Office of the Chief of Logistics of the Strategic Missile Forces. Management of the rear of the Russian contingent in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts - ivagkin
2. REAR MANAGEMENT POINTS.
To control units (subunits) in a division (brigade, regiment), a system of command posts is deployed. One of its mandatory elements, as a rule, is the rear control point (TPU). It controls the rear and parts (subdivisions) of technical support.
in separate battalions material support and separate medical battalions, command posts (CP) are organized to control units.
The commanders of companies (platoons) for the material support of automobile, medical and other rear units manage them from their command posts (CP).
At the TPU there are rear management bodies and command and control bodies subordinate to the deputy commander for armaments, departments (officers) of the headquarters of the regiment6 in charge of accounting and recruiting, as well as other bodies and officers that are not part of the command and reserve command
mand items.
To organize communications, ensure the placement and movement of TPU personnel and maintenance technical means the management of their communications units and the commandant platoon is allocated personnel, command and staff and staff vehicles, vehicles and means of communication.
In total, TPU can have:
In a division - up to 120 personnel and 25-30 vehicles;
In a brigade, a regiment - 35-40 people and 8-10 cars.
TPU is headed by the deputy commander of the rear unit. This means that on issues of accommodation, movement, internal regulations, commandant service, organization of protection, security and defense, as well as the use of communications and control automation, all officials who are part of the TPU fulfill it instructions. The time and place of deployment of the TPU is determined by the commander or chief of staff of the regiment.
The location of the transport hub should be known only to those officials who need it to perform their official duties.
Typically, the TPU is deployed in the area where the main forces and means of the regimental rear are located, from where the continuity of rear management, communication with its command post, command posts of battalions, divisions and TPU of the formation is ensured.
However, it usually includes the following elements:
rear control group;
Technical Support Units Management Group;
group of others officials located at TPU, but not included in the specified control groups;
Communication node;
Support group.
The listed elements of TPU may include:
To the rear command group:
Deputy Commander for Logistics;
Head of fuel service;
Heads of food, clothing, medical services.
To the technical support department management group:
Deputy Commander for Armaments;
Heads of RAV, BT and AS services.
To a group of other officials:
Combat part of the headquarters;
Head of financial service and other persons.
The communication node is: . KShM, individual radio stations, complex hardware communications, individual mobile communications equipment, a landing pad for communications helicopters.
Support group includes: . personnel, vehicles and property of support units.
The size of the area for the placement of the TPU depends on the nature of the terrain and the appropriate placement of its elements.
In a brigade (regiment) they can be 150x300 m, in a division 250x1500 m. computers with self-contained power supply, sound recording equipment, instruments and devices for making calculations, means of collecting data on the situation and other technical means of control in accordance with the nature and volume of work of an official or governing body.
Medium power radio stations are moved outside the TPU area at a distance of up to 1 km in order to eliminate interference in the operation of other radio stations and provide radio masking. Landing landing for communication helicopters is equipped at a distance of 3-5 km from the TPU.
The location and equipment of the transport hub should ensure reliable communication with combat units, rear services and technical support units, with the command post of the unit, with the transport hub of the superior formation and neighboring units, as well as inside the transport hub, the convenience of work and rest of officials, the possibility of their personal communication, survivability TPU.
TPU survivability largely depends on its reliable protection, protection and defense.
TPU must be equipped in engineering terms and carefully masked.
To conduct radiation chemical and bacteriological (biological) reconnaissance in the TPU area, a chemical observation post is deployed by chemical protection units.
In addition, all security posts and patrols monitor and report on command if signs of infection are found.
TPU security is provided by a system of round-the-clock and night posts and round-the-clock patrols on the outer approaches to the area of its location and inside the area, as well as by blocking the access routes to it. TPU security is based on a circular system and is included in common system rear defense and technical support units.
Moving the TPU is carried out only with the permission of the commander or chief of staff, with the expectation of maintaining continuous sustainable control of the rear and technical support units. The movement is organized by the deputy commander for logistics.
When the TPU fails, temporary rear control, as mentioned earlier, is transmitted:
In connection: at the TPU of one of the units or at the command post (control point) of a separate battalion (company) of material support;
In part: to her command post.
To ensure the continuity of rear management in case of TPU failure, it is necessary to foresee the redistribution functional duties officials and the rapid restoration of the disrupted rear communications system.
PLA cooperates with the Ministry state security, Ministry of Public Security, Customs and financial services. Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China. Recently, another direction has also been developed - the creation, on the basis of existing formations, of mobile forces of the PLA, intended for operations in local conflicts along the perimeter ...
... : pursuit, cover, blocking, search, encirclement and detention. TRAINING QUESTIONS 1st training question: Features of the combat activity of the border detachment during the search and repulse of the invasion and their impact on the organization of food supply Border search is the most difficult type of service and combat activity of the border troops, which is carried out in order to ...
...) with a width of 5-8 km (up to 5 km) and a depth of up to 12 km (3 km). The width of the offensive front of a tank battalion tactical group (for TB - 3 km or more), the width of the defense area and its depth (3-5 km) are similar to the above-mentioned standards for a motorized infantry battalion. gr. The principle and procedure for the use of units in combat Features of the combat use of battalion tactical groups With the adoption of the concept of "air-ground ...
On the main line of defense, there are reserves, command posts, army aviation in base areas, air defense facilities and other important facilities. Conducting an offensive against the defending enemy with advancement from the depths. The advancement of regimental units to the line of transition to the attack and fire defeat. Attack. Fulfillment of the nearest task by the regiment. Attacking a defending enemy with...
