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Transaction category. Transaction costs, their classification

A significant number of types of classifications transaction costs is a consequence of the multiplicity of approaches to studying this problem. O. Williamson distinguishes two types of transaction costs: ex ante and ex post. Ex ante costs include the costs of drafting the agreement and negotiating it. Ex post costs include organizational and operational costs associated with the use of the governance structure; costs arising from poor adaptation; costs of litigation arising in the course of adapting contractual relations to unforeseen circumstances; costs associated with fulfilling contractual obligations

K. Menard divides transaction costs into 4 groups:

Isolation costs;

Costs of scale;

Information costs;

Costs of behavior.

The most famous domestic typology of transaction costs is the classification proposed by R. Kapelyushnikov

1. Costs of searching for information. Before a transaction is made or a contract is concluded, you need to have information about where you can find potential buyers and sellers of the relevant goods and factors of production, what are the prevailing conditions this moment prices. Costs of this kind consist of the time and resources required to conduct the search, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the acquired information.

2. Negotiation costs. The market requires the diversion of significant funds for negotiations on the terms of exchange, for the conclusion and execution of contracts. The main tool for saving this kind of costs is standard (standard) contracts.

3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. In the act of exchange, only some of them are inevitably taken into account, and the accuracy of their assessment (measurement) can be extremely approximate. Sometimes the qualities of a product of interest are generally immeasurable, and to evaluate them one has to use surrogates (for example, judging the taste of apples by their color). This includes the costs of appropriate measuring equipment, the actual measurement, the implementation of measures aimed at protecting the parties from measurement errors and, finally, losses from these errors. Measurement costs increase with increasing accuracy requirements.

Enormous savings in measurement costs have been achieved by mankind as a result of the invention of standards for weights and measures. In addition, the purpose of saving these costs is determined by such forms of business practices as warranty repairs, branded labels, purchasing batches of goods based on samples, etc. 4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. This category includes the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, government agencies, the cost of time and resources required to restore violated rights, as well as losses from their poor specification and unreliable protection. Some authors (D. North) add costs here. maintaining a consensus ideology in society, since educating members of society in the spirit of observing generally accepted unwritten rules and ethical standards is a much more economical way to protect property rights than formalized legal control

5. Costs of opportunistic behavior. This is the most hidden and, from the point of view of economic theory, the most interesting element of transaction costs. There are two main forms of opportunistic behavior. The first is called moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs when one party in a contract relies on another party, and obtaining actual information about his behavior is costly or impossible. The most common type of opportunistic behavior of this kind is shirking, when the agent works with less efficiency than is required of him under the contract.

If the personal contribution of each agent to the overall result is measured with large errors, then his reward will be weakly related to the actual efficiency of his work. Hence the negative incentives that encourage shirking. In private firms and government agencies, special complex and expensive structures are created whose tasks include monitoring the behavior of agents, detecting cases of opportunism, imposing penalties, etc. Reducing the costs of opportunistic behavior is the main function of a significant part of the management apparatus of various organizations.

The second form of opportunistic behavior is extortion. Opportunities for it appear when several production factors work in close cooperation for a long time and become so accustomed to each other that each becomes indispensable and unique to the other members of the group. This means that if some factor decides to leave the group, then the remaining participants in the cooperation will not be able to find an equivalent replacement for it on the market and will suffer irreparable losses. Therefore, the owners of unique (in relation to a given group of participants) resources have the opportunity for blackmail in the form of a threat to leave the group. Even when “extortion” remains only a possibility, it always turns out to be associated with real losses. (The most radical form of protection against extortion is the transformation of interdependent (interspecific) resources into jointly owned property, the integration of property in the form of a single bundle of powers for all team members).

We can now move on to the task of classifying transaction costs. It makes most sense to tie the classification of transaction costs to the stages of concluding a transaction. O. Williamson talks about transaction costs ex ante And ex post 28 , those. arising before and after the conclusion of the transaction. If the stages of concluding a transaction are the following: searching for a partner, coordinating interests, formalizing the transaction, monitoring its implementation, then the classification of transaction costs can be presented in the form of a table. 10.2 29.

Constructing a classification of transaction costs based on the stages of concluding a contract allows us to clarify the issue of their quantitative assessment at both the micro and macroeconomic levels. For example, when concluding a transaction for renting an apartment, which involves the transfer by the owner of the apartment to the tenant of the right to use it, transaction costs for the tenant will take the following forms.

The costs of searching for information about apartments for rent, about prices on the housing market: buying specialized publications and calling advertisements or contacting a real estate company, which independently selects several options for a commission - costs in in cash and time costs.

The costs of negotiating with the owners of apartments selected based on the results of the first stage on special rental conditions - time, can be transferred to the intermediary and in this case take monetary form.

The costs of assessing the quality of housing during a visit to selected apartments - time and transportation costs can also be transferred to the intermediary.

Costs legal registration the rental contract, its notarization - costs in monetary form.

The costs of preventing the owner's opportunism, expressed in the desire to change the terms of the lease, for example, to increase the rent, are time costs, psychological costs.

The costs of protecting the right to use an apartment transferred for the duration of the contract in the event that the owner makes claims to the tenant regarding the maintenance of the apartment and/or wants to terminate the contract early are the costs of time and monetary costs associated with going to court.

Table 10.2

Costs ex ante	Costs ex post
Costs of searching for information include the costs of searching for information about potential partner and about the market situation, as well as losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the acquired information	Costs of monitoring and preventing opportunism relate to the costs of monitoring compliance with the terms of the transaction and preventing opportunism, i.e. evasion of these conditions
Negotiation costs include the costs of negotiating the terms of exchange and choosing the form of the transaction	Costs of specification and protection of property rights include the costs of maintaining courts, arbitration, the cost of time and resources necessary to restore rights violated during the execution of the contract, as well as losses from poor specification of property rights and unreliable protection
Measurement costs relate to the costs necessary to measure the quality of goods and services for which a transaction is made	Costs of protection from third parties include the costs of protection from claims of third parties (state, mafia, etc.) for part of the beneficial effect obtained as a result of the transaction
Costs of entering into a contract reflect the costs of legal or extralegal registration of a transaction

Thus, quantification transaction costs arising when renting housing can be obtained either by analyzing the income of intermediary firms, or by summing up direct monetary costs and time costs, multiplied by the average hourly wages. For example, in Moscow in the mid-90s, transaction costs were approximately equal to the monthly rent, i.e. amounted to the equivalent of 200-500 dollars.

