USSR held 40% of the world market for civil aircraft, and MIG combat aircraft and MI helicopters held the record for the number of copies operated in the world), for any more or less sane power means an unthinkable shame. Therefore, the entire 2000s passed in convulsive organizational and bureaucratic attempts to reshape the smoking remnants of the aviation industry empire and create a workable structure adequate to the new internal and external conditions development. However, in the 1990s, such powerful destructive and disorganizational processes were laid down that huge managerial and financial resources are required to overcome them. Consider how the country's aviation industry collapsed.
1. "Chronicles of the diving aviation industry" or a manual on the collapse of the state administration of a science-intensive industry. The "senseless and merciless" reform of the system of state management of industry with the annual change of top management and the pronounced professional degradation of civil servants has become a distinctive style of the new state elite. In January 1992, the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) of the USSR was disbanded and all real management of the industry by the state was transferred to the aviation department of the Ministry of Industry of Russia. In this ministry, respectively, all the other seven branches of the military-industrial complex were brought together. For the sake of the fashion of that time to reduce the number of bureaucrats, its number was about 600 people, while formally retaining the previous functions, while in 1990 the MAP of the USSR alone employed more than 1,000 people. Naturally, the new monster existed for a little over a year and could not do anything worthwhile to manage the aviation industry, since its employees only tried to figure out who was sitting where and responsible for what for a year.
Now you can’t even remember the number and names of the defense industry, the Roskomoronprom, the State Defense Committee and just the Ministry of Industry of that period. And, finally, the non-state Rosaviakosmos, an organization with one state function of regulating the aviation industry - the formation and control of a program for the development of civil aircraft. The rest of the proclaimed functions were more declarative. And they could not be fully carried out by the existing workers. As a result of the administrative reform of 2004, the distribution of state finances, as in 1992, was transferred to the superministry of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, which began to unite not only the defense industry, but the entire Russian industry with energy.
So, there was a complete withdrawal of the state not only from the system of state regulation, even partial, but the very principle of centralized management of the aviation industry was called into question.
The real levers of industry management are material and technical resources, control over the use of fixed assets, the formation of a unified personnel policy, almost all funding, and most importantly, responsibility to the country for a unified policy in science and aircraft design - were taken away from the new "amusing" federal officials of the aviation industry. Formally, all control levers and resources were transferred to enterprises. Everything but money. Money as the main resource in the new economic formation has disappeared for the most part. There are small crumbs of an unstable, miserable state order and several targeted programs costing dozens of times less than the former state funding. A paradox has arisen in the industry - economic relations have changed and all available resources seem to be in the hands of enterprise managers, but they cannot do anything, since there are no working capital and now the main resource - money. The state in the person of its officials cannot help either.
The Soviet centralized control system for the aviation industry was based on obtaining an aviation product through the main material production resources and distributing them in one center. Everything on which production depends, i.e. its three fundamental means: raw materials, fixed assets and personnel, were central to the consideration of any new project and control of its implementation. Only these three resources can fully and adequately characterize any production product, since only they determine from what, with what tool and with what proportion of human labor the product is made. financial resource has always been of secondary importance, since non-cash production money was separated from the sphere of consumption and was in fact a means of assessing the effectiveness and social value of the work performed by the enterprise.
After a couple of years of the declared "transition to the market" of aviation raw materials and materials for the organization of real mass production, the industry simply did not have a reserve, because. the heads of enterprises, who received economic freedom, were able to quickly “eat through” all the standard stocks of material circulating assets through the well-known system of firms-“bokoviks”. But the main thing is that there is no new resource that, according to the plan of the reformers, determines today's production - money. Finances from the "non-cash" went into the "black" or "gray cash" and practically withdrawn from the production sector.
As a result of the “reforms”, the domestic aviation industry has been plunged into a state of such a deep crisis, in the face of which the moaning about the decline in the industry as a whole and the reduction in GDP fades. Here are just some of the facts.
1. The largest enterprises, which at one time produced up to 50 large aircraft per year each, in the ten years since the beginning of the reforms, have produced only 22 new-generation aircraft - only 2% of the existing fleet of airliners. As a result, the aircraft fleet not only grew old morally and physically and lagged behind its Western counterparts in terms of economic indicators, but also fell under non-tariff restrictions from competitors - the tightening of environmental standards agreed with our own car builders (primarily we are talking noise restrictions).
Table 1. Dynamics of production of aircraft and helicopters.