“Military rear”
Topic #7"Fundamentals of military rear management"
Lesson #1"Organization of rear management"
Educational and educational goals:
study the procedure for issuing a work card for the deputy commander of the rear unit.
Time: 2 hours
Conduct method: lecture
Location: lecture hall
Logistics:
Posters, stands.
Literature: 1. Instruction on the rear, ch.3, art. 124-168.
2. "Army economy", textbook
3. Guide to the accounting of materiel in the army and navy. Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 333 dated 08.10.2003
4. Instructions on the military (ship) economy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 1 dated 05.01.2005
5. Charter of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan
6. Combat charter of the ground forces. Part II Battalion, company.
7. Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 275 dated 08.07.2006.
Study questions and timing
№__________Subject Questions __________________ Time (min)
|
IOrganization of the lesson | ||
|
IIMain part | ||
|
Introduction 1. Rear control system. Fundamentals of the work of officials in the management of the rear in the preparation and during combat operations. Combat documents of the rear. Working card of the deputy commander for logistics and the procedure for its execution. Order on the rear and the order of its development. Reports (report on the rear). Rear command post of the brigade (regiment) | ||
|
2. The procedure for moving and deploying TPU on the ground. Engineering equipment. Drawing up a layout of the TPU brigade (regiment) on the ground | ||
|
IIIConclusion |
Lesson progress
I Organization of classes
Leader actions:
accept the report of the platoon duty officer;
check the availability of students, readiness for employment, material support;
conduct a quiz on the topic covered;
state the topic and purpose of the lesson.
Introduction
The success of logistic and rear services technical support in troop combat operations is achieved by implementing an appropriate set of measures, including continuous and firm control of the rear.
The combined-arms headquarters is the main body of command and control of the troops, including the military rear.
Future officers should keep in mind that today there are certain shortcomings in the management of both the troops and the military rear. The experience of command-staff and tactical-special exercises and training shows that commanders, staffs, and chiefs of logistics services show insufficient diligence and firmness in planning and organizing logistics and technical support for troops, do not apply the method of parallel work insufficiently, pay little attention to ensuring the survivability of the rear control system, the introduction of important field controls and automated control systems, do not fully use the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the experience of wars in Afghanistan, Chechnya and the Batken events and other local conflicts.
Training question: Logistics control system. Basics of work
rear management officials
preparation and during combat operations
Rear management is an integral part of command and control. It consists in the purposeful activity of commanders, headquarters, deputy rear commanders, heads of services and other officials of units to maintain the combat readiness of the rear, prepare it to provide units during combat operations and guide them in the performance of assigned tasks.
Rear management includes:
continuous acquisition, collection, study and analysis of data from the environment;
decision-making on the organization of the rear and rear services of the technical support of units;
bringing tasks to subordinates;
planning for the provision of units during combat operations;
organizing and maintaining interaction between various services and rear units;
organizing and carrying out activities for the rear to increase and maintain combat readiness of units and ensure their combat capability;
organizing and carrying out activities to increase and maintain the combat readiness of the rear, its protection, protection and defense;
organization of the rear management system;
direct management of the preparation of the rear for the fulfillment of tasks and its actions during hostilities;
organization and implementation of control, as well as other activities.
Rear management must be stable, continuous, operational, covert and provide effective use the capabilities of the rear units, subunits and the fulfillment of their assigned tasks on time and in any conditions of the situation.
The essence of the organization of the management of the military rear lies, first of all, in the activities (work) of officials of the control bodies.
The structure of the governing bodies of both operational and tactical instances is determined by the approved states.
At present, there are many states in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, depending on the state and certain tasks of brigades (regiments). For example, brigades (regiments) of constant readiness have states close to wartime.
The staff of the base for storing weapons and equipment in peacetime has been significantly reduced in comparison with parts of the state border cover.
Reliable and effective management of the rear requires: a high level of professional training and organizational work of deputy rear commanders and heads of services, commanders of rear units, and all other officials military rear; their deep understanding of the nature and methods of conducting modern combat operations, the principles of organizing the rear and technical support of the brigade (regiment); solid knowledge of the possibilities and principles of the use of subordinate rear services; the ability to correctly understand the tasks set by senior commanders and assess the situation; foresight and foresight; high efficiency and organization in work when making decisions, setting tasks for subordinates and planning support; discipline and diligence, the manifestation of reasonable initiative, the skillful use of communications, automation and mechanization of rear management.
To do this, a rear management system is created in the brigade (regiment), which includes:
rear controls;
rear control points;
rear communications system;
complexes and means of automation of rear control
special systems (alerts, etc.)
The system should have high combat readiness and provide the possibility of both centralized and decentralized control.
Consider the elements of this system:
a) rear controls.
Commander in charge the rear personally, through the headquarters of the formation (unit), his deputies for rear and armaments (for the technical part), the chiefs of the armed forces and the chiefs of services directly subordinate to him.
Headquarters formations (units), organizing comprehensive support for hostilities, promptly communicates to the deputy commanders for logistics and armaments (for the technical part) the orders and instructions of the commander for logistics and other data necessary for planning and organizing logistics and technical support, informs them of changes in the setting; coordinates the work of all officials to provide units (subdivisions); allocates, by order of the commander, additional forces and means for protection, security, defense, organizing rear communications and solving other tasks to ensure his actions.
Deputy Commander for Logistics manages the rear personally, through the organizational and planning department and the heads of services.
