home Self-development Anti-submarine weapons then and now. Soviet anti-submarine defense during the war Anti-submarine defense in modern warfare

Anti-submarine weapons then and now. Soviet anti-submarine defense during the war Anti-submarine defense in modern warfare

In November 1944, the offensive operations of the forces ceased Northern Fleet. There was no longer a need to disrupt enemy transportation on sea lanes, since the German fleet was relocated to the Tromso-Narvik area and now transportation was carried out outside the operational zone of the Northern Fleet.

The war continued. At the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, Hitler's command relocated a significant number of its submarines to the port of Norway, which were supposed to disrupt the wiring of Soviet and allied convoys. The enemy also changed the tactics of underwater warfare. Having abandoned the pursuit of convoys on the high seas, fascist submarines began to appear more and more often in Soviet coastal waters, acting on the “wolf pack” principle. The main area of the Nazi submariners was the communication section from the Rybachy Peninsula to Cape Svyatoy Nos, and their main operational direction was the approaches to the Kola Bay.

The Northern Fleet command took urgent measures to organize anti-submarine defense. Significant forces were deployed to fight enemy submarines: 218 warships of all classes - destroyers, big and small hunters, torpedo boats, about 70 aircraft, an extensive network of coastal radar stations, observation and communication posts.

Beginning in December 1944, the fleet command began to organize special search operations on sea routes and in coastal zone. IN search groups torpedo boats were also included.

New difficult trials have come for the Severomorsk sailors. Dashing torpedo attacks under a hail of enemy shells and bullets were replaced by long stormy voyages in the frosty polar nights. Without having technical means detection of submarines, the personnel of the boats could only conduct a visual search, which had little effect. But the strong-willed, courageous boatmen honorably fulfilled the duties assigned to them in guarding the convoys.

Following as part of the security forces, the torpedo boats were forced to move at low speeds, which led to wear and tear on the equipment. Therefore, specialists from the electromechanical combat unit carefully monitored the mechanisms and assemblies and maintained the equipment in constant combat readiness. In the conditions of a stormy raging sea, when none of the crew members had a minute of rest or the opportunity to at least warm up a little and dry their wet, icy clothes, this was a real feat of arms.

Gradually people got used to this difficult naval service. Everyone, from the Red Navy to the brigade headquarters officer, was clearly aware that this was extremely necessary.

Anti-submarine defense of an aircraft carrier group.

Rear Admiral A. Pushkin, Candidate of Naval Sciences;
I. Naskanov

Aircraft carriers play an important role in the implementation of the expansionist plans of the ruling circles of the United States and other NATO countries - the main striking force of the fleet in conventional wars, a highly trained reserve of strategic forces in a general nuclear war and the most important tool for achieving Peaceful time political goals through the demonstration of military power.
The importance of such ships was convincingly demonstrated in the Second World War, which confirmed their wide capabilities in armed warfare at sea and in expanding the scope of the Navy's operations in coastal areas. At the same time, it showed that submarines pose a serious threat to aircraft carriers, as a result of whose combat activities 19 out of 42 ships of this class were lost in 1939-1945 (aviation accounted for 47.6 percent of aircraft carriers sunk and 92 percent of damaged aircraft carriers, and submarines - 45.2 and 3.5 percent, respectively).
The successful solution of tasks by aircraft carriers, as noted in the foreign press, was possible only if they were reliably covered by other ships and branches of the fleet. Moreover, special attention was paid to the air defense (AA) and anti-submarine (ASW) defense of aircraft carrier formations.
IN modern conditions Taking into account the experience of the Second World War and due to the increase in the combat capabilities of submarines, the protection of aircraft carriers from an underwater enemy, according to American military experts, has acquired even more higher value. When organizing aircraft carrier anti-aircraft defense, the following circumstances are taken into account: high speed, virtually unlimited cruising range and autonomy of modern submarines; the possibility of detecting aircraft carriers both by means available on the boats themselves and by those installed on other carriers, including satellites; long range of weapons used by boats (for modern torpedoes with homing systems - 10 miles, for anti-ship missiles - several times more).
Anti-submarine defense is carried out by surface ships, slot patrol and deck aircraft anti-submarine aviation, nuclear submarines. In addition, in the interests of anti-aircraft defense, it is planned to actively use existing and developed stationary and positional early warning systems for submarines. Thus, in the USA, the SOSUS long-range hydroacoustic surveillance system has been created, which makes it possible to detect a boat by isolating its noise against the background noise of the ocean and other ships located in the area at that time. Western military experts believe that if a boat is detected by two or three receivers of the system, the estimated area of its location will have an area of 100 square meters. miles.
In addition to SOSUS, the United States has developed, passed tests, and since 1983 should put into operation a maneuverable system for long-range hydroacoustic detection of boats (SURTASS project), which will include 12 special courts T-AGOS, equipped with hydroacoustic systems with towed antenna arrays (their construction is already underway). The vessels are intended to be used in those areas of the World Ocean where stationary detection means are not installed or their effectiveness is insufficient.
The foreign press notes that the capabilities of GAS with receiving devices built into the hull of surface ships and submarines have reached their limit, therefore, in accordance with the TASS program, towed antenna arrays have been developed, with the help of which you can get rid of interference created by noise and vibration of ship units and the hull , and significantly increase the range of hydroacoustic systems. It is also reported that in the United States, research has been completed on the creation of a temporary positional hydroacoustic surveillance system RDSS, which will be used as follows. Along the proposed boat routes, sonar buoys will be dropped from Orion or Viking aircraft (at sea depths of up to 5 thousand meters at intervals of 45 miles). A barrier of them will make it possible to transmit information about the underwater situation to coastal centers within six months. It is planned to use airplanes or satellites as repeaters. If necessary, the buoys can be retrieved by surface ships and seaplanes or self-scuttled.
Judging by the Western press, the anti-submarine defense of an aircraft carrier group is zone-based, that is, it combines the defense of both the area and the object (aircraft carrier and other ships). At the same time, by area defense, some NATO experts understand not only the anti-aircraft defense of the combat maneuvering area or the transition route of an aircraft carrier group, but also the blockade of the corresponding straits and narrows in order to prevent enemy submarines from entering the open ocean.
The order of battle and the nature of the use of security forces depend primarily on their composition and assigned tasks, expected enemy opposition, as well as the characteristics of the transition route and the area of combat operations. In the interests of aircraft carrier groups PLO, it is planned to use both hydroacoustic means of detecting submarines (ship, aircraft, stationary) and non-acoustic (magnetic detectors, radars, IR vision systems, etc.), which record various physical fields of the boat or its wake. .
Anti-submarine defense of the area along the transition route of the aircraft carrier group is provided by basic patrol aircraft flying ahead along the course and on the flanks, as well as by mixed air-ship search and strike groups (deck-based anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, nuclear submarines and surface ships), closely interacting with stationary and positional hydroacoustic surveillance systems.
Anti-submarine defense of the combat maneuvering area aircraft carriers are carried out both by their own forces and means, and by base patrol aircraft. At the same time, the principle of building defense with the concentration of forces and means in the direction of the greatest threat is preserved. The deployment of security forces, according to NATO experts, should ensure maximum efficient use their weapons and reliable protection of the aircraft carrier from attacks by enemy submarines.
The most difficult task in common system combat against boats is their detection, classification and issuance of target designation for the use of anti-submarine weapons. Having detected a target, the aircraft attacks it, simultaneously informing the aircraft carrier and escort ships that contact has been established. Other anti-submarine aircraft, helicopters and surface ships are immediately sent to the area of the latest detection. It is believed that an attack based on initial detection data may not always be successful, so radio sonobuoys (RSB) and magnetic detectors are used to clarify the location of the boat. Helicopters take positions along a circle covering the area where the boat is supposed to be located, and then, maneuvering in a spiral, approach and examine it with the help of lowered sonar systems, for which they periodically descend to 4.5-6 m above the sea surface.
The advantages of aviation search systems are a large range of action, high mobility and stealth. Airborne lowered and towed hydroacoustic stations operate in conditions of significantly less interference and are more efficient than ship-based ones.