Measurement problem

To assess transaction costs at the macroeconomic level, J. Wallis and D. North proposed using the concept transaction sector 30 . They included wholesale and retail trade, insurance, banking sector, real estate transactions, management costs in other industries, government costs for judicial and law enforcement activities (state transaction sector). According to calculations made by these authors, the share of the transaction sector in the United States increased from 26% of GNP in 1870 to 55% of GNP in 1970 (Fig. 10.4), but transaction costs per unit of national product decreased, in particular, due to the advanced growth of the state transaction sector.

Rice. 10.4

Although the methodology used in these calculations is imperfect and has been repeatedly criticized, let us make the following comparison: government spending on judicial and law enforcement activities amounted to 13.9% of GNP in the USA (in 1970) and 1.6% of GNP in Russia (in 1997 d.) 31 . Thus, the bulk of transaction costs in Russia are borne by economic agents themselves, and it is their prohibitively high value per transaction that explains why the Coase theorem does not describe the process of transforming state property into joint stock property well enough. Indeed, even taking into account that there are no approximate quantitative calculations of the size of the transaction sector in Russia 32 , its significant size is assumed by all three approaches to explaining the nature of transaction costs.

Transaction cost theory draws attention to the absence of a market for information and the distortion of price signals due to high degree market monopolization and structural imbalances.

The theory of public choice focuses on the incompleteness of market formation and the associated difficulty in finding a replacement counterparty in a transaction, on the size national market and a large number of its participants.

Agreement theory explains high level transaction costs by the instability of the relationships between various agreements and the predominance of fragmentation and expansion as options for their relationships 33 .

We can now move on to the task of classifying transaction costs. It makes most sense to tie the classification of transaction costs to the stages of concluding a transaction. O. Williamson talks about transaction costs ex ante And ex postn, i.e., those arising before and after the conclusion of the transaction. If the stages of concluding a transaction are the following: searching for a partner, coordinating interests, formalizing the transaction, monitoring its implementation, then the classification of transaction costs can be presented in the form of a table.

Constructing a classification of transaction costs based on the stages of concluding a contract allows us to clarify the issue of their quantitative assessment at both the micro- and macroeconomic levels. For example, when concluding a transaction for renting an apartment, which involves the transfer by the owner of the apartment to the tenant of the right to use it, transaction costs for the tenant will take the following forms.

The costs of negotiating with the owners of apartments selected based on the results of the first stage on special rental conditions - time costs - can be transferred to the intermediary and in this case take monetary form.

The costs of assessing the quality of housing during a visit to selected apartments - time and transportation costs can also be transferred to the intermediary.

The costs of legal registration of the employment contract and its notarization are costs in monetary form.

The costs of preventing the owner's opportunism, expressed in the desire to change the terms of the lease, for example, to increase the rent, are time costs, psychological costs.

Thus, a quantitative assessment of the transaction costs arising from rental housing can be obtained either by analyzing the income of intermediary firms, or by summing up direct monetary costs and time costs, multiplied by the average hourly wage. For example, in Moscow in the mid-90s, transaction costs were approximately equal to the monthly rent, i.e., the equivalent of 200-500 dollars.

D. North's theory of state

The main exponent of the institutional approach to the economic role of the state is D. North, and one of the most important premises underlying his analysis of the state is the close relationship between the state, property rights and economic efficiency. In this regard, the identification of two production possibilities frontiers is of particular importance, namely, technical And structural.

The level of knowledge, technology used, and available resources define the technical production possibility frontier, while the system of property rights defines the structural or organizational production possibility frontier, which is achieved by selecting from a set of possible types. economic organization those that provide the greatest economic efficiency. The effectiveness of a property rights system is determined by the proximity of the structural production possibilities frontier to the technical frontier (Figure 1.3). The system of property rights itself is determined by the state.

According to this theory, the state is economic agent with comparative advantage in the exercise of violence, extending over a territory whose boundaries are determined by its ability to collect taxes, and its main function is the specification and protection of property rights. The state arises as the result of a social contract under which, in exchange for compensation in the form of taxes, an economic agent with a comparative advantage in the exercise of violence provides society with the specification and protection of property rights.

There are three main restrictions of the state:

1. costs of obtaining information (here we will consider two types of information, namely, data on the size of the tax base, the difficulty of obtaining which forces the ruler to establish proportional taxation, which has a disincentive effect on economic activity, and information about offenses);

2. costs of opportunism of civil servants;

3. internal and external political competition.

Some of the most well-known formal models illustrating some elements of North's theory of the state are the Findlay-Wilson model and the McGuire-Olson sedentary bandit model.

Findlay-Wilson model

In this model, the output of the private sector is determined by the use of three factors of production, namely, labor L, capital TO and law and order R(it can be understood as government services in the form of specification and protection of property rights). Then production function will look like this:

Where G- the labor of civil servants, and the production function for law and order is such that P(0) = 1, i.e., in the absence of the state, the production function would have the form Y= f(K, L) . Total amount of labor N used in the production of private and public goods, i.e. law and order.

The dependence of the volume of output on the amount of labor of civil servants is manifested in the fact that, on the one hand, the supply of labor in the private sector is reduced by the amount of this labor, on the other hand, the legal order created by this labor increases the productivity of labor in the private sector (Fig. 2.3).