The organizational and planning department is the main control body for the rear of the formation. It carries out its work on the basis of the orders and instructions of the deputy commander for logistics, the headquarters of the unit and the higher headquarters of the logistics in close cooperation with the chiefs of the military branches and the chiefs of services subordinate to the direct commander.
Heads of the rear services are responsible for the corresponding types of logistics support for units (subunits) and technical support for their services. They organize the actions of the rear units (subunits) subordinate to them, report to the Deputy Rear Commander the data necessary for planning and organizing the support of the units (subunits); submit applications for the delivery of materiel and evacuation; participate in the development of draft orders (orders) on the rear and the organization plan logistic support; plan and organize the provision of units (subdivisions) for subordinate services; take measures to replenish stocks of materiel in combat units (subdivisions) and in the unit (subdivision) of the material support of a formation (brigade, regiment); organize the correct technical operation, maintenance, repair and evacuation of the relevant equipment
b) rear control points - will be discussed in the second question of this lecture.
c) rear communications system.
Communication is the main means of control. To control the rear, units and technical support units, the following are used: radio, wire, mobile and signal communications.
With the help of these means, radiotelephone, radio auditory, telephone, signal communication and data transmission are organized, and by mobile means - courier-postal communication. All technical means of communication are used in a complex with the use of automatic encryption and coding equipment, code tables and signal tables.
In the formations and units where the control of the rear, units and technical support units is carried out from the TPU, rear communications systems are created, which are constituent parts communication systems of the corresponding connections (parts). In formations and units where TPUs are not created, as well as in battalions and divisions, the control of the rear and technical support units is carried out using the communication systems of these formations and units (battalions, divisions).
The communication system for the rear of the formation (unit) includes: communication centers of TPU, command posts (control centers) of the rear units (subdivisions) and technical support units (subdivisions); direct communication lines between command posts and launchers, deployed by forces and means of rear units (subunits) and technical support; links of communication nodes of TPU (KP, PU) to the core communication network.
Logistics communications are planned and organized in accordance with the instructions of the chief of staff and the decision of the deputy commander for logistics, taking into account the availability and condition of forces and means of communication. Directly organizes the communications of the rear - the head of communications of the formation (unit).
From the TPU of the formation (unit), communication is organized with the deputy commanders of the units for logistics and armaments (commanders of battalions, divisions), commanders of subordinate rear units (divisions) and commanders of technical support units (divisions).
d) complexes and means of automation of rear management.
To increase the effectiveness of rear management, automated complexes and automation tools should be widely used. Their use ensures high efficiency in collecting, processing and issuing information, reducing the time for assessing the situation, bringing tasks (signals, codes) to the executors and monitoring the implementation of orders and instructions given.
In all cases, the organization and methods of work should ensure:
firm and continuous control of the rear;
timely decision-making, full and high-quality implementation of measures for planning and organizing the provision of brigade (regiment) units;
coordinated activities of officials in all links of the rear;
providing subordinates with as much time as possible for direct preparation for the tasks;
prompt response to changing conditions;
the most efficient use of forces and means of the rear.
The basis for starting work in a brigade (regiment) is the decision of the brigade (regiment) commander and his instructions on logistics and technical support. In other words, you need to understand the main thing - to determine the procedure for the work of officials of the rear services with the receipt of a task from the commander for logistics and technical support. Answer the question: “to whom, what, by what time to execute, to whom and in what form to present the results of work in the course of preparing the rear for the combat mission of the brigade (regiment).”
From the experience of the Great Patriotic War, local wars, as well as ongoing exercises, two main methods of work of commanders (chiefs) are known.
When making a decision, setting tasks and planning logistic support in a brigade (regiment), various methods of work can be used:
consistent method of work;
parallel method of operation or a combination of both.
Sequential method used for long periods of preparation for hostilities. At the same time, each instance is included in the work after the decision is made by the higher commander (commander) on the basis of the issued combat order or combat order, as well as orders and instructions for the rear. Planning of combat operations, including their support, is carried out sequentially (as planning is completed to a higher authority).
Parallel operation method It is used for limited periods of preparation for hostilities and is the main one. At the same time, decision-making and planning of combat operations, including their support, in the lower echelons begins immediately after the decisions are made by senior commanders and tasks are set, and if there is not enough time, after the senior commanders develop only the first element of the decision - the concept of an operation (combat) on on the basis of advance combat orders and advance orders for the rear.
For the purpose of timely preparation of the rear, the commander of a formation (unit), having clarified the task, orients his deputy for rear on the upcoming actions of the units (subunits) within the limits of the necessary and gives instructions that may include: the main tasks of the rear; direction of concentration of its main efforts; rear readiness time; by what date and what data to prepare for making a decision on military operations. Deputy commander of a brigade (regiment) for the rear, guided by the data orienteering, instructions of the commander and an order (instruction) for the rear of the higher command explains the task, calculates the time, orients the subordinate heads of services about the nature of the upcoming hostilities, assesses the situation. Then he makes a decision on the organization of rear and rear services technical support for units in the upcoming hostilities, coordinates it with the chief of staff of the brigade (regiment) and reports to the commander for approval at the appointed time.
Then he organizes the setting of tasks for subdivisions and rear services, planning of logistics and rear services for technical support, interaction of the rear, conducts organizational work in subunits and rear services to prepare for combat operations in the rear.