2. Most enterprises have been reduced to 10-20% of their original composition. The main serial aircraft factories, being loaded with no more than 30% of their capacity, are on the verge of a shutdown, because. do not have domestic orders for production new technology. Operating factories are 75% loaded with foreign orders for military equipment. By the mid-2000s, only three plants were in working order, allowing to launch mass production: Voronezh, which produces Il-96, Ulyanovsk (Tu-204) and Kazan (Tu-214).
3. The scientific, technical and design potential of the aviation industry is rapidly falling, and in some positions it has already approached zero. The ongoing developments go abroad - the Airbus consortium owes the creation of a new long-range main aircraft A380-800 to the latest developments of the head TsAGI Research Institute, which were transferred to the French side for a pittance. Moreover, the world's largest aircraft manufacturing companies, Boeing and Airbus, are fiercely competing with each other for possession of the world market over long distances. passenger traffic, organized their representative offices in Moscow, which employ hundreds of our qualified specialists, assembled from our design bureaus, where they were no longer needed due to the lack of orders.
4. The most acute problem of the industry has become a shortage of personnel. The brain drain has already reached 70%. It's no secret that the majority of former employees of leading research institutes and graduates of specialized institutes today work in the USA, Iran and China. Of every 10 graduates of the MAI last year, only 8 defended on aviation topics.
In the absence of a unified state strategy and policy for the development of the aviation industry, the problem of industry fragmentation has arisen, which leads to the fact that Russian aircraft manufacturing companies began to compete with each other in the foreign market, knocking down prices and luring buyers. The flagships of our military aviation industry, the MiG and Sukhoi companies, offering aircraft to the same foreign buyer different types and appointments, tried to outdo each other in price and services. At the same time, the MiG and Sukhoi companies should not be competitors. They have little overlapping market segments. The first company produces light fighters, and the second - heavy ones.
On the civil aircraft market, Tupolev, Ilyushin and other companies also began to enter the market separately and "compete" with each other. Meanwhile, they are opposed by large national holdings: Boeing, Airbus, Bombardier, Ebraer.
Thanks to spontaneous competition, instead of an efficient and economical aircraft industry, a set of design bureaus and factories began to exist, producing at their own expense a whole galaxy of aircraft that no one buys and the expediency of producing which, to put it mildly, has not been calculated and not justified. In civil aviation, instead of three types of aircraft - Il-96, Tu-204 and Il-114 - which in the early 80s centralized system management were strategically defined to cover all the needs for air transportation and timely replacement of an aging fleet of aircraft, by the mid-2000s there was a whole set of unfinished modifications and new models that duplicated each other. But then, under the old system of government, this issue was carefully considered, and all the pros and cons were weighed, especially from an economic point of view. For this, the unification of engines and on-board equipment was envisaged. And the task was real, since it was calculated economically in terms of all parameters, deadlines and required resources, and not "on the fingers."
Another destructive form of competition in the aviation industry, better described as destructive rivalry, has been the struggle for access to public resources.
Yury Koptev, former head of the department of the defense industry complex, noted that such a struggle for the survival of individual economic entities “is not the norm from the point of view of state policy and the aviation industry as a whole. 12 individual survival (1992-2004 - S.T.) years of existence of our new political and economic formation has shown that we are decades behind the developed countries in the field of aviation and rocket technology and 50-60 years in the field of electronics. We have lost the desire of the state to manage the processes of the aviation industry and influence them, despite the fact that Airbus and Boeing are suing each other because of exceeding state support standards. Further existence in the individual version is futile.
2. JSC "UAC" as a Russian model of public-private partnership in the aviation industry. On February 21, 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing the United Aircraft Corporation OJSC, which included all the major developers and manufacturers of the aviation industry (excluding helicopter construction). The founder of JSC "UAC" - the Russian Federation - contributes the following blocks of shares as its share in the authorized capital of JSC "UAC":
- Sukhoi Aviation Holding Company - 100%,
- Foreign Economic Association "Aviaexport" - 15%,
- "Ilyushin Finance Co" - 38%,
- Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Association. Yu.A. Gagarin - 25.5%,
- Interstate aircraft building company "Ilyushin" - 86%,
- Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant "Sokol" - 38%,
- Novosibirsk Aviation Production Association. V. Chkalova - 25.5%,
- "Tupolev" - 90.8%,
- Financial leasing company - 58%.