In Fig. Figure 2.3 provides a graphical illustration of the relationship between the labor of civil servants and output. In accordance with the principle of diminishing marginal productivity of factors of production, each subsequent unit of labor of civil servants produces an increasingly smaller effect, and after reaching the optimal value, a further increase in this type of labor already reduces output. The optimal value of this value, in accordance with the marginal principle, will occur at the point of equality of the marginal products of labor in the private and public sectors.

This model considers two types of state: a contract state and a state as a monopoly rent maximizer.

Problems of information asymmetry"

An important reason for the decrease in the intensity of competition and the acquisition of monopoly power in markets is the incompleteness and asymmetry of information. Information is one of the important types of economic resources. Each economic agent has access to only a limited amount of information.

Incomplete information is an indispensable feature of economic life. More or less incomplete information can affect the conditions and characteristics of the functioning of markets, creating additional transaction costs for economic agents. A special type of incomplete information has the greatest impact on market activity - asymmetric information. Asymmetry of information creates the possibility of one of the participants in the transaction misusing the counterparty’s lack of information. Asymmetry of information, as opposed to incompleteness itself, leads to a sharp decline in social welfare.

Asymmetric information is common in many business situations. As a rule, the seller of a product knows more about its quality than the buyer. Workers are aware of their skills and abilities better entrepreneurs. Managers know more about a firm's costs, competitive position, and investment climate than business owners.

First, let's consider a situation in which sellers of a product have more accurate information about its quality than buyers. We will see how such asymmetric information causes market imperfections. Then we'll look at how sellers avoid some of the problems associated with asymmetric information by signaling to potential buyers about the quality of their products. Product warranties provide a type of insurance that can be effective if buyers are less informed than sellers. But, as will be shown later, buying insurance is also difficult if buyers are informed better sellers. Finally, we show that labor markets can function inefficiently when workers are better informed about their productivity than employers.

Quality uncertainty and the market for “lemons”

For convenience, let's look at the example of used cars.

Let's imagine that we bought a new car for $10,000, drove it 100 miles, and then suddenly realized that you didn't really need it. Nothing happened to the car - it worked perfectly and met all your expectations. We just felt that we could do just as well without it and would benefit more if we saved the money to buy other things. So, we decide to sell this car. How much revenue could we get for it? Probably no more than $8,000, even if it's a new car with only 100 miles and a transferable warranty. If we were the buyer, we probably wouldn't pay more than $8,000 for it.

Why does the mere fact of selling a car second hand reduce its value so significantly? To answer this question, let's think about our own doubts as a potential buyer. Why is this car for sale? Has the owner really changed his mind as stated, or is there something wrong with the car? It is possible that this car may be defective.

Used cars are sold much cheaper than new ones because information about their quality is asymmetrical: the seller of such a car knows much more about it than the potential buyer. A buyer may hire a mechanic to check the car, but a seller who has experience with it will still know better. In addition, the very fact of selling this car confirms that it may in fact be a “lemon”, otherwise why sell a reliable car? Therefore, a potential buyer of a used car always has suspicions about its quality, and not without reason.

The importance of asymmetric information about product quality was first analyzed by George Akerlof in his classic paper. Akerlof's analysis extends far beyond the used car market. Markets for insurance, credit, and even labor are also characterized by asymmetric quality information. To understand its significance, let's start with the used car market and then see how the same principles apply to other markets.

The Importance of Asymmetric Information

The example of used cars shows how asymmetric information can lead to market disruption. In ideal market conditions perfect competition consumers would have the opportunity to choose between low- and high-quality cars. Some would choose the former because they are cheap, others would prefer to pay more for the latter. Unfortunately, in the real world, consumers have a hard time determining the quality of used cars at the time of purchase, so their prices drop and high-quality cars disappear from the market.

This is just a hypothetical example to illustrate an important issue that arises in many markets. Let us now consider some other examples of information asymmetry and the possible response of government or private firms.

Utilitarianism

The first norm laid down in the market constitution is complex utilitarianism. It presupposes not only the individual’s orientation toward maximizing his utility, but also his awareness of the connection between the utility received and his productive activity, i.e., the norm of complex utilitarianism eliminates the discrepancy between the level of needs and the productive activity of individuals. Such a discrepancy often underlies the “revolutions of inadequate expectations” that arise when high consumer standards are spread among the population of countries that do not have high production potential and high performance labor 16. In this situation, the perception of a new standard of consumption, which occurs mainly through the media, does not affect the dominant model of productive activity in society. Further, simple utilitarianism involves turning utility maximization into rent seeking when conditions are right. Any deviation from the situation of perfect competition, the establishment of restrictions on exchange (tariffs, quotas) turns the efforts of a simple utilitarian to seeking rent, or, in other words, to unproductive profit maximization (directly unproductive profits seeking17). The alternative is precisely complex utilitarianism as a normative and value restriction on the individual’s desire to maximize rent, the individual’s recognition of the permissibility of receiving gains only through his own activities, and not to the detriment of others |8.

Utilitarianism:

simple- the individual’s desire to maximize his utility regardless of his productive activity;

difficult"- maximization by an individual of his utility based on productive activity.

Purposeful action

If the norm of utilitarianism specifies the goal function of the individual, then the norm of goal-oriented rational activity specifies it, connecting the maximization of utility with the solution of specific problems. Let us recall that goal-oriented behavior involves the use by an individual of a certain behavior of objects of the external world and people as “conditions” and “means” to achieve his rationally set and thoughtful goal. In conditions of incomplete information and limited cognitive abilities to process it (i.e., incomplete rationality), goal-oriented behavior turns into manipulation by an individual who has more information, his counterpart.

In this way, the individual seeks to turn others into means to achieve his goal - maximizing utility. Classic examples of the use of information asymmetry by some agents to the detriment of others are the market for used cars (“lemons”) and insurance associated with the situation of “moral hazard.” 19 Such behavior is called opportunism, “the pursuit of personal interest using deceit, overt deception, or more subtle form"20. Guarantees against the transformation of goal-oriented behavior into opportunism can be either structural or formal legal:

The completeness of information available to all participants in the exchange and their perfect cognitive abilities;

Use of special procedures when concluding a contract.