In the decision of the deputy brigade (regiment) commander for logistics on the organization of support for units in the upcoming hostilities, the following are determined:
rear task;
the direction of concentration of his main efforts, areas, time of deployment and movement of rear units, the size and timing of the creation of stocks of material resources, their separation, consumption rates, the order of delivery;
ways of supply and evacuation, the timing of their preparation, the forces and means allocated for this;
organization of technical support services and medical support;
the main measures for the protection, protection, defense of the rear and technical support units;
rear readiness time;
rear management organization.
The decision is drawn up on a map with an explanatory note in the form of a Logistics Organization Plan. In the brigade (regiment) - on the working card of the deputy commander for rear with the necessary calculations. At the same time, the main tasks for organizing educational work in the rear are determined.
When planning provision for the services, each head of the service enters the necessary information on his work card and prepares the corresponding calculations.
Logistics organization plan is the main document coordinating the actions of all types of troops and services of a formation (unit) in solving the general tasks of the rear and rear services of technical support of units (subunits) during preparation and during combat operations.
In May 2013, the 4th International scientific and practical conference "War and weapons. New research and materials".
We bring to your attention the article by V.V. Naumov "Experience in organizing the management of the rear of the Russian contingent in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts", published in part III of the proceedings of the conference.
Photo (c) A.A. Kovylkov, correspondent of the newspaper "Military Bulletin of the South of Russia" / fotki.yandex.ru/users/kovilkov/album/827 31/
Another, the third since the withdrawal from the composition former USSR, Georgia's attempt to liquidate the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia by force of arms, and after that liquidate Abkhazia, ended in a decisive defeat of the Georgian invasion forces.
Armed action against South Ossetia, in which the Georgian side invested a significant part of its accumulated last years military potential, has become, perhaps, the most fleeting regional armed conflict in the post-Soviet space.
In the course of the operation, the analysis of the experience gained in the conduct of combat operations of troops, as well as their logistic support and command and control, deserves attention. Logistics management is an integral part of command and control of troops and consists in the purposeful activities of commanders (commanders), deputy commanders (commanders) for logistics, logistics headquarters to maintain logistics in high degree combat readiness, preparing him for the fulfillment of assigned tasks and leading formations, units, rear organizations (SCOT) in the course of their implementation.
It should be noted that the management of the rear during the operation was built according to the classical scheme: Center - military district - association - formation - military unit - subdivision.
At the same time, the management of the rear consisted in the development and implementation of measures to create a rear management system, maintain high combat readiness, develop and build up its stable and continuous functioning, as well as rapid recovery during the operation.
The complexity of organizing rear management in the operation was that in its preparation and conduct it was necessary to take into account the influence of such factors as: surprise and unpredictability of the actions of the Georgian side; insufficient degree of awareness of the rear management bodies about the upcoming tasks; staffing of units and subunits of the rear, as well as rear management bodies at all levels in peacetime states; physical-geographical and climatic conditions; lack of controls and a significant reduction in their capabilities in mountainous areas.
Link: Center
To manage the logistics of groupings of troops (forces), the Logistics Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation deployed a rear management system. It included the operational group (OG) of the rear control of the Center, the rear control authorities of the directions, the North Caucasian Military District, 58 A, 4 A of the Air Force and Air Defense, the Black Sea Fleet, rear control points (points) of 58 A, 4 A of the Air Force and Air Defense, 19 MSD, 42 MSD, formations and units of the Airborne Forces, forces special purpose and other formations and military units that are part of groupings of troops, as well as units and military units of communications and automation.
The work of the military control bodies of the rear, in accordance with the nature of the conduct of hostilities, can be logically conditionally divided into 3 stages:
Stage 1: management of subordinate formations, units and organizations in preparation for the operation;
Stage 2: management of logistic support of the units participating in the operation to force Georgia to peace;
Stage 3: management of logistics support for troops during their withdrawal to their original positions, the formation of motorized rifle brigades and posts.
A threefold task was set before the rear control bodies from the Center to the formation: to build a vertical of control along the trunk of responsibility; timely forecast the development of the logistics situation; make a proactive assessment of the development of events.
During the first stage, measures were taken for the advance and direct preparation of the rear.
At the same time, advance preparation of the rear to provide formations and units in the operation included: the implementation of a set of measures with the development of all plans for the operation and policy documents in relation to several standard options environment. Anticipating a significant increase in the volume of logistic support tasks associated with a likely increase in the size of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, limited time parameters, and the complexity of geographical conditions, the Logistics Headquarters of the RF Armed Forces developed a number of preparatory measures to bring material and transport resources closer to potential conflict zones.
The Headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation prepared and sent to the North Caucasian Military District instructions from the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the creation of increased stocks of materiel (for 30 days, including military stocks - in military units (subdivisions) for 6 days, carryover stocks - in a joint warehouse SSPM and separate departments of storage of KSPM for the entire grouping of troops (forces) for 24 days) and the formation of an integrated logistics base in the settlement. Gudauta and the joint warehouse in the village of Java.
Direct training was carried out in as soon as possible already in the second stage. At the beginning of the operation, the control of the rear of the groupings of troops (forces) was carried out from the rear control point of the North Caucasus Military District, later, in order to fulfill the triune task, it was decided to create an OG in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts. They included generals and staff officers and central offices Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
This measure made it possible to maintain the controllability of the logistics support system, especially during the period of a dynamic increase in the composition of groupings of troops and rear in conflict zones. Working directly in formations and military units, operational groups obtained information about the real state of the military rear; provided them with practical assistance; promptly brought to the Center information about changes in the provision of troops with materiel and transport resources.