There is also a possibility for private shareholders to contribute 38.2% of the total value of Irkut shares to the authorized capital of OAO UAC as a contribution. Since 11.89% of this company's shares are already on the balance sheet of AHC Sukhoi, which is included in UAC, the newly created corporation will receive a controlling stake in NPK Irkut.
The value of the authorized capital of JSC "UAC" is about 96.72 billion rubles. The share of the Russian Federation in the authorized capital of the corporation exceeds 90%.
At first, such "whales" of the domestic aviation industry as RAC "MiG" and "Kazan Aviation Production Association named after S.P. Gorbunov", which carry out the necessary preparatory work (corporation, restructuring) and only after three years are part of the UAC.
As part of the additional issue of shares of the Open Joint Stock Company United Aircraft Corporation (OJSC UAC), which took place from September 30 to October 28, 2009, state-owned stakes in aircraft manufacturing enterprises were transferred to the Corporation.
In particular, the Russian Federation has contributed to the authorized capital of JSC UAC the blocks of shares of the following open joint-stock companies:
- JSC "Voronezh Joint-Stock Aircraft Building Company" in the amount of 0.22% of the authorized capital;
- JSC "Financial Leasing Company" in the amount of 28.69% of the authorized capital;
- OJSC "Kazan Aviation Production Association named after S.P. Gorbunov" in the amount of 100% of the authorized capital;
- OAO Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG in the amount of 100% of the authorized capital;
- OJSC Aviation Holding Company Sukhoi in the amount of 1.17% of the authorized capital;
- OJSC Ilyushin Finance Co in the amount of 17.31% of the authorized capital.
The authorized capital of OAO "UAC" in 2009 amounted to 131.6 billion rubles, the share of the Russian Federation in the capital of OAO "UAC" - 89.04%.
Thus, by the beginning of 2010, about 80% of all aviation assets of Russia were collected as part of the UAC, and the company de facto turned into a new ministry of the aviation industry, functioning within the business model of a large corporation. Among the large aviation enterprises that have remained from the Soviet legacy in the KLA, the Saratov Aviation Plant, which, in essence, ceases to exist, and the Smolensk Aviation Plant, which has been transferred to another structure - the Tactical Missiles Corporation, have not been included.
UAC was one of the first public corporations created to collect disparate assets under the flag of increasing the competitiveness of various industries. This was followed by Ros-technologies, the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the United Engine Corporation, etc.
The decision to create a state aviation holding was made back in 1999. However, then everything rested on the ownership structure of companies - some of them were OJSCs with a state stake, others were federal state unitary enterprises. The implementation of the adopted decision was remembered in 2004, and since the president himself became interested in the issue, he was no longer forgotten. This is good example the incredibly poor quality of public administration, the lack of initiative of officials and the lack of proper political will. In February 2005, the president instructed the government to prepare a draft decree on the creation of a united aircraft manufacturing company (later a corporation), and in September, Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko reported to Vladimir Putin that the preparation of a package of documents to create a corporation "is at the final stage." Soon the government considered a strategy for the development of the aviation industry. The prepared strategy, assured Minister V. Khristenko, "will create conditions for overcoming the crisis, preserving the Russian aircraft industry as a competent integrator, from design and production to launching aircraft into series." At the same time, the Ministry of Industry and Energy sent to the government a package of regulations defining the process of creating an aviation corporation.
When UAC was formed in February 2006, the corporation was set an ambitious goal to retain Russia's role as the world's third largest aircraft manufacturer by increasing the total revenue of the enterprises that will be part of the company from $2.5 billion to $7-8 billion over ten years. dollars.
In the development scenario approved by the UAC board of directors in early 2007, by 2012 the corporation had to build 405 civilian vehicles. Then the bar was lowered to 196 - 118 regional (74 Sukhoi SuperJet-100 and 44 An-148), 58 long-haul narrow-body aircraft such as Tu-204/Tu-214, nine Il-96 wide-body aircraft and 11 Be-200 amphibious aircraft. These figures are well illustrated by the situation with the most branded civil development of the domestic aviation industry - the short-haul aircraft Sukhoi SuperJet 100 (SSJ-100). The first 30 machines in the basic configuration were supposed to appear at the base customer - Aeroflot - in the fall of 2008.
According to the plan for 2009, UAC was supposed to deliver 20 civil aircraft to customers, but actually 14 were delivered, which, incidentally, is regarded as a huge victory and the highest achievement in recent years since the corporation was founded (Table 2).