The last aspect is the subject of a special study of the theory of optimal contract and will be considered later, so we will limit ourselves here to just stating that the second element of the market constitution is purposeful action, eligible full rationality.

One of key categories modern economic theory. The concept of transaction costs was introduced into wide scientific circulation in 1937 in the article by R. Coase “The Nature of the Firm.” IN in a certain sense demonstrating the fact that exchange and freedom in the economy is not free was revolutionary. Neoclassical theory accepts the position that transactions are costless, which is very significantly reflected in the conclusions of neoclassics. For example, from the point of view of neoclassical theory, it does not matter how the exchange is made: through money circulation or through barter. An even more fundamental example: ignoring the importance of transaction costs, neoclassicals build mathematical models with which they prove that socialism, all other things being equal, can achieve the same efficiency in resource allocation as a market economy. New institutional economic theory, which is centered on the thesis about the non-zero level of transaction costs and their great significance for the functioning of the economy, casts doubt on these conclusions.

Famous American economist K. Arrow, characterizing transaction costs, draws a famous analogy: transaction costs in economics play the same role as the force of friction in physics. Another interesting metaphor was proposed by S. Chen, who writes that transaction costs are a type of cost that is absent in the economy of Robinson Crusoe (i.e., where there is only one economic agent).

The significant amount of transaction costs is the main reason that agents create rules and mechanisms for enforcing their execution, i.e. institutes.

Transaction and transformation costs

In standard economic theory, only one type of costs is usually identified - transformation costs. These are the resources that are spent on production. The new institutional theory complements this view with the category of transaction costs. However, these two categories are not interpreted independently of each other - on the contrary, they are subject to mutual influence, and this mutual influence can be very diverse. For example, reducing transformation costs can, in turn, reduce transaction costs. For example, the creation of electronic trading systems has sharply reduced the cost of buying and selling goods. At the same time, other options for the relationship between these types of costs are possible.

At the same time, it should be remembered that in some works transformation costs are understood as the costs of resources allocated to changing existing institutions.

Classification of transaction costs

Currently, there are many different classifications of transaction costs. Prominent economists. E. Furubotn and R. Richter propose the following typology: market transaction costs (arising during exchange through the price mechanism), management costs (arising within a hierarchical structure such as a firm), and political costs (or the costs of using the political market to change rules or their preservation).

The most common classification in our time is the following (author - K. Dalman):

Costs of searching for information and identifying alternatives.
These costs arise, for example, when searching for the most favorable price On the market.
Measurement costs useful properties goods (buying household appliances from hand, ordinary consumers do not know how long it will last).
Costs of negotiating and concluding contracts (for example, costs of legally competent drafting of contracts).
The costs of specifying and protecting property rights (this could be, for example, the cost of resources spent on registering land ownership rights, or the cost of barbed wire that surrounds private property).
Costs of opportunistic behavior, i.e. such behavior of individuals, which is aimed at maximizing their own well-being through violation of established rules ( typical example- concealment of product defects during its sale).
It should be noted that various classifications of transaction costs do not have any absolute advantages over each other - their application depends on the research task that the economist sets for himself.

Recommended reading

North, Douglas (1992). Institutions, institutional arrangements and economic performance.

In neo-institutional economic theory, the unit of analysis is an act of economic interaction, a deal, a transaction. Moreover, the category “transaction” covers both material and contractual aspects of exchange. It is understood extremely broadly and is used to refer to both the exchange of goods and various types activities, as well as the exchange of legal obligations, transactions of both long-term and short-term nature, both requiring detailed documentation, and presupposing interaction, which is certainly present in the processes of self-organization and self-regulation.

The concept of “transaction” was introduced into economic theory by J. Commons. In his opinion, a transaction is not just an exchange of goods, but the alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms created by society, based on the assumption that institutions ensure the spread of the will of an individual subject beyond the boundaries of the areas of his influence on the environment through his actions, that is, beyond his physical control, therefore turn out to be transactions, as opposed to individual behavior as such or the exchange of goods.

Domestic neo-institutionalist scholars adhere to an almost similar view. For example, Shastitko A. believes that a transaction should be understood as the activity of a subject in the form of alienation and appropriation of property rights, freedoms accepted in society, which are carried out in the process of planning, monitoring the fulfillment of promises, as well as adaptation to unforeseen circumstances.

Commons J. distinguished three main types of transactions:

1. The transaction of the transaction serves to carry out the actual alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms and its implementation requires mutual consent of the parties, based on economic interest each of them. In a transaction, the condition of symmetry of mutual actions, including relationships, between subjects is observed. Distinctive feature The transaction of the transaction, according to Commons, is not production, but the transfer of goods from hand to hand.

2. Control transaction. In it, the key is the internal interactions that arise in the management of subordination. They are not symmetrical, at least in terms of formal characteristics - the right to make decisions belongs to only one side. The asymmetry of behavior in these interactions is a consequence of the asymmetry of the position of the parties and, accordingly, the asymmetry of legal relations.

3. Rationing transaction - it preserves asymmetry legal status parties, but the place of the managing party is taken by a collective body that performs the function of specifying rights. Rationing transactions include: drawing up a company budget by the board of directors, the federal budget by the government and approval by a representative body, an arbitration court decision regarding a dispute arising between existing entities through which wealth is distributed, as well as interactions arising in the processes of self-organization and self-regulation. In the latter, the public union as a collective body has a stronger position in the market both in relation to its constituent entities and in relation to those not participating in it.

Williamson O. evaluates all transactions by the frequency of transactions and the specificity of assets. Based on these two parameters, he divides transactions into four main types.

The first is a one-time (or elementary) exchange on an anonymous market. In this case, the frequency of transactions is rare and there is no specificity of assets.

The second is the repeated exchange of mass goods. In this case, the transaction frequency increases. There is still no specificity of the asset.

