LFI program

Appearance of the Su-29:

The creation of fourth-generation fighters began in the Soviet Union in response to information about a similar program begun in the United States in 1966. The American FX (Fighter Experimental) program envisaged the creation of a successor to the F-4C Fantom II tactical fighter. Over the course of several years, the fighter concept was revised and refined, and in 1969, McDonnell-Douglas began designing a new fighter, designated F-15. According to the results of the competition, the F-15 project was declared the winner, beating out projects from North American, Lockheed and Republic. In December 1969, the company was awarded a contract to build prototype aircraft, and on July 27, 1972, the YF-15 prototype made its first flight. After the successful completion of the tests, production of the first production F-15A Eagle vehicles began, which entered service with the US Air Force in 1974.

Fighters of the FX program.

The FX program was closely followed in the USSR as well. Information leaked into periodicals, as well as through intelligence channels, made it possible to create a fairly accurate idea of ​​the scheme, characteristics and capabilities of a potential competitor. It is not surprising that the original design brief for the 4th generation fighter called for an aircraft with similar performance to the F-15. This "Advanced Frontline Fighter" (PFF) program was issued by the Ministry aviation industry three main Soviet design bureaus involved in fighter aircraft - P.O. Sukhoi, A.I. Mikoyan and A.S. Yakovlev - in 1970. Almost immediately, when discussing the program, representatives of the Mikoyan Design Bureau put forward a proposal to create a light fighter in addition to the heavy one. According to the speakers, the fighter aircraft fleet of the USSR Air Force was to consist of 1/3 heavy fighters and 2/3 light fighters. A similar concept was being developed at the same time in the United States, when, in addition to the heavy F-15 fighter, the development of light fighters F-16 and F-17 continued. The proposal was received very ambiguously, but nevertheless it was accepted. The PFI program was divided into programs for creating a “heavy front-line fighter” (TFI) and a “light front-line fighter” (LFI).
All three design bureaus began developing aircraft under both programs. They received the designations: Su-27, MiG-33 and Yak-47 (TFI program) and Su-29, MiG-29 and Yak-45I (LFI program).

In 1971, the first tactical and technical requirements (TTT) of the Air Force for the promising light front-line fighter LFI were formed. By this time, the details of the ADF (Advanced Day Fighter) program, which started in the USA in the late 60s, became known in the USSR. The requirements of this program were taken as the basis for the development of the TTT, and it was stipulated that the Soviet fighter should be 10% superior to its American counterpart in a number of parameters. In accordance with the TTT, a lightweight, cheap fighter with high maneuverability and thrust-to-weight ratio was required. The main characteristics that, according to the Air Force, the new fighters should have were:
- maximum speed flight at an altitude of more than 11 km - 2500...2700 km/h;
- maximum flight speed near the ground - 1400...1500 km/h;
- maximum rate of climb near the ground - 300...350 m/s;
- practical ceiling - 21...22 km;
- flight range without PTB near the ground - 800 km;
- flight range without PTB at high altitude - 2000 km;
- maximum operational overload - 8...9;
- acceleration time from 600 km/h to 1100 km/h - 12...14 s;
- acceleration time from 1100 km/h to 1300 km/h - 6...7 s;
- starting thrust-to-weight ratio - 1.1...1.2;
- weapons: 23-30 mm cannon, 2 medium-range missiles, 2-4 short-range missiles.
The main combat missions of the LFI were determined to be:
- destruction of enemy fighters in close air combat using guided missiles and cannons;
- interception of air targets at long range when targeting from the ground or autonomously using a radar sighting system and conducting air combat at medium distances using guided missiles;
- covering troops and industrial infrastructure from air attack;
- countering enemy aerial reconnaissance systems;
- conducting aerial reconnaissance.
The armament of the new fighter was proposed to include K-25 medium-range missiles, which were created at that time at the Vympel plant according to the American AIM-7E Sparrow missile system, or similar Soviet K-23 missiles used on 3rd generation fighters, as well as K-60 close-in air combat missiles and a promising 30 mm double-barreled cannon.
The preliminary design of the Su-29 aircraft, which generally satisfied the specifications of the Air Force for LFI, was developed at the Sukhoi Design Bureau in the first half of 1972. The project, which received the code name T11-1, was a single-engine monoplane with a front horizontal tail and a vertical tail, installed at 2/3 of the wingspan with a significant camber angle. The engine air intake was located under the fuselage.
The normal take-off weight of the aircraft was estimated at 10,000 kg. In accordance with the given starting thrust-to-weight ratio, the engine thrust should have been 11,000-12,000 kgf. In the early 70s. Of the bypass turbojet engines being developed, the AL-31F, D-30F-9 and R59F-300 had similar thrust. The thrust-to-weight ratio with the AL-31F engine was considered insufficient, although the concept of using one type of engine on both heavy and light fighters was tempting. The D-30F-9, although it had more thrust, was heavier and did not fit well into the hull design. As a result, the R59F-300 engine was chosen for installation on the Su-29, which at that time was being developed at MMZ Soyuz under the leadership of general designer S.K. Tumansky.
The fighter's armament included two K-25 medium-range missiles and two K-60 close-range missiles. The ammunition capacity of the built-in AO-17A 30 mm double-barreled cannon was 250 rounds.