An analysis of the activities of the rear management bodies from the Center to the division inclusive showed that all plans for the use and support, combat crews, and urgent reports were forgotten. Literally, each calculation of the need for certain material resources had to be developed anew, as if before that there had been no developments, reconciliations and clarifications of planning documents.
With the outbreak of hostilities, combat crews did not provide for the procedure for the provision of reporting and administrative documents by military command and control bodies, SCOT. From the entire list of urgent reports in the prescribed form, the following were submitted: a report on the rear of the Black Sea Fleet (in the Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - from August 14 this year), a summary of the rear of the Air Force Civil Code (in the Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - from August 8 this year) and a summary on the rear of the Airborne Forces (in the Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - from August 15 of this year). By the timing of submission, it is clear that the reports began to arrive at the Staff of the RF Armed Forces with a delay of up to seven days from the start of hostilities.
In terms of their content, the reports were declarative in nature, and, as a rule, were the initiative development of officials. At the same time, the necessary analytics based on objective calculated data was absent. In addition, in violation of the requirements of the statutory documents most of Quantitative indicators were calculated not in RFE (with the exception of reports of the Airborne Forces), but in physical units of measurement, which did not allow assessing the compliance of the level of security of groupings of troops with the established standards. In summaries, as can be seen from Table. 1, not all required sections were worked out.
Table 1. The quality and completeness of the logistic reports submitted
| Logistics sections | Black Sea Fleet | Airborne | air force |
| rear deployment areas | + | + | + |
| financial security | + | + | + |
| data on the delivery of materiel | + | + | - |
| condition of transportation routes and vehicles | + | + | + |
| data on technical support for rear services (failure of equipment, repair and evacuation of rear equipment) | - | + | - |
| health care data | - | + | - |
| losses from the impact of the enemy | + | + | + |
| trophy details | - | + | + |
| conclusions about the state of the rear (degree of combat readiness) | - | + | - |
| applications for missing (necessary) material and technical means | + | - | - |
The exchange of operational information between the military command and control bodies was carried out inefficiently, because. these tasks were performed by individual officials, while the rest of the operational staff was engaged in daily activities. It was difficult to collect information about the state and operation of bases (warehouses).
This negatively affected the coherence of the actions of the entire vertical of rear management, up to the military level. Due to the poorly organized information exchange, information about the real situation of the troops (forces) and their security was collected with difficulty, the information was frankly scarce, and often contradictory.
A number of bodies of the military command and control of the rear, including those that are part of the Civil Defense Command, which are entrusted with the function of ensuring the peacekeeping mission, were excluded from this process.
The rear management system did not ensure the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to it, the required stability and efficiency, was poorly adapted to work within the framework of an interdepartmental joint operation, and generally remained at the level of the 80s of the last century. The communication system, primarily its technical
state, did not ensure the reliability of the control of the rear of the land group, and especially in mountainous conditions.
The peculiarities of rear management in the course of the completed peacekeeping operation were that the control bodies operated in peacetime states, the personnel were not called from vacations and business trips, and the activities of everyday “peaceful” activities were carried out in full. The officers of the headquarters and rear services worked according to peacetime documents, which did not provide for the development of those documents that they should work out during operations. With the beginning of the conflict, the rear management system, which worked quite quickly and steadily in everyday mode, gave some failures.
1. Violations of the stability of the functioning of the communication system. To ensure the stability and continuity of the communication system in the Rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, it was proposed to create a mobile communication center of constant readiness.
2. Problems with the organization of communications were identified in the work of the central command post for the rear of the Navy. It is proposed to equip the headquarters of the rear of the Navy with radiotelegraph equipment and create a subscriber station for receiving secret electronic correspondence.
3. One of the problems was of a systemic nature and consisted in the fact that units and subunits of the rear, according to the Combat Regulations, are not included in the battle order of a division (brigade, regiment). And the tasks in the combat order are set only for the elements of the combat (marching) order. In the course of coordinating the draft Combat Manual, the headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation drew the attention of the developers to this. After all, the order of battle is the formation of formations (units) for combat. And the bodies of the military rear are organizationally included in the states of these formations and military units. Therefore, they should also be included in the battle order. Moreover, the rear is part of the operational formation. But these arguments were not taken into account.
As a result, there was a discrepancy between the theoretical views of the developers of the charter and objective reality, as a result of which the battalion rear and the rear of divisions turned out to be the only full-fledged echelon in the combat zone in the military rear. Those tasks that were supposed to be solved by regimental and divisional transport vehicles had to be performed by district automobile battalions. And the tasks of the district transport had to be assigned to the automobile battalion, transferred from the Center.
In order to exclude the prerequisites for a recurrence of negative examples, it is proposed to include units and subunits of the military rear in the battle order, similar to how formations and units of the rear are included in the operational formation of troops. It is proposed to petition for amendments to the Combat Regulations regarding the inclusion of subunits and military units of the rear in the composition of the battle order, taking into account the presence of a rear in the operational formation of formations and the experience gained.
4. The procedure for the transition of military control bodies to wartime documents has not been determined.
With the beginning of the use of interspecific groupings of troops in conflicts of any intensity, it was proposed to put into effect the Report Card of Urgent Reports on war time for all involved units, military units, formations, associations and authorities. At the same time, it was proposed to provide for the appearance in the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of bodies of orders and deliveries, perpetuating the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland, as well as subordination to the head of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Railway Troops.
Operational link
The Logistics Directorate of the North Caucasus Military District actually prepared the operation in the course of combat operations, and the previously developed plans were only partially implemented.