The use of helicopters significantly expands the capabilities of shipborne search and strike groups (SSUG) to detect underwater targets and long-term tracking of them and significantly increases the likelihood of a boat being hit by anti-submarine weapons.
Anti-submarine defense of an aircraft carrier (object) organized in the near and far zones. It is carried out primarily by ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, submarines), carrier-based anti-submarine and base patrol aircraft

The main task of the close guard forces is to prevent the enemy boat from using weapons (missiles and torpedoes). It is solved primarily by surface ships and deck helicopters. In this case, the ships use the sonar in active mode. To create a continuous ring of hydroacoustic surveillance, they are located from each other at a distance equal to 1.75 of the sonar operating range. During a sea crossing, when the speed of the ships is quite high (over 20 knots), security in the bow sectors of the marching order is strengthened, since this direction is considered the most likely for attacks by submarines. The detection range of their close guard ships and deck helicopters can reach 40 miles from the center of the warrant.
Helicopters, as a rule, follow the course of close guard ships ahead of them, periodically hovering over the water surface and listening to the underwater environment. The organization of surveying the area by helicopters, and in the future by hydrofoils (HFC) and hovercraft (HCS) is shown in the figure.
In the long-range anti-submarine security zone, the search for an underwater enemy is carried out by passive hydroacoustic means of stationary systems, aviation, submarines and surface ships, since the detection range of underwater GUS parcels significantly exceeds the detection range of a boat, and the latter, having established the fact of the search in advance, can evade the security forces and launch an attack on a protected object. Therefore, long-range security forces use hydroacoustic stations and complexes in active mode only after detecting a boat by passive means to classify it and clarify its location, most often when launching an attack.
Taking into account the possible approach of modern submarines with aircraft carrier groups at speeds exceeding the speed of surface ships, depending on the situation, appropriate forces are allocated to provide ASW groups at aft heading angles.
Currently, as noted in the foreign press, for anti-aircraft defense of aircraft carrier groups it is planned to widely use nuclear submarines, which have high speed and stealth operations, are equipped with modern sonar and can carry out fairly stable communications with surface ships. By following underwater at a certain distance from the escort ships and maintaining sound-underwater communication with one of them, they are able to effectively search for and destroy an underwater enemy. Definition optimal conditions The work of hydroacoustic means related to the peculiarities of sound propagation in sea water is carried out by various sound speed meters, zonographs, rayographs and thermobatygraphs. To destroy an underwater enemy, SABROK torpedo missiles and homing torpedoes are used.
Nuclear submarines, according to American military experts, deployed to positions 40-90 miles (75-165 km) along the course from the center of the marching order, can detect enemy submarines traveling at a speed of 33 knots at a distance of up to 55 miles.