In October 1972, a meeting of the joint Scientific and Technical Council (STC) of the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP) and the Air Force was held, which reviewed the state of work on promising fighters within the framework of the LFI program. Representatives of all three design bureaus made presentations. On behalf of the Mikoyan Design Bureau, G.E. Lozino-Lozinsky reported, presenting to the commission the design of the MiG-29 fighter (still in the classic configuration, with a high-mounted trapezoidal wing, side air intakes and a single-tail tail). O.S. Samoilovich from the Sukhoi Design Bureau presented the preliminary design of the Su-29 at the NTS. General Designer A.S. Yakovlev spoke from the Yakovlev Design Bureau with a project for the Yak-45I light fighter (based on the Yak-45 light attack aircraft). Yakovlev’s project was a development of the design of the Yak-33 supersonic interceptor with a variable-sweep wing and engine nacelles with frontal air intakes installed at the fracture site of its leading edge.

Light fighters submitted to the preliminary design competition under the LFI program in 1972.

Main characteristics of fighters:

Three months later, the second meeting of the NTS took place. The composition of the participants has not changed, but the Mikoyan Design Bureau presented in principle new project the MiG-29 fighter, now made using an integrated circuit and having a smaller dimension (normal take-off weight 12800 kg). As a result of two meetings of the Scientific and Technical Development Bureau, the Yakovlev Design Bureau dropped out of the competition due to the need to refine the aerodynamic design to ensure the safety of continued flight of the fighter in the event of failure of one of the engines installed on the wing, while the other two participants had to finalize their projects and clarify the design characteristics.
By the time of the third meeting of the Scientific and Technical Council on the LFI program in April 1973, the competition for a heavy front-line fighter ended in victory for the Su-27 project. This fact largely influenced the result of the second competition. The Ministry of Aviation Industry considered that it was wrong to concentrate the development of both promising fighters in one design bureau, which was also overloaded with other equally important projects, and gave victory to the MiG-29 project. Officially, the reasons for abandoning the Su-29 were problems with the suction of stones and debris from the runway at the time of takeoff (on the MiG-29 this problem was solved by using separate air channels), worse avionics, problems with fine-tuning the R59F-300 engines, and also the fact that During the process of clarifying the characteristics, the normal take-off weight increased to 10,800 kg. Despite this, the Su-29 also had advantages: its cost was 20% less than its competitor, and its maneuverability and climb rate were higher.
In any case, the Su-29 project was closed, and the main forces of the Sukhoi Design Bureau were directed to the development of the Su-27. Developments in a light single-engine fighter with a PGO were used to create the S-37 project in the late eighties.

Main characteristics of the Su-29:

Total length - 13.66 m
Wing span - 7.04 m
Wing area -17.5 m2
Powerplant - 1 x R59F-300 turbofan engine
Engine take-off thrust:
- afterburner - 12500 kgf
- maximum - 8100 kgf
Takeoff weight:
- normal - 10800 kg
- reloading - 12100 kg
Empty weight - 6850 kg
Weight of combat load - 750 kg
Fuel weight - 3000 kg
Thrust-to-weight ratio - 1.16
Maximum speed:
- near the ground - 1500 km/h
- at altitude - 2550 km/h
Practical ceiling - 22000 m
Climb time 18000 m - 2.5 min
Practical range without PTB:
- near the ground - 800 km
- at an altitude of 2000 km
Maximum operational overload - 9
Run length - 350 m
Run length - 500 m
Armament - 30mm AO-17A cannon (200 rounds of ammunition), 2 K-25 missiles, 2 K-60 missiles

Competition has always been a great incentive for technical progress. This state of affairs also occurred in the former Soviet Union. This fact is confirmed by the numerous systems being developed at that time for the defense of the country, competing for the right to be called the best.

Left - Su-27, right - Mig-29

One of the most obvious examples is the creation of excellent air interceptors, which replenished military weapons at approximately the same time - in the early 80s of the last century. In particular, we're talking about about Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft. If you analyze photographs of military equipment, the models look very similar. However, in fact, this judgment is incorrect, because the models in question belong to different classes and have a lot of differences. First of all, it is worth noting that the Su-27 is a heavy interceptor, and the MiG-29 is a light military aircraft.

Technical indicators

Let's try to more carefully analyze how the Su-27 differs from the MiG-29, taking into account the opinion of experts. The decision to divide military aircraft into heavy and light ones was considered back in the early 60s. According to experts, light interceptors would be able to carry out maneuverable air battles, called “carousel” by pilots. It is much easier for such models to carry out maneuverable combat due to the increased wing area and the insignificant weight of the vessel itself.

Heavy aircraft, as conceived by the designers, must successfully fight bombers and destroy missiles launched by the enemy from a long distance. To fulfill the main purpose it was necessary to have such military equipment, who had excellent speed, long-range powerful weapon, well-equipped radar. It was precisely these characteristics that were inherent in heavy interceptors, so they were able to easily capture an enemy target and strike the enemy from a long distance.

Having analyzed the comparison of the characteristics of military vessels, it is not difficult to understand that the assembly of heavy interceptors requires much more Money. It is probably for this reason that there are much fewer units of such military equipment in the aircraft fleet. And besides, this state of affairs can be explained as follows:

• Large military aircraft are not always needed to perform complex combat missions;
• more expensive to develop and maintain air Transport more difficult to maintain;
• Many countries in the world acquire military air equipment for status reasons, and not for protection against an actual nuclear threat.

Summing up the preliminary results, we can come to the following conclusion: the MiG-29 is inferior to the Su-27 in size and level of equipment, but is ahead of its “brother” in maneuverability and demand.

Main Differences

Even after the warships in question were divided into 2 categories, a clear difference was never noted by the designers. Analysts of our time are also concerned about this issue, because after comparing the MiG-29 and Su-27, it is still not entirely clear why specialists needed to create two very similar fighter models.

Moreover, after conducting some research, analysts came to the conclusion that light and maneuverable equipment is not much cheaper to assemble than the heavy Su-27. However, experts still noted the main difference between these aircraft:

The light model was supposed to penetrate approximately 120–130 km into enemy territory in the event of hostilities. At the same time, ground posts will be able to control the aircraft.