From the beginning of the operation, the logistics management of the active grouping of troops (forces) was built in accordance with the scheme for organizing the management of troops and was carried out through the regular logistics management bodies of the units and subunits, as well as through the operational logistics groups (OGT), formed at the expense of the personnel of the Logistics Directorates of the North Caucasus Military District and 58 BUT.
Combat crews did not provide for the procedure for the provision by military command and control bodies, SCOT with the start of hostilities of reporting and administrative documents.
The presence of incomplete and untimely information on the provision of troops with basic types of materiel (ammunition, fuel, food), as well as the lack of real information at a certain point in time on the volume of need for their transportation and the state of the rear created significant difficulties in planning the logistics of troops (forces) and development of regulatory documents.
Taking into account the fact that the fixed communication network in South Ossetia was disabled by air and artillery strikes of the Georgian army, and field communication lines were not built, the basis of the communication system was satellite and radio communications, which were used to organize direct communications.
The rear of the Air Force and Air Defense Army was controlled by the Chief of Logistics - Deputy Commander of Aviation and Air Defense Forces - from the rear control point. Management was organized using the forces and means of the Air Force communications system. It was carried out by setting tasks and separate orders issued personally by superiors to their subordinates using technical means of communication or through their representatives. However, the established algorithm of work and the air force and air defense rear services was not maintained.
Rear management Black Sea Fleet carried out from the day-to-day control point. The work of the Deputy Commander of the Fleet for Logistics in the subordinates of the SCOT in organizing the fulfillment of the assigned tasks was carried out by exercising personal control over the correct understanding, timely and accurate execution of the given orders and providing the necessary assistance to subordinates. There were no failures in the Black Sea Fleet rear management system.
As a result, on the part of the operational rear, primarily the rear departments of the North Caucasus Military District and 58 A, organizational activities to ensure the advancement and deployment of district and army military units, as well as troops arriving in the composition of the interspecific grouping being created from other regions, were not carried out.
At the third stage, the logistic support management system in the conflict zone consisted of the following structure of levels of command and control: NKVD rear OG - 58A rear OG - NT formations - NT units and subunits - posts.
An audit by the Logistics Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation showed that this structure was incapacitated.
All instructions and orders of the chief of logistics and the chiefs of logistics services of the North Caucasus Military District did not go beyond the army level. The military link generally fell out of the management process. A situation has arisen in which information from the “top” does not reach the “bottom”, and the “bottom”, in turn, cannot reach the “top”.
In the course of the inspection by the commission of the Logistics Headquarters of the RF Armed Forces of the troops located in the zones of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts, the logistics management vertical was restored, which consisted in the creation of a single operational logistics group headed by the head of logistics 58 A (in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict ), with the subordination of officers of the operational groups of the rear services of the district, as well as the heads of warehouses.
The bulk of the shortcomings were made not because of a lack of resources, but because of the lack of organization of specific officials.
Problematic issues and solutions:
1. Violations of the stability of the functioning of the communications system for the rear of the North Caucasus Military District. It is proposed to restore the TPU 58 A communication center in order to maintain it in constant combat readiness.
2. Significant problems in the work of the OUT were created by the almost complete lack of communication. The funds intended for the work of the deputy commanders of the SCOT were absent or did not work. The means of communication that ensured the combat work of the deputy commanders of the rear units were not provided by the states, both between the logistics control bodies themselves at all levels, and with subordinate forces and means, especially during the advancement of troops in mountainous wooded areas. In this regard, the daily collection, generalization and analysis of the tactical and rear situation were actually paralyzed.
Documents from the rear department at the command post of the operational group of the North Caucasus Military District were not kept in a timely manner. Reports in the links "connection - military unit" were worked out untimely and biased, and the link "unit" was practically excluded from this work.
Taking into account the prospect of the transition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to a brigade structure, it was proposed to develop the structure and composition of the brigade rear, taking into account the reorganization of the battalion level, as well as the district rear, capable of simultaneously providing formations and military units of the district set, on a modular basis to form the most approximate to the provided interspecific groupings of troops, the necessary rear groupings.
Military link
The performance of combat missions was carried out by battalion tactical groups (BTGr). At the same time, the chiefs of the rear of the battalions, on which the main burden lay at the military level, did not have regular means of control and communication, which greatly hampered the rapid exchange of information with the higher headquarters and the contenting body. The experience of the previous “Chechen companies”, as well as the conduct of the operation on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan, indicates that this form of warfare is typical for the conditions under consideration, and, therefore, taking into account this factor, it is proposed in the future to provide rear units with appropriate controls.
At the same time, the military control bodies of the rear of regiments and divisions were put forward in the conflict zone, which, having no forces and means under their control, only hampered the control process, turning into redundant intermediate links in the control system.
The presence of incomplete and untimely data on the provision of troops with basic types of materiel (ammunition, fuel, food), as well as the lack of real information at any given time on the volume of their delivery and the state of the rear created significant difficulties in planning logistic support and transferring administrative documents to the troops. .
During the creation of groupings of troops in the directions, the march was carried out by almost all military units and subunits.
The greatest load fell on the units of the 42nd Motor Rifle Division, which made a march of more than 200 km in 15 hours and 136 Motorized Rifle Brigade - 680 km in 48 hours, respectively, which were immediately put into battle after the march.
The military units of the Airborne Forces showed good training when making a march to the conflict area.