The third is a recurring contract associated with investments in specific assets. A specific asset is created specifically for a specific transaction. This means that the next one after best opportunity The use of this asset brings much less income and is associated with risk. Specific assets are those among the entire population, the next use of which is much less profitable. When a contract to sell a non-specific asset is terminated, the seller does not incur any particular loss. But termination of a contract for the sale of a specific asset leads to significant losses for it. Therefore, in the process of negotiations regarding the conclusion of such contracts, the seller will demand: either monetary compensation in the amount of capitalization of his risk; or legal guarantees of the safety of the contract; or decision-making rights and the ability to bear joint risks.

And the fourth is investment in idiosyncratic (unique, exclusive assets). . Idiosyncratic is an asset that, when used alternatively (when removed from a given transaction), loses value altogether or its value becomes insignificant. These assets include half of production investments, investments in a specific technological process.

As for the recurring contract for the use of a specific asset, it, according to O. Williamson, entails a “fundamental transformation” when, instead of market type connectivity, an extra-market partnership type of connection arises - communicative interactions leading to mutual dependence of subjects in the market network. He believes that more than half of all transactions in value account for transactions in relationships of mutual dependence, and in frequency 90-95% account for one-time or repeating transactions of mass goods. Those. In practice, in economics there is not just a market in the traditional understanding of neoclassics, but a dense network of institutional interactions based on relations of mutual dependence.

It follows that, if we consider the IS market from the standpoint of the duration of transactions, it can be divided conditionally into two sectors. The first is the sector of relatively rare but long-lasting transactions of mutual dependence. They are the ones who make the environment more stable and predictable. Figuratively speaking, it is these long-term transactions that form the “skeleton of the market.” And the second sector is associated with massive, but shorter transactions. Transactions in this sector support market efficiency by creating a competitive background of economic relations among IS subjects.

The development of the market occurs through the constant “flow” of transactions from the first sector to the second and vice versa. Moving from the first level (one-time exchange on an anonymous market) to the fourth (investments in idiosyncratic assets, which can be communication links), the subject reduces production costs, saving on scale, and increases transaction costs to compensate for the risk. In other words, movement in this direction ensures a reduction in transformation costs and, other things being equal, an increase in transaction costs, because the risk of significant violations in market activity in case of contract termination increases many times over.

A natural consequence of the process of evolution in the market of ICC subjects is the desire to increase the number of transactions in the first sector and the time of their existence. But, on the other hand, this entails a decrease in the mobility of subjects and the consolidation of various types of their associations capable of occupying a monopoly position in the market. Following the basic laws of economic theory, at some point conditions are created for an imbalance between sectors, associations of entities are destroyed, and the number of long-term transactions in the first sector decreases. Transactions “flow” into the first sector, the number of massive and shorter transactions increases until equilibrium is achieved. This process is cyclical in nature. And the current state of the market for ICC subjects is characterized by a movement towards an equilibrium state through transactions of the first sector. This is evidenced by the problem of creating self-regulatory organizations in construction, which is actively discussed today in the literature and at the state level.

Transactions (that is, types of interaction) can be characterized by a number of characteristics. They can be:

General or specific (concerning standard or fairly unique resources);

Fleeting or long-term, one-time or regularly recurring;

Weakly or strongly dependent on unpredictable future events;

Autonomous or closely intertwined with other transactions;

With easily or difficultly measurable end results (allowing for more or less effective control over the participants’ fulfillment of their obligations).

Transactions differ in what demands they make on the limited rational abilities of economic agents and what scope they leave for their opportunistic behavior. For each type of transaction, special coordinating and protective mechanisms are created to mitigate the friction and losses associated with it.

Let's take a closer look at each of these signs.

1. Degree of specificity. According to Becker G., in economics it is common to call a resource that is of interest to many producers. Its market value depends little on where it is used. A specific resource is a resource that can only be used by a given specific manufacturer. For everyone else, it has zero value. It can be special not only in relation to one single company, but also in relation to any one industry, region, or country. The degree of specificity is judged by how much the value of the asset would be reduced if it were used in another place. Some resources may also be “designated” for a single user, not because they are of interest only to him, but because there is no current demand for them from other users. Activities related to specific resources are complex, since their owner incurs high transaction costs associated, for example, with the inability to sometimes refuse a deal with a supplier of this kind of resource. In the figurative expression of R.I. Kapelyushnikov, he finds himself, as it were, “locked” into a deal with his current partner. Therefore, transactions with specific resources usually require thoughtful, sometimes very expensive measures to protect the interests of the owners.

2. The degree of regularity and duration of transactions. If the transaction is one-time and its execution takes a short time, the relationship will be built primarily on an impersonal, formalized basis (say, using standard contracts). When a transaction between the same partners is repeated regularly and/or its execution requires them to be in close contact for a long time, then each of the participants has the opportunity to get to know the other better and begin to take his interests into account more fully. Their relationship becomes less formal, more personalized. Many issues are resolved through personal communication, which avoids the costs that arise when using formal mechanisms such as court, arbitration or actions of other government regulatory bodies.

3. Degree of uncertainty. Economic entities that interact are limitedly rational, that is, their ability to foresee the future is not absolute. At the time of concluding a long-term transaction, there is usually great uncertainty regarding the future state of the market. This encourages subjects to detail contracts, thinking through everything possible situations, or leaving a number of positions open, which, in turn, requires additional protection measures.

4. The degree of measurability of transaction characteristics. Any product or service has a certain consumer value that can be measured to varying degrees. For example, it is easier to determine the consumer value of oil than the managerial potential of management construction organization. It is precisely the difficulty of measurement that is associated with high transaction costs when purchasing hard-to-measure goods.