Such characteristics were supposed to help save on control personnel, simplify the design of the equipment, and reduce the cost of assembling the structure.

The technical equipment of light military transport was as follows:

• R-60 caliber heat-seeking missiles, later replaced by R-73;
• The radar had a detection range to detect R-27 missiles;
• an expensive communication and electronic warfare system was not provided for in the aircraft.

The main task of the Su-27 was reconnaissance of enemy territory, analysis and attack on its own. Heavy transport was supposed to penetrate enemy territory, intercept targets, and provide support to its bombers.

Since ground services did not control the equipment, the fighter needed more powerful equipment:

• onboard radar, twice the MiG-29’s vision range;
• twice the flight range;
• the main armament of the R-27, as well as R-73 missiles for close combat.

Options

It is quite difficult to accurately answer which model is considered the best, light or heavy. However, it is quite possible to analyze the comparison of the MiG-29 and Su-27 based on flight performance.

MiG-29 parameters:

• average speed – 2550 km/h;
• rate of climb – 330 m/sec;
• combat radius - 2100 km;
• weight of the loaded aircraft – 15240 kg;
• general length parameter – 17.3 m;
• wing span length – 11.3 m;
• height – 4.7 m;
• total wing area – 38 sq. m.

Su-27 parameters:

• average speed – 2500 km/h;
• rate of climb – 300 m/sec;
• combat radius - 3.9 km;
• weight of equipped transport – 23000 kg;
• length – 22 m;
• height – 5.9m;
• wing span length – 14.7 m;
• total wing area – 62 sq. m.

It is almost impossible to find differences in the design of the cockpit. Design engineers, despite the fact that during the assembly of the first models there was fierce competition, still managed to achieve a mutual decision on this issue. And it was precisely this moment that had a positive impact on export interest regarding the two aircraft.

A comparison of characteristics proves that the Su-27 wins in terms of size, speed, and combat radius, but light transport is ahead of its counterpart in climb rate and maneuverability. It is worth noting that when assembling both models, a two-dimensional scheme was used, noted as reliable and durable.

Today it is not so important to determine how the Su-27 differs from the MiG-29, since they are being replaced by more advanced military aircraft. For example, a light fighter successfully replaced the MiG-33, equipped not only with an improved platform, but also with modern aerodynamics and a large fuel tank. It is also worth noting another model, more improved and modified - the MiG-35. The Su-27 was replaced by modern fighters - the Su-35 and Su-34, equipped with all the necessary instruments that military equipment may need.

In contact with

The only and most important reason was the missiles they had on board.

When the Su-27 and MiG-29 appeared on the world stage in the 1980s, they represented a dramatic generational leap over the early Soviet fighters. Another such leap was missiles, which form the basis of their weapons.

In fact, the short-range air-to-air missile R-73 and the medium-range missile R-27, first installed on these aircraft, are still in service today. At the same time, the design of the R-27 has proven itself to be particularly successful, being suitable for constant modernization. What is the secret of her longevity?

In 1974, the CPSU Central Committee decided to begin development of the fourth generation of fighters - the MiG-29 and Su-27. As a consequence of this decision, Vympel Design Bureau began developing the R-27 missile (whose prototype was designated K-27).

According to the original plan, there were two variants of the R-27 - the “light” K-27A for the MiG-29 with a shorter range and the “heavy” K-27B with an extended range for the Su-27. As a result, a modular propulsion system was developed for the rocket.

In keeping with the Soviet trend of simultaneously developing radar and infrared missiles, the R-27 was developed modular system guidance This will come in handy later, when a number of R-27 variants with various systems homing.

Another interesting design decision was the butterfly-shaped control surfaces located in the center of the rocket. At first, they caused a number of complaints: some designers defended the design previously installed on the R-23, where the control surfaces were located at the tail of the rocket. This solution reduced air resistance at low angles of attack and was considered aerodynamically more advanced. However, since the modular design of the rocket was a priority, this solution was rejected, since the tail location of the control surfaces would jeopardize the very modularity of the power plant.

Context

Su-27 - a copy of the US military aircraft?

Sina.com 11/23/2017

Su-27s continue to fall

BBC Russian Service 06/10/2016

How the MiG-29 appeared in Yugoslavia

Kurir 04/24/2017

The truth about the MiG-29

Air & Space 08/26/2014

It is also interesting that the developers feared that even taking into account the progress of Soviet technology, the radars of the R-27 and its carrier aircraft would be inferior in power and sensitivity to their Western counterparts. To prevent lag, Soviet designers improved the missile's ability to lock onto a target after launch.

The earlier R-23 missile had an inertial target acquisition system, in which the missile was aimed at the target after launch and could fly without locking for some time while its course was provided by the inertial navigation system. The R-27 achieved significant improvements due to the carrier aircraft's ability to correct the missile's course using a radio transmitter.

During tests conducted in the late 1970s, K-27s were fired from MiG-23 fighters. The purpose was only to check telemetry, and the launches were not carried out on target. A thermal imaging missile was also tested - it was fired at parachute targets. A working version of the K-27 with an infrared homing head was also released from the MiG-29 prototype in 1980 - despite the fact that the carrier aircraft did not yet have a radar at that time.

State testing continued in the 1980s and ended in 1984. The K-27 missile was finally put into service in 1987 in two versions, under the names R-27R and R-27T. The letter “P” denoted the variant with a semi-active radar homing head, and “T” denoted the variant with a passive infrared homing head.