A number of military units of constant readiness with the outbreak of hostilities were sent to areas of combat mission without full-time rear units. At the same time, the military control bodies of the rear of regiments and divisions were put forward in the conflict zone. But, not having forces and means under their control, they could not affect the timeliness and quality of the supporting process. Thus, the aforementioned rear controls also turned into redundant intermediate links in the control system.
Excessive breaks were allowed between combat and rear units, which did not follow a single marching order. For example, when 71 infantry regiments of 42 infantry divisions, 693 infantry infantry divisions of 19 infantry divisions were put into battle, the removal of battalion rears reached 15 km, and in some cases even more (with a standard of no more than 3 km). Ultimately, omissions, primarily of a managerial nature, resulted in delays in refueling military equipment, preparing hot meals, delivering bottled water on time, and so on.
In conditions of unstable communications (and often lack of communications), a significant amount of time was spent transmitting combat orders and orders from senior commanders to the BTGr. As a result, the decision-making and setting of combat missions were carried out by the BTG commanders under a strict time limit. The organization of interaction with units and subunits (including other types and types of troops) was not carried out. All issues were resolved by the unit commanders in the course of performing combat missions (with neighbors operating in the same direction, interaction was organized only through personal communication).
Decision-making and management of subunits was hampered by the absence at the initial stage (subsequently insufficient number) of maps of combat areas. At the same time, outdated maps of the 1987 edition did not always correspond to modern reality. The commanders were in dire need of large-scale maps, city plans, aerial photographs of the main military installations and important industrial centers.
In the link battalion - regiment - division there were no control vehicles with automation equipment. There was no automation of the communication system, as a result, its high inertia, low mobility and the inability to constantly comply with the rapidly changing command structure (the actual need to ensure communication between the military district (army) and the armored personnel carriers, companies in separate directions, i.e. through two, three instances) .
The means of communication were not protected from electronic suppression by the enemy. In the absence of communication, units were often managed using mobile phones captured from the Georgian military.
They were armed with bulky, outdated and unreliable means of communication (and those in insufficient quantities), which were not able to provide communication in the mountainous terrain. The traditional way of deploying a subscriber network (cable lines) did not meet modern requirements control systems.
Problematic issues and solutions:
1. Lack of means of control and communication in the rear units.
Taking into account the expansion of the practice of application in modern conditions battalion tactical groups, it was proposed to include in the battalion rear forces and means that would ensure its autonomy to the maximum extent possible. At the same time, to provide for the presence in the staff of the rear units of the developed and put into service command and staff vehicle of the new generation KShM-142T, which should become for the head of the rear and the heads of services both a point and a means of control.
2. Low level training of home front officials. The main reason was the simplistic approach in carrying out combat training activities. Support units enter the exercise areas in advance, operate in a daily rhythm, no one keeps them on their toes. When the situation develops dynamically and unpredictably, they are not ready to perform tasks in difficult conditions.
In the course of planning measures for the combat training of units and subunits of the rear, it was proposed to take into account the analysis and generalization of the experience gained. Eliminate a simplistic approach when conducting tactical-special (special) classes and exercises.
3. The absence (insufficient number) of maps of combat areas from the deputy commanders for logistics, commanders of the SCOT. It is proposed to resolve the issue of providing units and subunits of the rear of central and district subordination with maps of the respective regions through the headquarters of the rear of the North Caucasus Military District.
Despite the complex and contradictory situation in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts, the current rear management system and the logistics support system as a whole fulfilled the tasks of meeting the needs of the groupings of troops.
№ 139
ORDER OF THE DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE
WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GKO DECISION ON MANAGEMENTTHE REAR OF THE RED ARMY
I announce for guidance and execution the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3543s of June 9, 1943 on changing the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 300s of July 31, 1941 “On the Management of the Logistics of the Red Army”.
Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal Soviet Union VASILEVSKY
RESOLUTION
STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE No. 3543s
ON CHANGING THE DECISION OF THE STATE
“ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RED ARMY’S REAR LINES”
In a change to the Decree of the GOKO No. 300s of July 31, 1941 “On the Management of the Rear of the Red Army”, the State Defense Committee decides:
I. According to the Logistics Directorate of the Red Army
1. Abolish the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army. 2 Establish the post of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army with direct subordination to his People's Commissar of Defense. 3. Under the head of the rear of the Red Army to have:
1) Headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army;
2) personnel department.
4. Subordinate to the head of the rear of the Red Army:
1) Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Red Army;
2) Main Automobile Directorate of the Red Army;
3) Main Road Directorate of the Red Army;
4) Main Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army;
5) Main Directorate of Food Supply of the Red Army;
6) Main Military Sanitary Directorate of the Red Army;
7) Department of fuel supply of the Red Army;
8) Veterinary Department of the Red Army;
9) Financial management Red Army;
10) Department for personal accounting of losses of junior commanders and rank and file active army and pensions for their families;
11) Administrative and economic department of NCOs;
12) Editorial Board of the Logistics and Supply of the Red Army magazine.