Table 2. Deliveries of UAC aircraft in 2009
| Aircraft type | TYPE OF UAC COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT TO AIRLINES IN 2009 | |
|---|---|---|
| Quantity | Operator | |
| IL-96 | 1 | Special squadron |
| 3 | AK "Polyot" | |
| Tu-204 | 2 | Red Wings |
| 1 | Cubana de Aviation | |
| 1 | Air Koryo | |
| 1 | VTB Leasing | |
| Tu-214 | 2 | Administration of the President of Russia |
| 1 | JSC "Transaero" | |
| An-148 | 2 | GTK "Russia" |
| Total: | 14 | |
Source: Aviation Industry magazine, 2010, No. 1, p.11.
Table 3 gives an idea of how insignificant the "successes" of the UAC look against the background of the main competitors.
Table 3. Deliveries of commercial aircraft by the world's leading manufacturers in 2009
* — for three quarters of 2009.
The financial results of the UAC in the first years of its existence were extremely unconvincing. On the one hand, the company demonstrated growth in gross sales (Table 4), especially for defense products. On the other hand, the company ran into huge debts due to the loss-making production of many of its products. As part of an off-site government meeting on August 18, 2009 during the MAKS-2009 air show, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticized the UAC for unprofitable contracts for the supply of aircraft. According to V. Putin, a number of UAC contracts "brought not profit at all, but direct losses." He noted that UAC and its subsidiaries owe about 119 billion rubles to creditors. “Moreover, about 64 billion of them are deficits that are not secured by the revenues or profits of enterprises.”
Table 4. Consolidated financial results of JSC UAC for 2008-2009
| million rubles | 2008 | year 2009 | change, % |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 96 500 | 114 000 | 18,1 |
military products |
71 900 | 86 000 | 19,6 |
civilian products |
11 500 | 12 500 | 8,7 |
| 13 100 | 15 500 | 18,3 | |
Export |
68 900 | 69 000 | 0,1 |
domestic market |
27 600 | 45 000 | 63,0 |
| Duty | 180 500 | 157 000 | -13,0 |
At the beginning of March 2010, the UAC Board of Directors approved a debt restructuring in the amount of 70.54 billion rubles. The scheme provides for the repayment of 24.26 billion rubles from the budget in 2010, of which 21 billion rubles will be paid by Vnesheconombank, which has already received money from the budget. 46.28 billion rubles will be restructured through the issuance of UAC bonds under the guarantees of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and with 100% interest rate subsidies from the state.
Qualified experts so far state the organizational helplessness of the KLA leadership. Thus, Anatoly Sitnov, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of CJSC Engines Vladimir Klimov - Motor Sich, characterizing the role of the new supercorporation, categorically states: “It is intended to perform the functions of the former Ministry of Industry, but in fact only plays the role of a financial manager. The strategy declared by the corporation is not being fulfilled: there is no loading of enterprises, no development, renewal of fixed assets - nothing .... And what kind of strategy can we talk about if 9 civil aircraft are actually produced per year.
Unfortunately, we have to state that the first years of the existence of the UAC did not lead to streamlining the product line of the domestic aviation industry, but, perhaps, on the contrary, they increased the disparity and duplication of production efforts in creating competitive passenger liners. To the sound developments of the late Soviet period of medium-haul Tu-204/214 and short-haul liners TU-334, UAC leaders added hastily put together projects SSJ-100 and MS-21. Competition for public funding has intensified; porridge was smeared on a plate with a thin layer, and the result in the form of a full-scale production of domestic liners is postponed indefinitely. At the same time, let's not forget that the protagonist of recent years, the miracle project SSJ-100 is a common “brainchild” 28 foreign firms, which ensure the supply of 80% of components and components, where Boeing, having completely renounced authorship, did not take on the rights of "paternity" and responsibility for the aircraft.
National economic economic efficiency when promoting new projects, it is sacrificed to group bureaucratic and commercial interests. Thus, the Tu-334 short-haul airliner, which has already been developed and successfully passed all tests, is 80% unified with the Tu-204, and its serial production could cost 22-25 million dollars, in contrast to 43-46 million dollars for SSJ- 100. The Tu-334 is the only aircraft that provides passengers on regional routes with the same amenities that are available on long-haul aircraft. It's quiet in the cabin. It is capable of being operated at all Russian airports that have a variety of lanes in terms of their coverage and evenness. Tu-334 is among the top ten aircraft in the world in terms of fuel efficiency. In addition, Rolls-Royce engines can be installed on it, which increases its export potential, and the wide fuselage creates the prerequisites for organizing a very comfortable VIP cabin.