At the same time, the “heavy” version of the missile, K-27B, originally intended for the Su-27, changed its designation to K-27E. The letter “E” meant higher energy power (and, therefore, increased range). The development cycle proved to be longer than its lighter counterpart due to a radical redesign of the Su-27's radar system in hopes of making it more competitive. Unforeseen problems associated with increasing the range of action also complicated the development.

The tests were finally completed in 1990, and the missile was put into service under the names R-27ER and R-27ET - and its creators were awarded a state prize in 1991.

During the long development cycle of the R-27, designers realized that the semi-active radar homing system (where the missile is guided to the target by a radar signal from the carrier aircraft) could become obsolete. Therefore, research was carried out to create an active homing system. The homing heads of this type of missile are equipped with their own radar, which allows it to independently irradiate the target without relying on the carrier aircraft.

This version was named R-27EA. It was developed in 1983, but difficulties encountered in creating a compact radar in a homing head led to a delay. The final fate of the project is unknown, but most sources agree that development finally stopped around 1989, when the design bureau switched to the R-77 missile. However, the work could well have continued even after this point, as a private initiative.

In general, the main advantage of the R-27 series over its competitors is the increased range of the ER variant, reaching 130 kilometers. This is significantly superior to any modification of the AIM-7 Sparrow, its closest NATO equivalent. The main problem with the R-27 is the protracted development cycle, which allowed American missiles to surpass it.

One example of such delay is the R-27’s intermediate course correction system. Although this feature was originally developed in the 1970s, the rocket entered service only in 1987. By this time, American engineers had gradually made adjustments to the design of the AIM-7 missile, including a similar course correction system. The AIM-7P Block II missile entered service in the same year 1987.

The decision to stop further development of the rocket was probably facilitated by the compromise nature of the control surfaces. The R-77, a next-generation active-homing missile designed for the Soviet Air Force, featured pre-array stabilizers for better maneuverability. Since it was still not destined to achieve the aerodynamic characteristics of its descendant, the R-27, the addition of an active homing system was considered a waste of time and money.

In many respects, the R-27ER can be considered the swan song of the semi-automatic homing system. At the development stage, it became one of the most advanced missiles of its type due to its increased range and the possibility of intermediate course correction, but by the time it was accepted into service, semi-automatic guidance itself began to become obsolete. The US launched its first auto-homing missile, the AIM-120 AMRAAM, in 1991, just a year after the R-27ER.

Apparently, the Russian Air Force continues to use these missiles because their range is superior to the weakest possible adversaries, who are unlikely to have automatic homing missiles at their disposal. However, as it became clear in Syria, when danger arises from an equal or practically equal enemy, the R-27 is abandoned in favor of the R-77.

Charlie Gao studied political science and computer science at Grinnell College and is an expert on defense and national security issues.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

New times

Since 1991, the process of degradation of the armed forces of the USSR, and then Russia, began. All subsequent processes had a negative impact on all types of Air Force, Air Defense and Navy aircraft, but it was the MiG-29 that received the most painful blows. Of course, with the exception of those types that were simply destroyed entirely before their service life expired (Su-17M, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27).

Of the 4th generation fighters in Soviet aviation, the MiG-29 was the most popular. However, after the division of the army between the union republics in the Russian Air Force, the number of 29s was actually equal to the number of Su-27s. A large number of MiGs, quite fresh ones at that, remained in the Union republics. For example, almost all aircraft of this type produced in 1990 went to Belarus and Ukraine, because literally on the eve of the collapse of the Union, the regiments in Starokonstantinov and Osovtsy were saturated with them. The planes from the “groups of forces” mostly ended up in Russia - and these were not the newest aircraft produced in 1985-1988. Also in the Russian Federation, the aircraft of the very first production, which arrived in 1982-1983 at the 4th Combat Use Center, remained in the Russian Federation.

The situation with the Su-27 turned out to be better, mainly due to the fact that mass production of this type began later than the MiG-29, and the entire fleet of 27s was generally newer. In addition, the bulk of the Su-27s were stationed on the territory of the RSFSR and losses due to the “division” of the Soviet inheritance between the former fraternal republics did not greatly undermine their numbers. The following figure is of some interest: the average age of aircraft acquired by Russia in 1995 was 9.5 years for the MiG-29 and 7 years for the Su-27.

The initially designed balance of the system of two fighters was disrupted. Suddenly, the fleet of a mass-produced light fighter became almost smaller in number than the fleet of a heavy fighter. The very meaning of dividing into two types in this situation became quite absurd. Looking ahead, we can say that in the future the fleet of 29s declined faster than 27s. Thus, in 2009, the combined Air Force and Air Defense of the Russian Federation included 265 MiG-29 of old types, 326 Su-27 and 24 newly built MiG-29SMT (presumably intended for Algeria, which abandoned them in 2008). Naturally, not all of the aircraft in this number were in flying condition, but the total number of those on the balance sheet also indicates that the “heavy” fighter has become more popular than the “light” one.

As mentioned above, some other qualities were sacrificed for the sake of mass production in Soviet fighters. In particular, the assigned resource, which for the MiG-29 was set at 2500 hours or 20 years. There was simply no need for more. The excess resource was not needed by a front-line fighter, which, at the start of a full-scale war, would die without flying for perhaps 100 hours. On the other hand, the speed with which military technology was improved over the years cold war, required regular updating. The plane was aging for 20 years. In 1960, the MiG-21 seemed like a guest from the future, and in 1980, against the backdrop of the MiG-29, it seemed quite the opposite, a guest from the past. Therefore, making an aircraft with a service life of 40-50 years is not profitable - it will simply need to be written off without using up 50% of the reserve. However, already in the 90s the situation changed dramatically. The rapid change of generations of equipment slowed down, and savings required maintaining the existing machines in service as much as possible. In these conditions, the key opportunity to extend the life of aircraft was to extend their service life. However, in the case of the MiG-29, such work was not actually carried out. In reality, the planes brought to Russia gradually stopped flying, being laid up for a long time. Under open air, without any preservation. All this led to the fact that already in the 2010s the design of many machines became unusable.