Within 100 miles (185 km) from the aircraft carrier along the course of the carrier group, the search for an underwater enemy is carried out by carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft (up to 1/3 of all anti-submarine aircraft available on aircraft carriers). When organizing patrols with these aircraft great importance has clear planning of flights according to times and routes that should not be known to the enemy. These routes are assigned in such a way that carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft have the opportunity to approach the group’s ship guard several times, and the interval between each approach to the close guard forces does not exceed 2 hours, or even better, 1 hour. The flight route of an individual aircraft should not contain a large number of tacks .
Viking carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft, whose flight time is up to 6 hours, are usually in the air for 3.5 hours when practicing submarine search tasks in peacetime conditions. Outside their search zone, they are ahead along the course and on the flanks of the aircraft carrier groups patrol (if possible) one or two aircraft of basic patrol aircraft.
The Western press emphasized that the escort forces of a modern aircraft carrier group can control the water area with a radius of 350 miles and provide reliable defense of the aircraft carrier from attacks by heterogeneous enemy forces.
According to NATO military experts, the inclusion in the future of aircraft carrier groups of aircraft-carrying ships - carriers of aircraft with vertical or short take-off and landing, which will search for and destroy submarines, will significantly increase the combat stability and capabilities of aircraft carriers. The placement of such ships in front and on the flanks at an appropriate distance from the protected aircraft carrier for more reliable provision of anti-aircraft defense and other types of defense will enable the aircraft carrier group to carry out its task even in the event of the destruction or incapacitation of the aircraft carrier. Some helicopters and aircraft with vertical or short take-off and landing will be able to transfer from it to other aircraft-carrying ships and operate from there.
Judging by the materials of the American press, it should be expected that the US ruling circles will seek the allocation of funds for the construction of such ships and encourage allies to do so in order to reliably cover their aircraft carrier groups with the least expenditure of their own funds.
As you know, by 1975, all anti-submarine aircraft carriers in the United States were excluded from the fleet's operational strength and placed in reserve. The Navy command explained this by the fact that, converted from Essex-class aircraft carriers that entered service in 1942-1946, by the beginning of the previous decade they had significant wear and tear on their hulls and power equipment, and their modernization required unreasonably high costs. Since the role of other anti-submarine warfare systems in the overall anti-submarine warfare system has increased, the further operation of these ships, taking into account the cost/effectiveness criterion, was considered unprofitable.

However, according to the foreign press, the views of the US Navy command on the prospects for using carrier-based aircraft as part of the fleet's anti-submarine forces have not changed. Moreover, according to American experts, in the event of the loss of some coastal bases and the need to concentrate large anti-submarine aviation forces on a short time or conducting continuous patrols over an extended period in areas beyond the range of base patrol aircraft, carrier-based anti-submarine aircraft can be the most effective anti-boat weapon. They survey the ocean around the carrier group, searching in designated sectors. The organization of the search for a submarine depending on the number of dedicated carrier-based aircraft is shown in the figure.
It is believed that modern submarines, along with torpedoes, will widely use anti-ship missiles to combat enemy surface ships, which creates an almost constant threat from the air to aircraft carrier groups. Therefore, Western countries are actively developing combined means of combat that would simultaneously be designed to destroy both underwater and air targets.
When organizing anti-aircraft defense of aircraft carrier groups in the Second World War and in the first post-war years, as a rule, a circular order was used, the direction of movement of which, if necessary (evading enemy attacks, ensuring take-off and landing of aircraft) could be changed without changing the places of the ships in the battle formation . At the same time, destroyers, used primarily as anti-submarine ships, operated at a distance approximately up to the distance of a submarine torpedo salvo, and when there was a threat of an air attack, they concentrated around aircraft carriers in order to meet enemy aircraft with dense anti-aircraft artillery fire.
Currently, in order to simultaneously solve the entire complex of problems of defense of aircraft carrier groups, taking into account the increased age and detection range, as well as taking into account the use modern means defeat and the need to concentrate forces in the direction of the greatest threat, the command of the US Navy, abandoning geometrically correct marching orders, adopted a system of dispersed battle formations in which only the average relative position of the ships was maintained.
Since the capabilities of weapons and equipment are constantly increasing, their effective implementation in combat conditions requires reliable and clear interaction of all links associated with the use of these weapons and equipment. Judging by the materials of the foreign press, an analysis of numerous specific tactical situations during the Second World War and exercises conducted in the post-war period indicates that the capabilities of modern means of armed warfare at sea, incorporated into them by their designers and creators, taking into account all objective circumstances and various “human factors”, factors" (physiological, psychological, etc.) are realized, as a rule, only 20 percent. In this regard, a clear organization and reliable interaction of forces and assets involved in the anti-submarine defense of aircraft carrier groups is required. It is emphasized that it is necessary to centralize such functions as “collecting, summarizing and analyzing surveillance data, monitoring the location of one’s forces and maintaining reliable communications with them.
Integration of information coming from coastal anti-aircraft defense centers, ocean surveillance system centers and naval intelligence processing centers is carried out by the command posts of fleet commanders, who bring them and the decisions made to subordinate formations and other interested authorities.
Direct management of the heterogeneous forces of the aircraft carrier group is assigned to the flagship command center, deployed on the aircraft carrier and providing, with the help of combat information and control systems - ship-based NTDS and aviation ATDS - control of ships of various classes, submarines and aircraft. It includes command posts (anti-aircraft defense, air defense, electronic warfare), an automated intelligence center and other units.
The anti-submarine defense command post carries out centralized control of anti-submarine warfare forces and means, ensures the exchange of information when planning and executing anti-submarine missions, collects, processes and displays information about the underwater situation in the specified area, evaluates this data and transfers it to the crews of anti-submarine aircraft and ship commanders security, prepares proposals for making decisions on the destruction of boats and allocates the necessary forces.
The greatest difficulty, according to American experts, is controlling the actions of a nuclear submarine located underwater, since in this case it can establish communication with surface ships, as a rule, only using underwater sound communications. To transfer to it necessary information from the aircraft carrier's PLO command post it is necessary to use escort ships as relays.
Thus, the commands of the US Navy and other countries - members of the aggressive NATO bloc are paying the most serious attention to the anti-submarine defense of aircraft carriers. They believe that effective anti-aircraft defense in combination with all other types of defense will help maintain the combat stability of aircraft carrier groups in the conditions of modern armed warfare at sea.