5. Degree of interdependence of transactions. Transactions can be autonomous or closely intertwined with many others within the business process of manufacturing a product. Violation of the chain of interconnected transactions can lead to the loss of the entire business chain. And the stronger the subject’s dependence on the decisions of others, the greater the costs required to coordinate his actions and the actions of others, and to insure against possible changes in a series of contracts. The more general, short-term, definite, controlled and autonomous a transaction is, the more reason there is either to do without its legal registration at all, or to limit oneself to drawing up a simple standard contract. On the contrary, the more specialized, repetitive, uncertain, difficult to measure and interconnected it is, the stronger the incentives to establish long-term relationships on a formal and informal basis. Accordingly, the lower or higher the level of costs in transactions.

Naturally, the size of the actual costs related to transactions is determined by the characteristics of the transactions themselves. In other words, the costs present in transactions - transaction costs - are the costs of economic interaction, no matter in what forms it takes place.

The total costs of society consist of the costs of land, labor, capital and entrepreneurial abilities necessary, firstly, to transform physical properties various goods (their color, chemical composition, location, etc.) and, secondly, to establish interaction between the economic agents themselves (delimitation, protection, transfer and unification of property rights). If the level of “transformation” costs (as North D. called them) is determined first of all technological factors, then the level of transaction costs is institutional. As Arrow K. aptly puts it, transaction costs are “the costs of keeping economic systems running.”

The concept of transaction costs was introduced by R. Coase in the 30s of the 20th century. It has been used to explain the existence of hierarchical structures that are antithetical to the market, such as the firm. As previously emphasized, Coase R. associated the formation of these “islands of consciousness” with relative advantages in terms of savings on transaction costs. He saw the specifics of the company's functioning in the suppression of the price mechanism and its replacement with a system of internal administrative control.

Among the integral costs that economic science deals with, it is necessary to distinguish between two types of costs:

Transformation costs – “ production costs»;

Transaction costs.

Transformation costs are sometimes called production costs. But this analogy can be recognized only conditionally, since the most significant production costs include both transformation and transaction costs. But for this study, this division is sufficient; here, transformation costs are understood as production costs, but not integral ones.

Transformation costs are the costs that accompany the process of physical change in a material, resulting in a product that has a certain value. These costs include not only the costs of processing the material, but also the costs associated with planning and coordinating the production process, if the latter concerns technology and not the interactions of subjects.

Transaction costs are the costs that ensure the transfer of property rights from one hand to another and the protection of these rights. Unlike transformation costs, transaction costs are not associated with the value creation process itself. They provide the transaction. Relatively speaking, transformation costs create goods whose properties are valuable for an individual or a collective agent of the economy (enterprise, firm, association).

There are several definitions of transaction costs.

Coase R. defined transaction costs as the costs of market functioning. Prior to this, economic theory assumed that the market was free, that market agents did not invest anything in it, that the price mechanism ensured coordination, bringing signals to market agents absolutely free of charge or at prices that could be neglected. Coase contrasted transaction costs, which he attributed only to the market, with the so-called “agency costs” that arise within the firm, for example, the costs of opportunistic behavior.

The next stage in the development of the theory of transaction costs occurs in the 50s of the 20th century. It is associated with a whole group of names, including Alchian A., Demsetz G., Stigler J., Williamson O., Arrow K. . These scientists combined the costs of operating a firm and the market into one category, contrasting them with transformation costs.

Currently, transaction costs are understood by the vast majority of scientists integrally, as the costs of system functioning. Most general definition transaction costs are the costs of resources for planning, adapting and monitoring the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by individuals in the process of alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms accepted in society.

It should be noted that today there is no generally accepted classification of transaction costs. Each of the researchers paid attention to the most interesting, from his point of view, elements. For example, Stigler J. identified among them “information costs”, Williamson O. - “costs of opportunistic behavior”, Jensen M. and Meckling U. - “costs of monitoring the behavior of an agent and the costs of his self-restraint”, Barzel J. - “measurement costs ", [listed in 219], Milgrom P. and Roberts J. - “costs of influence", Hansmann G. - “costs of collective decision-making”, and Dalman K. included in their composition “costs of collecting and processing information, costs of negotiations and decision-making, costs of control and legal protection of the execution of the contract” [cited in 79]. Let us dwell on the most recognized classifications in the scientific community.

Menard Cl. identifies four types of transaction costs:

Separation costs caused by varying degrees of technological divisibility of production operations;

Information costs, including encoding costs, signal transmission costs, decoding costs and training costs to use the information system;

The costs of scale are due to the existence of systems of impersonal exchange, requiring a system for enforcing contracts;

Costs of opportunistic behavior.

Milgrom P. and Roberts J. proposed dividing them into two categories: costs associated with coordination and costs associated with motivation. Coordination costs, in turn, contain three components, and motivational costs have two.

Coordination costs include:

Costs of determining contract details. Essentially, this is a market survey to determine quality characteristics an offer that can satisfy a need before the final choice is made in favor of a particular product.

Costs of identifying partners. They involve some kind of examination of partners who supply required services or goods (their location, ability to fulfill a given contract, required prices, etc.).

Costs of direct coordination. When concluding a complex contract, it becomes necessary to create some kind of structure within which the parties come together to conclude the contract. Its task is to ensure the negotiation process. This can be either a structure that has legal status or some kind of communication structure, the action of which is ensured with the help of social, public institutions.

The second group of costs – motivational costs – is associated with costs arising in the selection process:

Costs of incomplete information. The limited rationality of subjects cannot provide complete and comprehensive information. Hence, the incompleteness of this information can lead to a refusal to complete a transaction or to acquire a good. In other words, the level of uncertainty may be so high that subjects would rather abandon transactions than spend resources, such as time, on obtaining additional information and reducing uncertainty.

Costs associated with opportunism. Opportunistic is the behavior of a subject not related to moral considerations, which is expressed in the strategic manipulation of information in conditions of uncertainty and conscious asymmetric distribution of information, as well as concealment of actions taken. Most often they appear within the company, but are also possible in market contracts. These are, for example, attempts to reduce the costs associated with overcoming a partner’s dishonesty. The subject tries to reduce them either by hiring controllers or by more detailed elaboration of the contract being concluded.