The Su-27 initially had approximately the same service life as the MiG-29 - 2000 hours and 20 years of service. The devastating consequences of the collapse of the USSR also affected it, but air defense aircraft still flew a little more often. As for the MiG-31, it was saved by its initially robust design, designed for high-speed flights and the abundance of titanium and steel alloys in the design. Therefore, it was the fleet of 29s that underwent the most massive reductions. When aviation began to fly again in the 2010s, it was the 29s that were in the worst condition.

Indian Air Force Su-30MKI

The entire period of destruction and degradation in the 90s and 00s new technology I hardly shopped. Design bureaus were forced to survive as best they could. And in these conditions, luck smiled on the Sukhoi Design Bureau. One of the main customers of the Su-27 and the new Su-30 are China and India. The PRC acquired a license to assemble the Su-27, and total sales abroad amounted to at least 200 Su-27 and 450 Su-30. The number of MiG-29s sold during the same period was an order of magnitude lower. There are various reasons for this. Firstly, the largest customers had an urgent need for an aircraft with the dimensions and characteristics of the Su-27/30. This is primarily India and China. They had plenty of light fighters of their own design. And they simply did not need a MiG-29 class vehicle (PRC) or was purchased in limited quantities (India). On the other hand, Russian exporters were clearly delighted with the sales of Sushki, and they began to pay less and less attention to the promotion of the MiG, realizing that since there was a demand for Sushki, they needed to promote it as much as possible. From a trading point of view, it is quite logical and correct.

For Sukhoi's company, foreign orders allowed it to keep production in good shape (KnAAPO and Irkut) and carry out work to seriously improve the Su-27. Be that as it may, this fact must be taken into account. It was Sukhoi that received hard currency from abroad, and this became a serious trump card.

Association of Air Force and Air Defense

The next step towards destroying the “peaceful” coexistence of the two fighters was the demolition of the Soviet concept of distributing tasks between the Air Force and Air Defense. In 1998, the air defense forces were reorganized and merged with the air force. In fact, front-line aviation also ceases to exist - now we are talking about a single, universal type of armed forces. The Soviet system with separate air defense troops was caused by the extreme importance of the task of protecting its territory, which was constantly violated by reconnaissance aircraft of NATO countries. There was a danger of a massive attack by nuclear strike aircraft on the country's key facilities.

But at the same time, such an organization was extremely costly. All structures were parallelized - management, pilot training, supply, administrative apparatus. And this despite the fact that there were no fundamental obstacles to the inclusion of front-line fighters of the Air Force in the air defense. Technical issues (differences in communication frequencies, radar frequencies, guidance and control algorithms) were surmountable. The only consideration that can be accepted as significant is the inability of fighters from one regiment to simultaneously provide air defense for the country and follow the moving front of ground forces. In Soviet times, this was important. Front-line aviation was supposed to support ground forces without being distracted by anything. At the same time, the simultaneous start of hostilities by ground armies and a massive raid on the cities of the USSR was considered the norm. That is, the air defense and air forces had to operate simultaneously in different places - in such a situation, the distribution of responsibilities was inevitable.

With the collapse of the USSR and the reduction in funding, it became impossible to support two structures - both the air defense and the air force. The merger was a matter of time, and in a certain sense justified. Nowhere in the world, even in countries with a large area, are air defense troops allocated separately. Minimizing costs leads to the creation of universal fighters. At present, in fact, air defense tasks are relevant only in Peaceful time and during the threatened period. With the outbreak of a full-scale conflict with NATO, Russia is unlikely to immediately launch an active attack on the West; rather, we are talking about the defense of its territory, i.e. about the classic air defense task, not only the control and industrial centers, but also their own troops will simply cover themselves. Aviation has become too expensive a resource to solve such highly specialized problems. In addition, an invasion of masses of bombers is not expected - the payload will be dropped in the form of cruise missiles occurs at borders unattainable for air defense systems and fighters of the defending side. With a high probability, after repelling the first massive raid, the country’s air defense task will become not very relevant - either the nuclear end of the world will come, or the confrontation will move to the plane of combat operations of ground armies, without repeated massive raids on the country’s cities. The enemy simply does not have enough cruise missiles for several massive strikes, and a prolonged use will not allow short term inflict decisive damage on the Russian Federation in conditions of surprise. Finally, the country’s defended facilities are covered not only by fighters, but also by air defense systems, which are not planned to be moved to the front line with the outbreak of hostilities.

In addition, serious changes have occurred in the nature of “front-line” aviation. In particular, not every conflict today is accompanied by the existence of a clearly defined front line, and aviation has to operate in a difficult environment that excludes the stable presence of a rear and its own air control system. Of course, wars with the classical front have not gone away either - but there is an expansion of tasks and their complication for aviation, which was considered front-line in the USSR.

In the united structure, called “Air Force and Air Defense”, and then “VKS”, the two fighters were already cramped. The MiG-29, although an excellent front-line fighter, was less suited for air defense missions. It can be argued that the MiG-23, which was similar in performance characteristics, solved air defense problems quite successfully. This is true, but the MiG-23 did it under the conditions of unlimited funding of the Soviet period. Then it was possible to afford to maintain a fleet of “heavy” fighter-interceptors (MiG-25, -31 and Su-15) and a fleet of light interceptors. Their deployment depended on the spatial scope of those being covered. In particular, in the Urals and central Siberia there were no MiG-23s at all. But in modern conditions maintaining such a diverse fleet became impossible - something had to be sacrificed. And by the time of the unification in 1998, there were almost no 23 left in the air defense forces (like the Su-15 and MiG-25), but all the Su-27 and MiG-31 were preserved. With the exception of those transferred to the former republics of the USSR.