5. In the direct jurisdiction of the chief of logistics of the Red Army to have:
a) Molotov Military Academy of Logistics and Supply of the Red Army;
b) the Military Transport Academy of the Red Army named after Kaganovich. 6. On the head of the rear of the Red Army to assign:
a) organizing the rear of the Red Army;
b) the development of questions on the organization of the rear of the army in the field, the development of plans and considerations for the formation, disbandment and distribution
between the fronts of rear services, units and institutions and the implementation of these measures through the General Staff of the Red Army;
c) carrying out operational transportation of military formations, marching reinforcements, as well as transportation of wounded and sick military personnel;
d) delivery to the fronts, at the request of the main and central departments of NCOs, of weapons, ammunition, food, fuels and lubricants, technical, commissary and other property;
e) management of military bodies on rail, water and air transport serving the Red Army;
f) management of the quartermaster and food services of the Red Army, management of the supply of fuel and lubricants, monetary and housing allowances for the troops;
g) leadership of the motor transport service and the supply of motor vehicles to units and formations of the Red Army;
h) management of the road service of the Red Army;
i) leadership of the sanitary and veterinary services of the Red Army;
j) organizing and conducting the evacuation of wounded and sick military personnel from the theater of operations;
k) transportation of prisoners of war, trophy and unnecessary military property from the fronts to the rear of the country;
l) management of the case of personal accounting of the losses of the junior commanding officers and rank and file of the army in the field and pension provision their families;
m) management of the combat and special training of the rear services, units and institutions of the Red Army.
7. Establish that the head of the logistics of the Red Army performs his duties of providing for the Red Army through the heads of the main and central departments of the NGOs and the heads of the rear of the fronts and individual armies.
8. To the head of the rear of the Red Army, in the circle of duties assigned to him, to grant the right:
a) enter with a petition to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on all issues related to the implementation of measures to organize the rear of the Red Army, the creation of stocks and the supply of food forage, fuels and lubricants, clothing, wagons, household, medical and veterinary property and other issues belonging to the scope of duties of the chief of logistics of the Red Army. Note. The heads of the main and central departments of NPOs subordinate to the chief of logistics of the Red Army may enter the Government with a petition USSR only through the head of the rear of the Red Army.
b) issue orders and instructions for the rear, binding on all bodies and institutions subordinate to the head of the rear of the Red Army;
c) issue orders on the personnel of the rear services, units and institutions subordinate to the head of the rear of the Red Army:
1) on the assignment of military ranks up to and including the colonel;
2) appointment and transfer to all positions, with the exception of the heads of the rear of the fronts and armies, the heads of the main and central departments and their deputies and the heads of the departments that are part of the main departments, whose appointment is made by orders of the People's Commissar of Defense;
d) approve and put into effect manuals, guidelines, learning programs, instructions relating to the range of issues related to the organization of the rear of the Red Army and the supply of quartermaster property, food and fodder, fuel and lubricants, medical and sanitary and veterinary equipment and combat training of rear units, institutions and educational institutions;
e) control the correct distribution and use, within the limits determined by the State Committee of Defense and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, of resources for the Red Army of food and fodder, quartermaster, sanitary and
veterinary property, fuels and lubricants, motor vehicles, tractors and spare parts for them, as well as to control the operation and repair of vehicles.
II. Front Logistics Administration (Army)
Under the head of the rear of the front (army) to have:
a) Headquarters of the Front (Army) Logistics Directorate;
b) personnel department;
c) inspection.
Subordinate to the head of the rear of the front (army):
a) Directorate (department) of military communications of the front (army);
b) Automobile management (department) of the front (army);
c) Road administration (department) of the front (army);
d) Quartermaster department (department) of the front (army);
e) Directorate (department) of the food supply of the front (army); f) fuel supply department of the front (army); g) Sanitary department (department) of the front (army); h) veterinary department of the front (army); i) the financial department of the front (army);
j) department for personal accounting of losses of junior commanding officers and rank and file of the front (army).
To assign to the head of the rear of the front (army):
1. The organization of the rear of the front (army) and the management of the location of the rear organs, units and institutions of the front (army), the organization of their defense.
2. The development of questions on the distribution between the armies of rear organs, units and institutions and the implementation of these measures through the headquarters of the front (army).
3. Management of the creation in front-line and army warehouses and in formations of established stocks of food and fodder, fuels and lubricants, clothing, baggage, household, medical and veterinary property and full and uninterrupted provision of troops with these types of supplies.
4. Planning and organizing the procurement of local funds in the front, army and military rear areas.
5. Management of the operational transportation of military formations, units and marching reinforcements, carried out by order of the military council within the borders of the front (army), and transportation along railways front (army) of the wounded and sick to the rear of the country.
6. Organization of the supply of armies (formations) at the request of supply departments (departments) of the front (army) of ammunition, food and fodder, fuel and lubricants, military equipment and other military property to army bases and unloading stations of armies.
The head of the rear of the army is in charge of the transportation of all types of supplies from army bases, unloading stations (divisions of army bases on the ground) to the DOPs along the unpaved supply routes.
7. Leadership of military communication agencies on the railway and waterways of the front (army).
8. Organization of the restoration and repair of automobile dirt rear roads of the front (army), construction and restoration of bridges on them and organization of the defense of roads and bridges.
9. Management of the commissariat, food supplies, money, apartment allowances for the troops of the front (army) and the supply of fuel and lubricants.
10. Management of the motor transport, road, sanitary and veterinary services of the front (army).
11. Organization and conduct of the evacuation of the wounded and sick military personnel to the rear of the country.
12. Transportation from the front (army) to the rear of the country of prisoners of war, trophy and unnecessary military property.
13. Management of the case of personal accounting of the losses of the junior commanding officers and rank and file of the front (army).
14. Leadership of the combat and special training of rear services, units and institutions of the front (army).
15. Organization of repair of military equipment and property.
16. Selection and appointment of leading personnel for services directly subordinate to the chief of rear services of the front (army), within the limits of the rights granted to him.
Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. STALIN
F. 4, op. 11, d. 76, l. 87-92. Script.