To start production of the Tu-334, according to the UAC President A. Fedorov himself, about 8 billion rubles are required, which the company's management cannot find.
The SSJ-100 program, by conservative estimates, has already cost the state $3.5 billion, and, in addition, there is reason to believe that a large part of the UAC debt of $5 billion, which has arisen over the past two years, is also attributed to this project.
Among medium-haul liners Tu-204 is one of the best aircraft in the world. The only aircraft of this class that can be landed without engines. At minimum investment In order to improve the avionics and engine, it would be possible to put the liner into mass production and in a short time completely replace the retiring veteran Tu-154. However, the bureaucratic-commercial symbiosis of the UAC wants to overshadow the reliable aircraft with the new brilliant MS-21 project, for which it is so nice to get state funding.
However, the prospects for the upgraded Tu-204SM seem to be more promising than the Tu-334. The Ulyanovsk Aircraft Building Plant Aviastar-SP, which is already part of the UAC, has begun manufacturing the first Tu-204SM serial aircraft. According to Igor Shevchuk, president of the Tupolev company, the TU-204SM is distinguished from its prototype by modern on-board equipment, an auxiliary power unit, new complex avionics, new materials and composites, upgraded cabin, landing gear, engine. The new car will create more comfortable conditions for both pilots and passengers in the cabin. To reduce the load on the flight crew, a control system for general aircraft equipment is installed, which increases the reliability of the aircraft. The passenger compartment is equipped with a modern system for regulating pressure in the cabin and air conditioning. At the request of the customer, additional options can be installed on the aircraft - a satellite high-speed data transmission system and GSM telephony.
At the same time, the authors of the project claim that the Tu-204SM will be 15-20% cheaper than its Western counterparts, not inferior to them in terms of operational and consumer characteristics. At the beginning of July 2009, UAC and Ilyushin Finance (IFC) leasing company signed a start-up contract for the supply of five Tu-204SM medium-haul passenger aircraft for Iran Air Tour, and another 15 aircraft were leased with the Moscow government airline Atlant-Soyuz in August of this year.
UAC expects that the total portfolio of orders for the Tu-204SM will be about 100-120 aircraft. This number will economically justify the launch of the project and will allow us to maintain this segment of the market until the release of the MS-21x400 for 210 passengers, which will appear by 2020 and will replace the Tu-204.
The MS-21 project is designed to challenge Airbus and Boeing with their A-320s and Boeing-737s. The MS-21 program provides for the creation of a family of short-range passenger aircraft with broad operational capabilities and focused on the Russian and world civil aircraft market. The family includes three aircraft: MS-21-200 (150 seats), MS-21-300 (181 seats), MS-21-400 (212 seats). For each modification of the MS-21, versions with a normal (3500 km) and increased (5000 km) range are provided. In the future, long-haul versions (up to 7000 km) may also appear.
The designers claim that for the first time in domestic practice, the aircraft will be made entirely according to Western standards, taking into account global trends and real market demand. According to marketing research, the largest volume of traffic in Russia falls on short and medium-range routes - up to 4,000 km. Russian Tu-154 and Tu-204, European Airbus A-320 and American Boeing-737 fly on them today. This is 40% of the total air traffic in the country. Fuel consumption - the main component of operating costs - for the MS-21 will be at least 20% lower than for aircraft of its class. This is achieved through the use of the Pratt & Whitney PW1400 engine, which has no analogues today. Unlike competitors, the MS-21 will also be lighter. This will be achieved through the use of composite materials in aircraft construction, which is a record for Russia (their share will be 40%).
The state policy towards the domestic aviation industry at the highest level is also distinguished by some oddities. On the one hand, some funding is allocated for domestic projects, meetings are held and organizational decisions are being developed in support of the aviation industry. On the other hand, during a visit to the United States in the summer of 2010 by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, an agreement was signed on the purchase of 50 narrow-body Boeings from abroad and an option was signed for another 15 wide-body aircraft manufactured by this company, which will cost Russia about 4.2 billion dollars. from the state treasury. For Russia and Ukraine, this is a direct loss of benefits in the form of 400 regional aircraft of their own production. Barack Obama, in his response, directly thanked the Russian President for the fact that the contract would allow to keep jobs at Boeing.
3. Restructuring of UAC. At the very end of 2009, the UAC Board of Directors made a landmark decision on intra-company restructuring, which will lead to the largest reformatting of the domestic aviation industry with the disappearance of some of the world-famous aviation brands familiar to any Russian citizen.