When asked about cuts and savings, the military naturally wanted to give away something that had more modest combat capabilities - i.e. light fighters. At first, the MiG-21 and 23 were retired, and when they ran out, and there was no end in sight to the reductions, we had to start gradually giving away the 29s as well. In matters of procurement it was the same, if they were going to buy something, then they wanted to purchase the most powerful weapons, i.e. Sukhoi aircraft. This is logical, because the Su-27 could solve tasks that were inaccessible to the MiG-29. The “dual” purpose initially intended for the Su-27 for the Air Force FA and the Air Defense Agency became a significant advantage.

In addition, throughout the world, tactical aviation has long been universalized for strike missions. American F-16s and F-15s have learned to work effectively against ground targets. The shortcomings of avionics are compensated by suspended sighting containers. Specialization is maintained only in very specific areas, such as “attack”, where aircraft such as the A-10 remain in service. In Russia, work has also begun in this direction, both on the MiG and Sukhoi. However, even here Sushka looked preferable. The fact is that the limit of the combat shock load of the MiG-29 was the suspension of only 4 aerial bombs with a caliber of 500 kg. While the Su-27 could take twice as much. The MiG-35 can take 6 FAB-500s, but the Su-30 can take 10, and the Su-34 can take up to 16 FAB-500s. At the same time, our Air Force was unable to completely abandon specialized bombers - the Su-34 went into production, while no one is building such aircraft anywhere in the world.

Due to foreign orders Sukhoi aircraft were constantly ready for operation and production. Measures were taken to expand their service life to 3,000 hours for the Su-30 and up to 6,000 hours for the Su-35. All this could have been done for the MiG-29, but the MiG company did not have such wide opportunities due to much more modest funding - there were an order of magnitude fewer foreign orders. But there was no interest from the domestic customer. The image of Sukhoi’s company also began to play an important role, as it beautifully displayed its cars at exhibitions. Well, the administrative resource - Sukhoi took over the entire meager flow public funds. The latter greatly irritates aviators from other companies, and there is some truth in this. However, in the new ones market conditions everyone is forced to survive as best they can. Sukhoi did it successfully. It’s always convenient to blame the state – they say they didn’t create conditions and didn’t support other producers. This is, of course, all true, and there is something to criticize the state for. But on the other hand, in conditions of limited funds, the choice is very bad - either give a little to everyone, or give to one, but a lot. Both options have their pros and cons. In any case, a similar situation with the adoption of two combat helicopters (Ka-52 and Mi-28) at once does not look like an ideal solution.

As a result, the situation with the “main” fighter itself returned to its original position, when when the PFI competition was announced in the 70s, only one, heavy fighter was considered. The MiG-29 fleet was dying out faster than other aircraft Russian aviation, and replenishment began with a weak trickle exclusively of Sukhoi-designed vehicles.

Prospects

In 2007, MiG introduced the “advanced” MiG-35 fighter. The word “promising” is put in quotation marks because the aircraft was based on the same MiG-29, created in the late 70s. If these are indeed our prospects, then, as one funny film says, “you are doing badly, comrade conscript.” And this is not at all a biased attitude towards the MiG company’s aircraft, because we are talking about the future, which in fact does not exist, neither the Su-35, nor the Su-34, nor the Su-30, nor the MiG-35.

MiG-29M2 in Zhukovsky in August 2003

MiG-35 in Zhukovsky in August 2007

MiG-35 in Lukhovitsy in January 2017. Presentation of the newest fighter. Although comparing planes by appearance It’s not a rewarding task - still, just for fun, find the differences in these three photographs.

The only promising fighter-bomber of our Air Force is the PAK-FA. The situation with modern supplies looks quite absurd in this light. Aircraft are being purchased, the effectiveness of which, compared to the foreign F-35, F-22 and domestic PAK-FA, is, to put it mildly, controversial. The thought is shocking, especially for the patriotic public, but that is the essence. To some extent, the current situation can be justified by the fact that we need to fly something, we need to keep the industry busy with something. Until the last engineers, workers and pilots from the combat regiments fled. All this should have been done in the late 90s, but for obvious reasons we started only a couple of years ago.

Su-30 and Su-35 are good, but they were needed in the mass series 10 years ago. Nevertheless, the fact that they have been producing quite a lot of them for the benefit of the Air Force for several years can still be welcomed. Even if these are aircraft that are inferior in all characteristics to the promising PAK-FA, they have a key advantage - they are entering combat units today, while the PAK-FA is still undergoing testing. This also makes them stand out against the backdrop of purely experimental MiG aircraft.

The Su-34 is produced, in principle, for the same reasons as the Su-30/35 - something needs to be flown, because the Su-24’s service life is not endless, and they are slowly becoming a thing of the past. However, as mentioned above, today aviation is too expensive to have such highly specialized aircraft as the Su-34 bomber. Nowhere in the world, not even the rich United States, can afford this. Although fighters in the role of attack aircraft lose some of their effectiveness (all American fighters when operating against ground targets are still less effective than the previously decommissioned F-111 and F-117), the savings are simply enormous. It would be much more logical to produce the same Su-30s in increased quantities instead of the 34th. However, obviously, the inertia of thinking hinders us in this matter. But the situation will become even less clear and logical when the serial PAK-FA appears. Shock missions thanks to powerful avionics, high speed and it will solve reduced visibility many times more effectively than the Su-34. What place and role will this bomber then have? It's difficult to understand. Unless the PAK-FA will clear a corridor for him, mowing down the air defense systems in the enemy’s air defense system. And then, Su-34s will be introduced into the resulting gaps that are not covered by air defense. Nevertheless, the Su-34 is again good because it has already been brought to mass production and more than a dozen vehicles are in service.