Wallis J. and North D. classified transaction costs in relation to the contractual process: those arising before the exchange; arising in the process of exchange; arising after exchange .

The classification of transaction costs by E. Furubotn and R. Richter is built depending on the area in which these costs arise:

Market transaction costs, which include the costs of searching for information, the costs of negotiations and decision-making, control and monitoring;

Managerial transaction costs arising in the management process;

Political transaction costs associated with the political-legal environment.

It must be said that in the economic literature there are many classifications of transaction costs, including those by domestic authors. But for the most part, they “fit” into the systems of views on this issue outlined above.

Perhaps the only classification that summarizes all types of transaction costs identified today is the classification of Eggertsson Tr. . In addition, it is distinguished by its simplicity and tangibility, as it is built on the principle of analogy with external signs activities that generate corresponding costs. According to Eggertsson Tr., transaction costs are:

Costs of searching for information. Within this group, the author identifies the costs associated with searching for an acceptable price and quality information: about available goods and services; about sellers and buyers;

Negotiation costs. Negotiation leads to clarification of the so-called. “true position”, which in the economic sense is the marginal indifference curve or marginal isoquant (in the case of a firm);

Contracting costs. This is the cost of predicting the future behavior of entities participating in contracts and stipulating them, for example, in the form of some kind of dispute resolution mechanism. In other words, contracts “reserve” some provision for unforeseen circumstances. The size of these costs is the highest among all others, it is about 5-10% of the transaction volume when investing in specific assets;

Monitoring costs. Monitoring costs arise after the conclusion of a contract and are associated with monitoring the execution of the contract by each of the entities that entered into it;

Coercion costs. Since each subject strives to act in his own interests, and information is by definition incomplete, situations of incomplete or partial fulfillment of the contract often arise. And in the institutional environment, a system is formed that forces partners to comply with the terms of the contract. These are government bodies, professional, public self-regulatory organizations. In a weak state, a so-called alternative system of coercion arises - private - various types of criminal structures. The costs of enforcing contracts in developed economies for economic agents are predominantly low, as economies of scale manifest themselves;

Costs of protecting property rights. They arise both in the process of protection from offenders - then this is a function of the state, but they can also take place during the development of a system of actions related to precautions in relation to the state, which is most typical for the Russian economy (instability in observing the principle of succession in power, high politicization of the economy, lack of development of the legislative system, decision-making at the level of state legislative bodies, sometimes contradicting previously adopted and received the status of fundamental norms and institutions, a tendency to revise formal norms in relation to a changing market situation, finally, persistent distrust in the values declared by the state machine, etc. .).

Table 16 presents a systematization of the most famous modern science and classifications of transaction costs recognized in the scientific community. However, the actual statement of the fact of the existence of transaction costs in the process of interaction between subjects does not yet solve the problem. It is important to identify possible ways to save them. Let's look at some of them.

Table 16

Various classifications of transaction costs


Menard Cl.	separation costs; Information costs; Costs of scale; Costs of opportunistic behavior
Milgrom P., Roberts J.	1 . Coordination costs: Costs of determining contract details; Costs of identifying partners; Costs of direct coordination. 2. Motivational costs: Costs associated with incomplete information; Costs of opportunism
Furubotn E., Richter R.	market transaction costs; Management transaction costs; Political transaction costs
Wallis J., North D.	Arising before the exchange; Arising in the process of exchange; Arising after an exchange.
Eggertsson Tr.	information search costs; Negotiation costs; Contracting costs; Monitoring costs; Coercion costs; Costs of protecting property rights.

It was previously emphasized that measurement costs include two parts. One part is classified as transaction costs, while the other is determined by the characteristics production process– production costs. In this regard, measurement costs are most often associated with quality measurement. At the same time, the subject, as a rule, does not bear all of the costs in full - neither production nor transaction. In an attempt to obtain more complete information about quality, he pays an increasingly higher price for it up to a certain limit. That is, until the moment when his costs for acquiring more accurate information turn out to be equal to the expected increase in value from owning this product. Naturally, a subject entering into a transaction is interested in minimizing measurement costs. What allows him to do this are several established institutions in society, which ensure a situation of measurement based on trust. First of all, these are different standards.

Examples of measurement based on trust can be associated not only with state standards, but also with certain business practices, for example, with the creation and activities of self-regulatory organizations in the market, including the ISK market. Savings in transaction costs associated with measurement problems in the latter case occur indirectly. But this is the only way, since replacing it with direct measurement is practically impossible, since it is impossible for each specific subject to independently carry out the process of change in each of the specific contracts.

Information costs, or information search costs (search and monitoring costs, as well as, to some extent, negotiation costs and coercion costs) partially overlap with measurement costs. The emergence of information costs is due to the incompleteness of information and the asymmetry of its distribution between interacting agents. Saving this type of costs is also possible in the direction of developing standards, but mainly proprietary ones, which include standards of conduct for participants in professional communities, associations that self-regulate activities in the market by accepting increased requirements in terms of providing comprehensive and reliable information, business ethics etc.

The costs of property rights (including the costs of coercion, partly the costs of negotiations) are generated by the imperfection of both the mechanism for protecting property rights and the mechanism for vesting these rights. The latter is especially relevant for Russia due to the very period of its development and its qualitative characteristics. And in this case, the direction of their savings may be the previously mentioned standards of professional communities, which may also include a number of functions delegated by the state to regulate market activities. For example, licensing of activities, if we specify this in relation to the subjects of the insurance policy, is so actively discussed today in this professional environment.

Search costs are associated with the acquisition of background economic information, i.e. information that is not directly related to a specific transaction. Background information is not included in the transaction costs of property rights, but is included in the transaction information costs. Background economic information is not related to a specific exchange of property rights, to a specific transaction, but forms the institutional background of the subject’s attitude to the transaction. Its significance is essential for acceptance specific solution. Here, a direction for reducing costs could be the voluntary assumption by self-regulatory organizations of functions to provide this kind of information about the institutional background, as well as consulting members of this professional community.