Even at the time of the creation of UAC in 2006, in order to establish effective management of the recreated industry, it was planned to streamline the mobilized aviation assets into several large business units or divisions according to the product principle. The structure of the KLA assumed a divisional principle of construction with the allocation of four areas: "Combat Aviation", "Civil Aviation", "Military Transport and Special Aviation" and "Assemblies and Components". But life suggested that these plans were somewhat idealistic. Transport aviation and aviation components are not yet ready to become an independent business structure, neither in terms of business volumes, nor in terms of scope of work.
After the signing of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation in early 2006 on the creation of UAC, it was assumed that the transition period associated with the process of corporatization of federal state unitary enterprises, the assessment and consolidation of assets that will be part of future divisions, will take approximately 1.5 years. However, according to the age-old Russian tradition of sluggishness, this period dragged on for more than 3.5 years, and only on December 28, 2009, Alexei Fedorov, President and Chairman of the Management Board of United Aircraft Corporation JSC (UAC JSC), determined by his order the procedure for the formation of three business units: "UAC - Combat Aircraft", "UAC - Commercial Aircraft" and "UAC - Special Aircraft". The creation of these structures as part of the corporate restructuring of the group for 2010-2012 was approved by the Board of Directors of OAO UAC, which took place on November 19, 2009.
The UAC-Combat Aircraft business unit will include Sukhoi Aviation Holding Company OJSC, Sukhoi Design Bureau OJSC, Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association named after M.V. Yu.A. Gagarin, JSC Novosibirsk Aviation Production Association named after V.P. Chkalov, JSC Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG, JSC Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant Sokol, CJSC Sukhoi Civil Aircraft. Mikhail Pogosyan, First Vice-President for Combat Aviation and Coordination of Programs of JSC UAC, was appointed responsible for the formation of the UAC-Combat Aircraft business unit. The Su-27/30, Su-34, Su-35, MiG-29, MiG-31, MiG-35, Yak-130 programs are included in his area of responsibility (in terms of work performed by JSC Nizhny Novgorod Aviation Plant Sokol) , PAK FA and a number of other projects, as well as the Sukhoi Superjet-100.
Oleg Demchenko, Senior Vice President for Commercial Aviation of OAO UAC, on the basis of OAO Irkut Corporation, was entrusted with the formation of the business unit "UAC - Commercial Aircraft". The business unit will include: OJSC OKB im. A.S. Yakovleva”, OJSC “AK named after S.V. Ilyushin”, OJSC “VASO”, CJSC “Aviastar-SP”, OJSC “Aviakor-AZ” (a decision was made to include this Samara enterprise in UAC), OJSC “ UAC-TS" and LLC "Management company" UAC-GS "". The business unit will be responsible for the implementation of the programs MS-21, International Industrial Cooperation (conversion and production of components), An-140, An-148, Tu-204, Il-76, Il-112, Il-96, An-124, MTS, Advanced Civil Aviation Projects, as well as Su-30MKI/MKM/MKA and Yak-130 (in terms of the work of OJSC Irkut Corporation).
The UAC - Special Aircraft business unit will include five main companies: JSC Tupolev, JSC TANTK im. G.M. Beriev”, JSC “TAVIA”, JSC “KAPO im. S.P. Gorbunov” and EMZ them. V.M. Myasishchev. Alexander Bobryshev, Senior Vice President for Strategic and Special Aviation of OAO UAC, will lead the work on the formation of the UAC - Special Aircraft business unit. The Tu-22M3, Tu-95, Tu-160, PAK DA projects, special aviation complexes, as well as the Be-200 are assigned to his sphere of responsibility.
Even when developing the concept for the formation of the UAC, it was proposed to move from the existing management structure of the aircraft industry, where each company is a profit center that provides a complete set of business competencies, to a structure based on the concept of product business units. The formation of such a structure implied the formation and development management company JSC "UAC" as a center of capitalization. In addition, such a restructuring required the transformation of the organizational and legal forms and corporate management mechanisms of the companies that were part of the UAC, in accordance with their roles and functions in the target structure.
The main goal of creating specialized business units was the transformation of the UAC group into an aircraft building complex that complies with the best world practice. At the same time, a market capitalization center will be created, intra-holding financing will be optimized, and liquidity will increase. In addition, according to the management of the UAC, the intra-group efficiency of making and implementing decisions, that is, the manageability of the corporation as a whole, will increase. There will also be an optimization of the UAC production and technological model, and the risks of the group's activities will decrease.