Foreign military review №2 1983

which in its modern form appeared at the beginning of the 20th century and made a revolution in naval weapons. The fight against enemy submarines has become one of the most important tasks of military fleets.

The first submarine of the modern type is considered to be the submarine "Holland", which was adopted by the US Navy in 1900. The "Holland" was the first to combine an internal combustion engine with an electric motor, which was powered by batteries and intended for underwater propulsion.

In the years before the outbreak of the First World War, boats similar to the Holland were adopted by all leading naval powers. They were assigned two tasks:

coastal defense, mine laying, breaking the blockade of the coast by superior enemy forces;
interaction with the surface forces of the fleet. One of the proposed tactics for such interaction was to lure enemy line forces to the boats lying in ambush.

1914-1918. World War I

Neither of the two tasks assigned to submarines (breaking the blockade and interaction with surface forces) was completed in the First World War. The close blockade gave way to a distant blockade, which turned out to be no less effective; and the interaction of submarines with surface forces was difficult due to the low speed of the boats and the lack of acceptable means of communication.

However, submarines became a serious force, excelling as commercial raiders.

Germany entered the war with only 24 submarines. In early 1915, she declared war on British commercial shipping, which became all-out in February 1917. During the year, Allied losses in merchant ships amounted to 5.5 million tons, which significantly exceeded the tonnage commissioned.

The British quickly found an effective remedy against the underwater threat. They introduced escorted convoys for trade transport. Convoying made it very difficult to search for ships in the ocean, since it is no easier to detect a group of ships than a single ship. The escort ships, not having any effective weapons against the boats, nevertheless forced the submarine to dive after the attack. Since the underwater speed and cruising range of the boat were significantly less than that of a merchant ship, the remaining ships afloat escaped from danger under their own power.

Submarines operating in the First world war, were actually surface ships that submerged only to sneak attack or evade anti-submarine forces. Submerged they lost most its mobility and cruising range.

Due to the indicated technical limitations of submarines, German submariners developed special tactics for attacking convoys. Attacks were carried out most often at night from the surface, mainly by artillery fire. The boats attacked merchant ships, escaped from the escort ships underwater, then surfaced and again pursued the convoy. This tactic, having received its share during the Second World War further development- began to be called the “wolf pack” tactics.

The effectiveness of Germany's submarine warfare against Britain is due to three reasons:

Germany was the first to widely introduce diesel instead of gasoline engines into the submarine fleet. Diesel significantly increased the cruising range of boats and allowed them to catch up with merchant ships on the surface.
Germany systematically violated international laws that prohibited attacking merchant ships unless they were carrying military cargo. Until 1917, these laws were almost always followed for ships of third countries, but after the start of a total submarine war, everything that was in the field of view of German submariners was sunk.
The escorted convoy tactic reduced the efficiency of commercial shipping because it forced ships to sit idle while the convoy formed. In addition, convoying diverted large numbers of warships needed for other purposes, so Britain did not always consistently pursue this tactic.

The decisive factor in the failure of unrestricted submarine warfare was the entry of the United States into the war.

1918-1939. Interwar period

The weakness of submarines of that time was that they spent most of the time on the surface and most often attacked the enemy from the surface. In this position, the boat was easily detected by radar.

Long-range bombers, hastily converted into anti-submarine aircraft and patrolling over the ocean for hours, could detect a surfaced submarine from a distance of 20-30 miles. The long flight range made it possible to cover most of the Atlantic with anti-submarine patrols. The inability for the boat to be on the surface near the convoy fundamentally undermined the tactics of the wolf packs. The boats were forced to go under water, losing mobility and communication with the coordinating center.

Anti-submarine patrols were carried out by radar-equipped B-24 Liberator bombers based in Newfoundland, Iceland and the North. Ireland.

Despite the victory won by the allied anti-submarine forces, it was achieved with great effort. Against 240 German boats (the maximum number reached in March 1943) were 875 escort ships with active sonars, 41 escort aircraft carriers and 300 base patrol aircraft. For comparison, in the First World War, 140 German boats were opposed by 200 surface escort ships.

1945-1991. Cold War

At the end of World War II, the battle with German submarines quickly turned into an underwater confrontation between the former allies - the USSR and the USA. In this confrontation, 4 stages can be distinguished according to the types of submarines that posed the most serious threat:

Modifications of the German diesel-electric boat Type XXI;
Fast deep-sea submarines;
Low noise submarines.

For the USSR and the USA, these stages were shifted in time, since until very recently the USA was somewhat ahead of the USSR in improving its submarine fleet.

Other factors that influenced the balance of power between submarines and anti-submarine forces were also important:

Submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
Conventional and nuclear anti-ship missiles;
Long-range nuclear ballistic missiles.

1945-1950. German boats type XXI

Modern boat SSK-78 "Rankin" of the Australian Navy at periscope depth under the RDP

AGSS-569 Albacore, the first submarine with a diving-optimized hull

Snorkel on the submarine U-3008

AN/SPS-20 radar mounted under the fuselage of a TBM-3 aircraft

SSK-1 Barracuda, the first anti-submarine submarine. A large BQR-4 acoustic array is mounted in the bow

At the end of World War II, Germany released a new type of submarine. These boats, known as the "Type XXI" had three design innovations aimed at radically changing submarine tactics towards underwater operations. These innovations were:

high capacity batteries;
hull shape aimed at increasing underwater speed;
snorkel (RDP device), which allowed diesel engines to operate at periscope depth.