Coercion costs, which include the costs of economic agents to protect their property rights and their contracts. Professional communities and, in particular, self-regulatory organizations in the ISK are quite capable of representing the interests of their members in the relevant bodies state power, thereby ensuring a reduction in this type of costs for all participants as a whole.

Control costs are especially high when opportunities and incentives for opportunistic behavior exist. For example, in the case of the production of a unique product; a dynamic market with uncertain demand and unpredictable price movements; asymmetry of information in the market, which makes contracts external to the subject ineffective.

Rising transaction costs due to the inefficiency of external contracts limit the scope of the market. However, as the company grows, the number of employees increases busy workers and fragmentation of the production process. As a result, the direct connection between work and its result is lost. Self-control of workers over the intensity of their own work ceases to serve as a way to increase production efficiency; a controlling authority is forced to take its place. The costs of monitoring the degree of labor intensity of each production link appear and grow. The larger the firm becomes, the higher these control costs become. Eventually, the costs of enforcing internal contracts exceed transaction costs, the attractiveness of market contracts compared to internal ones increases, and internal ones are replaced by external ones. In this case self-regulatory organization through carries the characteristics of both an external and an internal subject. As an external subject, it independently carries out the activities prescribed by the participants; as an internal subject, a self-regulatory organization aims to express the interests of participants in the professional community, thereby reducing their transaction costs of monitoring external and internal contracts.

Agency costs here have a slightly different meaning than described in the literature. According to most publications, one subject delegates his rights to another chosen by him, concluding an agreement with him, due to the fact that he himself is not able to dispose of the entire volume of his property. As a result, the second acts in the market on behalf of the first. Here, transaction agency costs include the wages of the second subject if he receives them for property management activities. But, first of all, these include the losses incurred by the first subject, firstly, due to the incomplete coincidence of his interests with the interests of the subject-agent; and secondly, due to the asymmetry of information between them. The second knows more about his capabilities and the specifics of his behavior than the first, because the latter, having hired the second, cannot control him all the time. Asymmetry manifests itself in the realization of its interests by the second subject to the detriment of the interests of the first subject. But in the case of professional communities, self-regulatory public organizations, associations, the second component of agency costs (the difference in goals and interests) is leveled by the very principle of their creation, since it is to protect the interests of community members that they are formed.

The classification of transaction costs by possible areas of savings is presented in Table 17.

Thus, there is no unity in the concept of transaction costs and in their classification representation in science today. There are also more complex definitions of transaction costs and their classification [for example, 92, 105, 106, 140, 154, etc.]. But in most modern studies in the field of institutional economic theory, the term “transaction costs” is used in the sense proposed by O. Williamson. These are all the costs in all transactions that arise both within the company and on the market. This is enough to prove the right to the existence of the basic provisions of neo-institutional economic theory, of which he is rightfully considered the founder. But in order to adapt what is stated in the paragraph to the practice of activities of ICC subjects, the term “transaction costs” requires clarification. As Demsetz X. notes, “... with such rather inappropriate word usage, one has to resort to textual explanations in order to make a distinction where this can be done through a single label word.”

Based on the last statement in the monograph, transaction costs are understood as costs (explicit and implicit) associated with ensuring the functioning of institutional interactions of IS subjects as economic system, coordination and motivation costs.

Such costs are associated with searching for information about a product or service, searching for a partner in a transaction, negotiations, organizing the conclusion of contracts and monitoring their implementation, the formation of a system of corporate standards, and the process of self-regulation of the activities of IS subjects in the market as a whole.

Within the framework of the methodological principles of activity theory, neo-institutional economic theory and the theory of transaction costs set out in this chapter, it is further necessary to consider the investment and construction complex as a system.

Table 17

Classification of transaction costs by content and possible areas of savings

Type of costs		Possible areas of savings
To search for information	Search costs: The most favorable price; More favorable conditions contract; And selection of potential counterparties	Open electronic trading platforms; Corporate electronic trading systems; Business reputation
To negotiate and conclude contracts	1 . Expenditure of resources and time on: Conclusion of a contract; Necessary negotiations. 2. Losses due to unsuccessfully concluded, poorly executed and unreliably protected agreements	The use of the state as an organization with a comparative advantage in the implementation of violence, which, through the judicial system, allows controversial issues to be resolved; Arbitration courts; Industry associations
For measurement	They consist of the costs of measuring equipment, as well as the costs of resources and time for the measurement process	Warranty repair; Branded labels; Purchasing batches of goods based on samples; Money as a generally accepted means; Standards
Specifications and property rights protection	1. Cost of time and resources required for: Property Rights Specifications; Protection of property rights; Restoration of violated property rights. 2. Losses from improper specification and improper protection of property rights. 3. Costs of maintaining courts, arbitration and other government bodies with similar functions	Use of law enforcement; Education.
Opportunistic behavior	Consists of the efficiency losses associated with opportunistic behavior, as well as the costs necessary to limit it	Tightening supervision over the activities of agents; Introduction of an incentive scheme that would minimize deviations of the agent’s interests from the interests of the principal
Monitoring	Costs of supervising contract partners to verify their compliance with its terms	Using an incentive system for proper performance of the contract and a punishment system otherwise

The role of transaction costs in economics is often compared to the role of friction in physics: “Just as friction interferes with the movement of physical objects, dispersing energy in the form of heat, so transaction costs prevent the movement of resources to the users for whom they are of greatest value, “dispersing” the utility of these resources during the economic process. Just as every known physical object is given a form that helps either to minimize friction or to obtain some useful effect due to it (a wheel, for example, serves both), so in fact any institution known to us arises as a reaction to the presence of transaction costs and in order, presumably, to minimize their impact, thereby increasing the benefits of the exchange. ...An economist who ignores the existence of transaction costs will face the same difficulties in explaining economic behavior, which would be encountered by a physicist who ignores the fact of friction when describing the movement of physical objects.”