The restructuring and reorganization will be carried out based on the criteria for increasing the value of the company. At the same time, although the management of the restructuring program will be carried out by the head structure of UAC, the condition for maintaining state control over the implementation of the development strategy and priority areas of activity remains unchanged. An important condition for the formation of business units is minimizing the costs of restructuring and outsourcing non-core assets and functions.
The main stake in the process of restructuring is placed on two leading aircraft building structures - the Irkut Corporation and the Sukhoi Company. It is quite natural that it is precisely around these poles that the two key UAC divisions are being built - the combat aviation division and the commercial aviation division. At the same time, the natural, historically established structure of concentration poles and their projects is carefully preserved.
Irkut Corporation is well aware of and able to work in the conditions of the modern aviation market. She has experience in raising funds from external investors (IPO, sale of a block of shares in EADS). In addition, OJSC Irkut Corporation became the first Russian aircraft manufacturing enterprise whose quality management system was certified according to the EN-9100 standard by an independent international certification body. The company has developed and is implementing a production certification program in accordance with the requirements of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The corresponding application has already been completed and submitted to EASA.
Irkut Corporation has a highly qualified and cohesive team of senior and middle managers with extensive experience in such critical management components as asset restructuring, project management, management accounting, as well as in corporate finance, corporate governance, implementation information technologies and the latest technologies thrift.
AT corporate governance Irkut specialists have extensive experience in building an integrated holding structure, acquiring blocks of shares in companies corresponding to a qualified majority, and building an effective system for managing subsidiaries and affiliates. It also has a fully organized corporate center located in the center of Russia's financial and business activity - in Moscow.
The aspect of information technologies is also important: Irkut Corporation carried out work to organize the functioning of a unified information space at production sites located at a considerable distance and in different time zones (Moscow, Irkutsk, Taganrog).
It is noteworthy that within the framework of two divisions - "Combat Aircraft" and "Commercial Aircraft" - "non-core" programs are preserved: "defense engineer" Poghosyan keeps his pride - the new short-haul passenger airliner Sukhoi Superjet-100, developed by CJSC "Civil Aircraft Sukhoi, and the merchant Demchenko - Su-30MKI/MKM/MKA and Yak-130 fighters, Il-76 military transport aircraft. Strict formal product logic required the separation of military and civilian programs, but this, according to the authoritative military-industrial observer Konstantin Makienko, “would only lead to the fact that it would have to be cut to the living, to destroy the already existing living tissue human relations along the Sukhoi-GSS or Irkut-IAZ line. All this would only result in the disorganization of ongoing programs, an increase in the development time for the SSJ-100, a delay in the preparation of serial production of the Yak-130, an additional burden on the management of Sukhoi-MiG and Irkut, already working at the limit of its capabilities.
Thus, the two leading supercorporations of the domestic aviation industry maintain military-civilian diversification, which should be regarded as a positive development for the following reasons.
First, diversification is a standard practice for most of the world's leading aircraft manufacturers. For example, the French aviation concern Dassault has the Rafal fighter and the Falcon business jets in its product range. American supergiant Boeing, the world's largest manufacturer of civilian aircraft, is the second US defense contractor, supplying the Pentagon with F/A-18 and F15E fighter jets, as well as military transport aircraft, tanker aircraft and a whole family of helicopters. Technological and managerial innovations emerging in the sphere of civilian production can be successfully used in military production and vice versa. This process of military-civil integration has long been the main direction of the technological development of the aviation industry and was described in detail by us in a series of works back in the early 90s. Similarly, the UAC combat aviation division will have Su-35, MiG-35 fighters and SSJ-100 regional aircraft in its product line. And the commercial aviation division - MS-21 liners, Il-76 military transport aircraft. Su-30MKI fighters and Yak-130 combat trainers. At the same time, the competence of one division within the UAC can be used in the interests of another division. Thus, the competence accumulated within the framework of the GSS will be in demand when creating the MS-21.
Secondly, competition between divisions remains both in combat fighter programs (SU-30 MKI at Demchenko versus Poghosyan’s other SU family) and commercial aircraft (MS-21 versus SSJ-100). The preservation of alternative technological bases in different divisions is especially useful in relation to military platforms, because it creates competition for the upcoming development of the sixth generation fighter. Even the development program for the Russian fifth-generation fighter, which started in the collapse of the 90s, took place in conditions of prototype competition - the current winner of the Sukhoi T-50 had a Migov competitor project 1.44, although real competition did not work out in conditions of meager state funding.