Boats type XXI undermined all elements of Allied anti-submarine weapons. The snorkel returned mobility to boats, making it possible to travel long distances using diesel and at the same time remain invisible to radar. The streamlined hull and large battery capacity allowed a fully submerged submarine to sail faster and further, breaking away from anti-submarine forces if detected. The use of packet radio transmission negated the capabilities of electronic intelligence.

After World War II, Type XXI boats fell into the hands of the USSR, USA and England. The study and development of underwater technologies created by Germany began. Very soon, both the USSR and the USA realized that a sufficiently large number of boats built using the “Type XXI” technology would nullify the anti-submarine defense system built during the Second World War.

Two measures have been proposed in response to the threat from Type XXI boats:

Improving the sensitivity of radars to detect the top of the snorkel rising above the water;
Creation of sensitive acoustic arrays capable of detecting a boat moving under the RDP at a great distance;
Deployment of anti-submarine weapons on submarines.

By 1950, the American airborne radar APS-20 achieved a range of 15-20 miles for snorkel detection of a submarine. However, this range did not take into account the camouflage capabilities of the snorkel. In particular, giving the upper part of the snorkel a ribbed multifaceted shape like modern technologies"stealth".

A more radical measure to detect submarines was the use of passive acoustics. In 1948, M. Ewing and J. Lamar published data on the presence in the ocean of a deep-sea sound-conducting channel (SOFAR channel, SOund Fixing And Ranging), which concentrated all acoustic signals and allowed them to propagate practically without attenuation over distances of the order of thousands of miles.

In 1950, the United States began developing the SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) system, which was a network of hydrophone arrays located at the bottom that made it possible to listen to the noise of submarines using the SOFAR channel.

At the same time. In the USA, the development of anti-submarine submarines began under the Kayo project (1949). By 1952, three such boats were built - SSK-1, SSK-2 and SSK-3. Their key element was the large low-frequency hydroacoustic array BQR-4, mounted in the bow of the boats. During the tests, it was possible to detect a boat moving under the RDP by cavitation noise at a distance of about 30 miles.

1950-1960. The first nuclear boats and nuclear weapons

In 1949, the USSR conducted its first atomic bomb test. From this point on, both major Cold War rivals possessed nuclear weapons. Also in 1949, the United States began a program to develop a submarine with a nuclear power plant.

The atomic revolution in maritime affairs - the emergence of atomic weapons and nuclear submarines - posed new challenges for anti-submarine defense. Since a submarine is an excellent platform for deploying nuclear weapons, the problem of anti-submarine defense has become part of a more general problem - defense against nuclear attack.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, both the USSR and the USA attempted to place nuclear weapons on submarines. In 1947, the US Navy successfully launched a V-1 cruise missile from a Gato-class diesel boat, Casque. Subsequently, the United States developed the Regulus nuclear cruise missile with a range of 700 km. The USSR conducted similar experiments in the 1950s. Project 613 (“Whiskey”) boats were planned to be armed cruise missiles, and Project 611 (“Zulu”) boats are ballistic.

The greater autonomy of nuclear submarines and the lack of the need to surface from time to time nullified the entire anti-aircraft defense system built to counter diesel submarines. Possessing high underwater speed, nuclear boats could evade torpedoes designed for a diesel boat traveling under the RDP at a speed of 8 knots and maneuvering in two dimensions. Active sonars of surface ships were also not designed for such speeds of the observed object.

However, the first generation nuclear boats had one significant drawback - they were too noisy. Unlike diesel boats, the nuclear one could not arbitrarily turn off the engine, so various mechanical devices (reactor cooling pumps, gearboxes) worked constantly and constantly emitted strong noise in the low-frequency range.

The concept of fighting first generation nuclear boats included:

Creation of a global system for monitoring the underwater situation in the low-frequency range of the spectrum to determine the approximate coordinates of the submarine;
Creation of a long-range anti-submarine patrol aircraft to search for nuclear submarines in a specified area; transition from radar methods of searching for submarines to the use of sonar buoys;
Creation of low-noise anti-submarine submarines.

SOSUS system

The SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) system was created to warn of the approach of Soviet nuclear boats to the US coast. The first hydrophone test array was installed in 1951 in the Bahamas. By 1958, receiving stations were installed throughout the east and west coasts of the United States and the Hawaiian Islands. In 1959, the arrays were installed on the island. Newfoundland.

The SOSUS arrays consisted of hydrophones and undersea cables located inside a deep-sea acoustic channel. The cables ran ashore to naval stations where the signals were received and processed. To compare information received from stations and from other sources (for example, radio direction finding), special centers were created.

The acoustic arrays were linear antennas about 300 m long, consisting of many hydrophones. This antenna length ensured the reception of signals of all frequencies characteristic of submarines. The received signal was subjected to spectral analysis to identify discrete frequencies characteristic of various mechanical devices.

In those areas where the installation of stationary arrays was difficult, it was planned to create anti-submarine barriers using submarines equipped with passive hydroacoustic antennas. At first these were boats of the SSK type, then - the first low-noise nuclear boats of the Thrasher/Permit type. The barriers were supposed to be installed at the points where Soviet submarines left bases in Murmansk, Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. These plans, however, were not implemented, since they required the construction of too many submarines in peacetime.

Attack submarines

In 1959, a new class of submarine appeared in the United States, which is now commonly called “multi-purpose nuclear submarines.” Characteristics the new class were:

Nuclear power plant;
Special measures to reduce noise;
Anti-submarine capabilities, including a large passive sonar array and anti-submarine weapons.