The MiG-31 survived in the 90s and 00s mainly due to its robust design, which survived a long period of downtime on the ground without catastrophic consequences for the power elements. However, the avionics of this aircraft, which shocked the imagination in the 80s, no longer looks unique today. The combat capabilities of the smaller F-35, Rafale and EF-2000 are no worse, and in a number of parameters are even better than those of the 31st. The speeds and altitudes of the MiG are not in demand today. And the cost of operation is simply cosmic. Obviously, the aircraft will serve until its service life expires and will not be replaced by anything “similar” in the new generation. The same PAK-FA solves all the tasks assigned to the MiG-31 more efficiently. A highly specialized high-altitude interceptor today is as expensive as a bomber, and therefore an endangered species.

What about the MiG-35? As usual, he is the most difficult one. It would have every chance of playing the role of a light transitional fighter, similar to the Su-30/35, if it had been tested in 2007, brought to mass production and the only question was its procurement. However, in 2017 there are only a few prototypes left, the flight tests of which, although close to completion, are still not completed. The series is planned for 2018. Moreover, for now this series is limited to a symbolic 30 cars. More like an attempt to prevent the “patient” from dying completely. A logical question arises - why? There is already a “transitional” aircraft in the form of the Su-30/35, which has been supplied in significant quantities for several years. Having started production in 2018, the MiG-35 will actually become the same age as the PAK-FA, in conditions where, despite all the “+” after the number 4 in the generation designation, there is a gigantic gap between them. And this is in a situation where our “potential friend” is already purchasing the third hundred F-35 fighters. Sadly, the MiG-35 has very little prospects. It does not have a decisive advantage in terms of performance characteristics over Sukhoi’s vehicles, is absolutely inferior to the PAK-FA and at the same time is still in the “experienced” stage, i.e. lags behind the Su-30/35 in terms of commissioning, and perhaps even the PAK-FA.

What kind of fighter does the Air Force need today?

The Russian Air Force primarily needs a heavy fighter-bomber with a long flight range and powerful avionics.

The difficult 90s greatly reduced the airfield network, which in Soviet years did not cover the country completely. There is no hope for a full revival, and even if closed airfields are partially put into operation, the coverage will remain insufficient.

To control vast spaces, you need an aircraft with a long flight duration and the ability to quickly reach the interception line. As for avionics, back in the 80s the rule was established that an increase in the weight of the equipment by 1 kg entails an increase in the weight of the airframe by 9 kg. This ratio may have become less extreme since then, due to some decrease specific gravity electronics, but the principle is unlikely to have changed radically. It is possible to have powerful avionics only on a large aircraft. A heavy fighter will always win against a light fighter in long-range combat due to its powerful avionics. In particular, the range of stable radar contact directly depends on the area of ​​the radar antenna, which is larger the larger the aircraft on which it is located. In a duel, a group of heavy fighters has a chance to be the first to detect the enemy and the first to attack with all the ensuing consequences. The first losses, even before visual contact is established, always deal a heavy psychological blow to the enemy, reduce his numbers before entering close combat and thereby contribute to success.

A large supply of fuel on a heavy fighter can be converted not into a greater flight range, but into the ability to maintain the ability to maneuver in afterburner longer than the enemy on a light fighter, without fear of using up fuel ahead of time. Or in opportunity long time loiter in the area, waiting for the enemy or a call to support ground troops. The latter is especially important - infantrymen will not need to wait for an attack aircraft or light fighter to take off and get to them - the strike will follow many times faster.

With the universalization of tactical aviation, a heavy fighter solves strike missions more effectively, delivering a significantly larger mass of bombs to the target, or a load comparable to a light fighter, but at twice the range. The previously existing advantages of light fighters in maneuverable close combat are completely offset by modern advances in the field of wing mechanization, controlled thrust vectoring and automation of aircraft control.

The MiG-29/35, unfortunately, does not fit into the future needs of the Air Force. This doesn't mean it's a bad plane - quite the opposite. The plane turned out great and fits the technical specifications perfectly. It was ideal for front-line aviation of the USSR Air Force. However, the problem is that front-line aviation of the USSR Air Force no longer exists. Conditions have changed. Money for defense is no longer allocated “as much as needed.” Therefore, a choice will have to be made.

The USA also has its own wonderful aircraft - the F-16, for example. But no one there is presenting this fighter as promising. They are working on a completely new F-35. This work is not without difficulties. However, this, albeit difficult, is a step into the future. The same cannot be said about the MiG-35. The Americans squeezed out of the F-16 design exactly as much as it was possible to squeeze out, without harm or competition for the new generation. What are we doing? By 2020, when the Americans receive their 400th F-35, we will only begin production of the aircraft that was supposed to appear in the 90s. The lag is 30 years. The only argument in favor of producing the MiG-35 is the desire to support the famous MiG company, which you really don’t want to lose.

A picky reader may think that the author’s goal is to throw mud at a wonderful aircraft - the MiG-29 and its descendants in the form of the MiG-35. Or offend the MiG team. Not at all. The current situation is not the fault of the team, and the MiG aircraft are excellent. It's not their fault that they are wonderful technical solutions and a beautiful aircraft fell out of the once harmonious weapons system, and modernizations were not introduced on time. Main question- let all this be true, but isn’t it worth concentrating today on creating something new, rather than passing off airplanes from the past (even excellent airplanes) as a great achievement of the present and future.