So, the implementation of such an ambitious public-private partnership project as UAC, especially in the context of a dramatic decline in the level of public administration and a still low level of private corporate management, contains many difficulties and dangers. Since all the parties involved (the state, domestic private companies and investors, foreign aircraft manufacturing companies, aviation industry workers) expect to derive their own benefit from the implementation of the project, it will be quite difficult to find a mutually acceptable solution, especially since there is a discrepancy between the interests of the leading players.
When organizing a public-private partnership in the UAC, the danger of collective irresponsibility and lack of control over financial flows has already manifested itself, which many experts and heads of aviation enterprises are actually openly talking about. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly delineate the powers and responsibilities of private business and the state, as well as private and public financial flows.
Unfortunately, the first years of the existence of the UAC did not justify the hopes placed on the corporation as a subject of the mobilization development of the aviation industry. To do this, at the first stage of the operation of the UAC, it was necessary to determine the product range of aircraft, which should be as short as possible, and the state was to create a giant leasing company that pays for the issued aircraft and transfers them to air carriers on a loan basis. In fact, this is exactly how the Soviet system of managing the aviation industry and air transportation functioned.
To date, almost no transaction for the purchase and sale of an aircraft on the world market is carried out for cash. Today, airlines use a large number of schemes to finance transactions for the purchase and sale of aircraft (AC). But they all basically come down to two general schemes:
- purchase of aircraft on credit;
- lease of an aircraft on the terms of financial or operational leasing from a leasing company.
Both of these schemes involve long-term (10-15 years) funding of an aircraft purchase and sale transaction with the participation of various security and guarantee documents, co-borrowers, guarantors, copyright holders and other intermediaries. Their activities are aimed at reducing the risks of loan default and reducing its cost. The success of a transaction ultimately depends on the cost of financing the transaction, including the time cost of raising money. This is one of the most vulnerable points in the system of sales of domestic products.
In Russia today, there is virtually no institution of long-term lending for transactions for a period of 10-15 years. Financing of leasing operations is carried out by medium-term loans for up to 5 years, which is why financial models leasing companies are not agreed on terms. In the Russian Federation, the average interest rates of Russian credit institutions on short-term loans for non-financial structures, which include most domestic leasing companies, judging by the dynamics of interest rates over the past 3.5 years, do not become lower, but fluctuate in US dollars around 9.5% , in rubles - around 12%. By world standards, this is very expensive.
In turn, Western banking capital is also in no hurry to lend to transactions involving domestic aircraft due to the fact that the main target customers for the sale of Russian aircraft are currently airlines in Russia and developing countries, which for the most part are economically weak and risky borrowers and lessees. .
The main reason for the riskiness of Russian airlines as borrowers is in many respects the low demand for air transportation. In turn, it is a consequence of low mobility and insufficient living standards of the Russian population. The highest figures for the past ten years in terms of passenger traffic in Russian air transport were achieved in 2008 - 122.6 billion passenger kilometers. This value is significantly lower than the level reached in 1991 - 150.4 billion passenger kilometers. Further recovery of traffic (taking into account the decline in 2009) and demand for new aircraft (including domestic production) is possible in the period 2011-2013.
Related to these estimates is the UAC strategy to increase the aircraft production program. Its goal is to fully cover the needs of air carriers in updating and expanding their air fleet.
Under these conditions, state support for the sale of domestic aircraft should be focused on the following three main areas:
It is clear that only financial mechanisms to stimulate demand (in theory they are called indirect or “market” methods of state regulation) for domestic aircraft will not achieve the goal of reviving Russia as an advanced aviation power. Thoughtful, consistent and bold political decisions are required (liberal economists call them "non-market") to force the leading semi-state carriers to be equipped with domestic aircraft, despite at first their commercial uncompetitiveness compared to Boeings and Airbuses. Without creating our own technological base, under which at first it is necessary to maintain artificial demand, it will be impossible to achieve the implementation of the "learning curve" and achieve the best world standards. After all, domestic aviation has actually already passed this path in the 20-40s. Aviation technology resulting from Stalin's industrialization was largely borrowed from the West, and the first Soviet aircraft destined for defense use were by no means of the best quality. But over the next 20 years, by the beginning of the 60s, the USSR turned into at least the second aviation power in the world (after the USA) both in terms of the range of aircraft produced and the level of technology.