This boat, called Thresher, became the model on which all subsequent US Navy boats were built. Key element multi-purpose submarine is low noise, which is achieved by isolating all noisy mechanisms from the hull of the submarine. All submarine mechanisms are installed on shock-absorbing platforms, which reduce the amplitude of vibrations transmitted to the hull and, consequently, the strength of sound passing into the water.

Thrasher was equipped with the BQR-7 passive acoustic array, the array of which was placed on top of the spherical surface of the BQS-6 active sonar, and together they constituted the first integrated sonar station, the BQQ-1.

Anti-submarine torpedoes

Anti-submarine torpedoes capable of hitting nuclear submarines became a separate problem. All previous torpedoes were designed for diesel boats traveling at low speed under the RDP and maneuvering in two dimensions. In general, the speed of the torpedo should be 1.5 times the speed of the target, otherwise the boat can evade the torpedo using the appropriate maneuver.

The first American submarine-launched homing torpedo, the Mk 27-4, entered service in 1949, had a speed of 16 knots and was effective if the target speed did not exceed 10 knots. In 1956, the 26-knot Mk 37 appeared. However, nuclear-powered boats had a speed of 25-30 knots, and this required 45-knot torpedoes, which did not appear until 1978 (Mk 48). Therefore, in the 1950s, there were only two ways to combat nuclear boats using torpedoes:

Equip anti-submarine torpedoes with nuclear warheads;
Taking advantage of the stealthiness of anti-submarine submarines, choose a position for attack that minimizes the likelihood of the target evading a torpedo.

Patrol aircraft and sonobuoys

Sonobuoys have become the main means of aircraft-based passive hydroacoustics. Start practical use buoys occurred in the early years of World War II. These were devices dropped from surface ships that warned the convoy of submarines approaching from behind. The buoy contained a hydrophone that picked up the noise of a submarine and a radio transmitter that transmitted a signal to a ship or carrier aircraft.

The first buoys could detect the presence of an underwater target and classify it, but could not determine the target's coordinates.

With the advent of the global SOSUS system, there was an urgent need to determine the coordinates of a nuclear boat located in a specified area of the world ocean. Only anti-submarine aircraft could do this promptly. Thus, sonobuoys replaced radar as the main sensor for patrol aircraft.

One of the first sonobuoys was the SSQ-23. which was a float in the form of an elongated cylinder, from which a hydrophone was lowered on a cable to a certain depth, receiving an acoustic signal.

There were several types of buoys, differing in algorithms for processing acoustic information. The Jezebel algorithm made it possible to detect and classify a target by spectral analyzes noise, but did not say anything about the direction to the target and the distance to it. The Codar algorithm processed signals from a pair of buoys and calculated the coordinates of the source using the time delays of the signal. The Julie algorithm processed signals similarly to the Codar algorithm, but was based on active sonar, where explosions of small depth charges were used as a source of sonar signals.

Having detected the presence of a submarine in a given area using a Jezebel system buoy, the patrol aircraft deployed a network of several pairs of Julie system buoys and detonated a depth charge, the echo of which was recorded by the buoys. After localizing the boat using acoustic methods, the anti-submarine aircraft used a magnetic detector to clarify the coordinates, and then launched a homing torpedo.

The weak link in this chain was localization. The detection range using the wideband Codar and Julie algorithms was significantly less than that of the narrowband Jezebel algorithm. Very often, the Codar and Julie system buoys could not detect a boat detected by the Jezebel buoy.

1960-1980

Literature

Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes / A. A. Grechko. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. - T. 1. - 6381 p.
Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes / A. A. Grechko. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976. - T. 6. - 671 p.

Owen R. Cote The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines. - United States Government Printing Office, 2006. - 114 pp. - ISBN 0160769108, 9780160769108

US Navy in the postwar period
Aircraft carriers
Battleships
Cruisers and destroyer missile leaders
Destroyers
Frigates
Multi-purpose submarines
SSBN
Landing ships
Artillery
Rockets And missile systems
Launchers
Torpedoes
Radars	PL: AN/BPS-15/16 2D overview: AN/SPQ-9 AN/SPS-10 AN/SPS-29 AN/SPS-32 AN/SPS-37 AN/SPS-40 AN/SPS-43 AN/SPS-49 AN/SPS-55 AN/SPS-67 3D overview: AN/SPS-8 AN/SPS-26 AN/SPS-30 AN/SPS-33 AN/SPS-39 AN/SPS-42 AN/SPS-48 AN/SPS-52 Weapon Controls: AN/SPG-49 AN/SPG-51 AN/SPG-53 AN/SPG-55 AN/SPG-60 AN/SPG-62 Mk 23 Mk 95 Mk 115 Multifunctional: AN/SPG-59 AN/SPY-1 AN/SPY-2 AN/SPY-3 EW: AN/SLQ-32 Traffic control: AN/SPN-35 AN/SPN-41 AN/SPN-42 AN/SPN-43 AN/SPN-44 AN/SPN-45 AN/SPN-46 Navigational: AN/SPS-64 Other: AN/SPS-60 AN/SPS-73

A source from the Izvestia newspaper from the Ministry of Defense said that Russia is creating a satellite surveillance system for submarines and deep-sea vehicles, which should significantly increase the country’s defense capability. The corporation acts as the lead developer space systems special purpose"Kometa", part of the Almaz-Antey concern. Dozens of Russian enterprises are taking part in the grandiose project.

Development work should be completed next year. And after approval of its results, the deployment of the system will begin.