We arrived at the hangar that the Su-29 shares with the Guards Yak-52. Previously, you could see it in Severka. Cold hangar.

And here comes Suchok. In 1990, the Sukhoi Design Bureau began work on the creation of a two-seat training and sports aircraft Su-29, which is further development Su-26M. The two-seat sports aerobatic aircraft Su-29 is designed for training, training and participation of pilots in competitions aerobatics and demonstration performances at air shows, as well as to maintain flying skills by military and civil aviation pilots.

In 1991, construction began on two aircraft prototypes intended for flight tests, as well as two for statistical tests.

At the end of 1991, the first experimental Su-29 took off, and in May 1992 the first production aircraft flew. Serial production began in the spring of 1992 at the Lukhovitsky Aviation Plant.

In 1994, an experimental Su-29KS was created, equipped with SKS-94 ejection seats developed by the Zvezda association. The serial modification of the training vehicle with ejection seats was designated Su-29M.

Su-29 plate, serial number 7506 and year of manufacture 1994. We don’t have an ejection seat, so it’s just Su-29.

To date, more than 60 Su-29 aircraft have been produced. They are used not only in Russia, but also in Australia, Great Britain, the USA, South Africa and other countries. More precisely, in Russia there are much fewer of them than in the rest of the world.

Evgeniy Vyacheslavovich masters the aircraft cockpit.

In 1997, the Argentine Air Force decided to purchase seven Su-29 aircraft, which are supposed to be used to improve pilot training. The Argentine trainers are equipped with a West German-made propeller, a cockpit canopy made in Sweden, as well as American landing gear wheels and avionics (including a GPS satellite navigation system receiver). In 1999, the delivery of Su-29 aircraft to Argentina was completed.

The aircraft was created on the basis of the Su-26M and borrowed many structural and technological solutions from his predecessor. At the same time, Roman Nikolaevich told me that there are almost no interchangeable spare parts between 26 and 29. The fuselage design here is completely different: the truss is only where the pilots are, and the tail section is like a monocoque, unlike the entire truss of the Su-26?

At the same time, thanks to the widespread introduction of composite materials, the share of which in the Su-29 aircraft exceeded 60%, the weight of the empty aircraft increased by only 50 kg. When flying with one pilot, the aircraft is not inferior in its characteristics to the Su-26M.

External differences consist of a slight increase in the wing span and length of the aircraft. Aerodynamics have been slightly improved. To increase maneuverability, static stability has been reduced.

Guards Yak-52 from the other side

The Su-29 also came here from the USA, where it had the number N229SU, but how many are there still in Russia or are they all over the hill?

External power and air

front cabin

general form front cabin. Very comfortable chair, you recline, very spacious and good view

a simple dashboard, as always without a horizon

Only 760 hours of flight time?

pedal assembly with belts. Very comfortably

switching tanks. The fuel is placed in the fuselage and two wing tanks with a total capacity of 276 liters. Basically something around 60 liters. Wing tanks are for ferrying only.

Photo 176.

Everything is done thoroughly. And why aren’t we making such planes now?

Rear, main cabin. Flights with one pilot are carried out from the 2nd (rear) cabin.

view from the rear cabin

here the set of instruments is richer, but also mainly engine control instruments, of flight navigation instruments only speed and altitude.

but at the same time the cabin is much more spacious and more comfortable than the Yak-52, well, it seemed to me...

company logo

It’s surprising, but here I can reach the pedals completely

syringe jammed in the cold

Photo 185.

everything is very functional

Photo 189.

nowhere without a pillow

Cuba fills the main tank with 100th gasoline

The power plant consists of an M-14P air-cooled piston star engine with a three-blade propeller.

The wingspan is a little more than 8 meters, for example, the Husky has almost 11 meters

what kind of hollows for the head

Photo 198.

general view of the rear cabin

Oil tank capacity - 20 l.

In such cold weather it is very difficult to be extremely careful, but the guys try to maintain cleanliness.

Photo 202.

And Roman Nikolaevich creates, zip ties are a very useful thing

Photo 204.

Photo 205.

Tail wheel. It looks like it’s imported and tubeless made of cast rubber. Ours are usually larger and can be inflated.

Photo 207.

And the main stand is simply a work of art

Photo 209.

Photo 210.

Why are there such windows on the side of the fuselage?

Well, a general view of the aircraft

Photo 213.

Photo 214.

The frame that shows the angle relative to the horizon for aerobatics has been removed for now

Modifications
Su-29 - basic.
Su-29KS - experienced Su-29 with ejection seat SKS-94 (1994).
Su-29M - serial Su-29 with an SKS-94 ejection seat.
Su-29AR - modification for the Argentine Air Force.
Su-29T (Su-31) is a single-seat aerobatic aircraft.

The price of the aircraft was 190 thousand US dollars then, now they are sold for more than 200 thousand in the USA
the other side is also closed

Well, the engine is constantly warming up

By the beginning of 2003, 153 sports aircraft of the Su brand (Su-26, Su-29, Su-31) were produced, of which 128 were delivered to foreign customers. Offers for the sale of such aircraft, I mean Su-29 and Su -31 is not that much.
everything is ready, let's assemble

Flight performance

Engine M-14P
Takeoff power, hp 360
Dimensions, m:
wingspan 8.2
length 7.29
height 2.89
Wing area, m2 12.2
Weight, kg
empty 735
take-off with 1 crew member 860
take-off with 2 crew members 1204
Fuel capacity, kg 207
Speed, km/h
maximum 325
maximum dive 450
stall 115
Maximum permissible overloads:
positive 12
negative 10
Ferry flight range, km 1200
Practical ceiling, m 4000
Crew, people 2