It would seem that this should have been done much earlier. After all, everything is perfectly visible from space - the view is unlimited. After all, the Legend naval space reconnaissance and target designation system was put into service back in 1978. It was capable of tracking the entire waters of the World Ocean, monitoring the position of enemy surface ships and transmitting to the means of suppression and destruction the exact coordinates, direction and speed of movement of targets. After the “Legend” exhausted its resource, it was replaced by the “Liana” system, capable of detecting meter-sized objects, determining their coordinates with an accuracy of up to three meters.

However, the Legends and Liana satellites find marine objects using the radio reconnaissance method, that is, using radar. Like active, when a radar sends radio waves to an object, and they are reflected and return to it. So is passive, when radio waves emitted by an object are received. This is impossible with submarines because water can only transmit long radio waves; anything in the shorter ranges is attenuated in water.

There are several methods for detecting submarines, differing in effectiveness. At the moment, the most effective is hydroacoustic. There are acoustic wave sensors in the water - sonars, which allow you to “hear” the noises made by the boat. In principle, in terms of the mechanism of interaction with an object, this is very similar to radar. There is passive sonar. In this case, the sonar “listens” to the sea. This method is good because you can detect a submarine at a great distance - up to 200-300 kilometers. At the same time, the type of boat can be recognized by the nature of the noise - each of them has its own “acoustic portrait”. However, the distance to the object cannot be determined this way.

The distance is determined using active sonar or echo location. The principle here is similar to radar: the sonar emits waves, which, reflected from the hull of the boat, return to the receiver. This method has two disadvantages. Firstly, the boat itself picks up the sent waves, and in accordance with this, its crew changes the movement parameters. Secondly, the detection range with the active method is significantly less than with the passive one.

Among other methods of detecting submarines, it is practical to measure, using magnetometers, the magnetic fields that are distorted by a massive submarine. This method is used by anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters patrolling the water area. However, if the boat hull is made of non-magnetic titanium, then this method does not work.

But most effective work anti-submarine aviation consists of placing and periodically “interrogating” sonar buoys, which report the appearance of foreign submarines in the region, and then transmit their coordinates to anti-submarine ships or independently destroy targets using depth charges and torpedoes.

The project, which is being implemented by the Kometa concern, involves delegating the interrogation and communication functions of anti-submarine aircraft to a satellite system. It is the satellites that will collect information from a permanent network of sonar buoys and transmit it for processing, analysis and target designation to ground control centers. It is these centers that will be the core of the system. Their creation cannot entail significant technical and technological complexity. In essence, this is a main supercomputer with powerful and reliable programs, connected in a single chain with peripheral computers on combat duty. Creating the necessary programs for accurate target localization using data obtained from hundreds of sonar sensors is, of course, a labor-intensive task. But they are created on the basis of well-known mathematical methods.

Of course, both coastal and sea-based communication networks between ground centers and the satellite system must be created on ships. And this is also not such a “Newton binomial”.

Izvestia’s source, citing the strict secrecy of the project, nevertheless points to the most complex sector of development. He is marine. It is necessary to create a huge network of buoys equipped with submersible sonars and fixed on the shallow shelf with anchors. They must control a section of the Russian maritime border several hundred kilometers long. Presumably the network will be located in the Arctic region. Most likely - in the Barents Sea, on the approaches to the main bases of the Northern Fleet.

The problem is to keep this network working long time. It's about, maybe about tens of years. Moreover, each buoy must be continuously supplied with electricity all this time, which is necessary both for the operation of active sonar sensors and for communication with satellites. Will it be the new kind energy sources? Or is it supposed to periodically recharge the network, which is very difficult? This is not yet known to the general public.

The Americans solved this problem, as they say, head-on. The US Navy began building its SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System) anti-submarine defense network in the early 50s to warn of the approach of Soviet nuclear submarines to the US coast. That is, with anticipation, since Soviet Union, in fact, there was no nuclear submarine fleet then. SOSUS acquired its final form in the 60s. At the same time, the geography of the system expanded due to the construction of a border along the line Greenland - Iceland - Faroe Islands - Great Britain.

The American passive acoustic direction finding system is a network of numerous hydrophones strung together in groups on 300-meter receiving antennas of acoustic vibrations. Signals from hydrophones are transmitted via underwater cables to the shore, to signal processing centers. The cables also supply the system with electricity.

SOSUS is made, as they say, to last. And this is her weakness. The network was effective way combating submarines of the first and second generations. When third-generation boats with significantly reduced noise entered the USSR Navy, their detection and identification became very difficult. That is, the network turned out to have a “too large mesh.” What is connected with the discrepancy between the sonar characteristics? modern requirements, and with insufficient density of their placement, and with imperfect methods of mathematical processing of information taken from the network. One good thing about the system is that it functions in automatic mode and does not require the involvement of operators.

In 1990, a third generation boat detection system was tested in the Norwegian Sea. The result was disastrous: SOSUS determined the estimated coordinates of the boat as “somewhere in an ellipse with axes of 216 and 90 kilometers.” Undoubtedly, the search for fourth-generation boats will turn into a rather pointless exercise for SOSUS.

At the moment, the Americans are keeping this system afloat because dismantling it would be too expensive. In the future, the US Navy plans to completely abandon static passive acoustic detection fields and move to a dynamic system that will deploy “in the right place at the right time.” This is the so-called underwater lighting system (SOIS). It is a system of acoustic emitters that create constant illumination of underwater objects. And a system of receivers - sonars. That is, in a given region, after the deployment of FOSS, quite effective active acoustic direction finding begins to work.

It must be said that the concept of FOSS arose shortly after the end of cold war, when the United States realized that there was no one else to defend against. And, therefore, it is necessary to have undivided dominion over all four oceans. However, the situation is changing. And it is not only the developing Russian fleet, but also the Chinese rapidly rushing forward. By 2030, China's submarine fleet could grow to three hundred submarines. So the concept of undividedness begins to rapidly dry out. It’s time for the Pentagon to remember that it is necessary to protect at least the US coastline. Which is becoming an increasingly complex problem for Americans.

And in conclusion, it must be said: I want to believe that the creators of the Russian satellite anti-submarine system will not step on the same rake as the Americans. That is, the system will not only be passive, but will also gain active bearing capabilities. It is possible that other detection methods will be integrated into it.

I will briefly outline my vision of the situation in the US PLO in 1962.

1. Strategic situation
The United States considers Soviet nuclear weapons to be its main threat. Since Soviet submarines are carriers of nuclear weapons, the main task fleet - anti-submarine defense. Appropriations for other naval tasks are relatively small.

2. The situation on the underwater front
The basis of the USSR's submarine forces are ocean-going diesel submarines produced in the 1950s. However, first generation nuclear boats have already been built.
Actually, apart from submarines at sea, we have nothing to threaten the adversary with. The surface ocean fleet is small and vulnerable, and submarines entering the Atlantic are sporadic.
Since the characteristics and capabilities of diesel and nuclear boats are extremely different, the American ASW is informally divided into two parts. One part (basic patrol aircraft + search and strike groups) hunts diesel boats, the other (SOSUS global detection system, anti-submarine submarines and, again, basic patrol aircraft) hunts nuclear ones.

3. Diesel boats
A diesel boat has a huge advantage - it is quiet. When it runs underwater on batteries, there is absolutely nothing to detect it at any decent distance. At an extremely close range, it can be detected by a destroyer with active sonar (about 5 km) or a patrol aircraft with a magnetic anomaly sensor (less than 1 km).
The weakness of a diesel boat is that it needs to surface from time to time to charge its batteries. At this moment, she has a diesel engine running and a snorkel (air intake) sticks out. At this moment, it can be detected by a patrol aircraft (by radar using a snorkel) or an anti-submarine submarine (by passive sonar based on the noise of a diesel engine and the turbulent noise of a snorkel cutting through the surface of the water). In addition, a patrol aircraft can drop buoys and detect the boat, but it is practically impossible to localize it , because The range of broadband buoys designed for this purpose is very short.

4. Nuclear boats
A nuclear boat does not have the disadvantages of a diesel boat, but also does not have its advantages. It is completely autonomous and does not need to rise to the surface. However, it is extremely noisy (at least the 1st generation boats). Since, unlike a diesel engine, it is impossible to arbitrarily shut down the reactor, on a nuclear boat all rotating mechanics such as cooling system pumps are constantly making noise. In addition, the cavitation noise of the propellers (the first generation boats had very high speed rotation) and turbulence at high speed.
The detection range of a nuclear boat based on noise is monstrous - the SOSUS system detects them literally across the ocean, at a distance of several thousand km. Tactical forces detect nuclear boat in a similar way: anti-submarine submarines - with passive sonars, patrol aircraft - with buoys (in this case, the buoys that provide localization work perfectly, two pairs of buoys give the coordinates of the boat).

5. How to hunt a diesel boat
While the boat is underwater (or under the control station, but there is no patrol aircraft within a radius of several tens of miles), it is almost impossible to detect it. Primary detection occurs when the boat is under the snorkel. Since anti-submarine submarines don't hang out in the ocean every 20 miles, the only real option is a patrol plane. The boat is usually detected by radar using a snorkel at a distance of 10-20 miles. However, aiming destroyers at the boat is a separate problem. The detection radius of the destroyer's active sonar is about 5 km. It is impossible to bring the destroyer to such a distance on the first approach, since the boat detects the radar radiation and dives. Anti-submarine forces are circling the area, waiting for the boat to surface again. After several iterations, with enough luck, the destroyer manages to detect the boat with sonar. After this, he either pursues her until she is forced to surface, or fires an anti-submarine torpedo.
When guarding an aircraft carrier group, destroyers move in a continuous formation, covering with sonar the entire space around the aircraft carrier. If a boat wants to attack an aircraft carrier, it itself enters the sonar range.

6. How to hunt a nuclear boat

Primary detection occurs by the SOSUS system even when the boat is just leaving the base. To this end, all key points along the routes for Soviet boats to exit from Murmansk and Vladivostok into the ocean should be equipped with SOSUS system antennas. However, in 1962, there are antennas only on both coasts of the United States, Barbados and Hawaii. SOSUS stations in the strategically important Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain region, through which Soviet boats pass from Murmansk to the Atlantic, will begin to be built only in 1965. In addition, anti-submarine submarines can be on duty at these points, but in 1962 this is not widely practiced because -due to the small number of them. Anti-submarine barriers of boats and patrol aircraft are set up situationally (for example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a barrier of 10 boats was placed in the area of Newfoundland Island).
The SOSUS system determines the area where the boat is likely to be located and reports it to tactical anti-submarine forces. This is usually a patrol aircraft. Anti-submarine submarines, due to communication problems and difficulties in interacting with other forces, operate almost autonomously.
The patrol aircraft surrounds the indicated area with buoys. First, directional buoys of the Jezebel system, which determine the presence of a boat and the approximate direction. And then Codar buoys, a pair of which, based on the relative delay of sound, determine the direction to the boat, and two pairs together determine the coordinates of the boat. There are also Julie system buoys, which operate on the principle of active sonar. The sound source is the so-called. practical charge (i.e. small depth charge). The principle of determining coordinates is the same as with Codar buoys, based on the relative delay of the echo. During the Cuban missile crisis, practical charges were used several times, although mostly as a signal for the submarine to surface.