home Sample Documents New oil refinery. A Chinese company is recruiting workers from Omsk to build a refinery

New oil refinery. A Chinese company is recruiting workers from Omsk to build a refinery

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The development of the Soviet oil industry received a powerful impetus after the oil crisis of 1973-1974. Revenues from oil exports rose sharply, and investment in the oil industry also increased. The Soviet leadership sought to maximize oil production, and this task was completed: production peaked in 1988, when production amounted to 11.8 million barrels per day.

However, by the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, in the Russian oil industry there are serious imbalances. The pursuit of the plan led to an increase in the cost of production: year after year, each new ton of oil required more and more investments. In 1970-1973, the share of the oil sector in the capital investment of the entire industry was about 9 percent, and in 1986 it more than doubled to 19.5 percent. Many deposits were used irrationally, which led to their premature depletion and damage to environment. Despite all efforts, in the late 1980s, oil production began to fall. By that time, the USSR was already firmly on the oil needle: the share of proceeds from the sale of fuel and energy resources in Soviet foreign exchange earnings reached its highest level in 1984 and amounted to 55 percent. As is known, the subsequent fall in world oil prices had catastrophic consequences for the Soviet economy.

Romance of the nineties
In the early 1990s, hopes were pinned on foreign capital for the restoration of the oil and gas industry. The famous Decree No. 1403, signed by Boris Yeltsin in November 1992, which launched the formation and privatization of Rosneft, Lukoil, Yukos and Surgutneftegaz, provided for the sale of up to 15 percent. shares of these companies to foreign investors.

Moreover, the state stopped financing the oil and gas industry, and in order to attract foreign investment, it provided joint ventures (JVs) with significant benefits, primarily the right to export 100 percent. all oil produced. At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a real boom in the JV in the Russian oil industry. By the end of the 1990s, when export preferences were abolished, JVs were producing more than 20 million tons of oil per year.

At an early stage, joint ventures were created mainly by small foreign companies, but in the early 1990s, the giants of the global oil and gas business also came to Russia. In 1994-1995, the Russian government signed three Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs). Two concerned projects on the Sakhalin shelf: Sakhalin-1 with Exxon and Sodeco and Sakhalin-2 with Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui. The third agreement on the development of the Kharyaginskoye field in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug was signed with the French Total.

It was in the three PSAs that the changing attitude of the state towards Western oil companies was reflected. The history of these projects is different. So, negotiations on Sakhalin-1 began back in the 1970s, then the Soviet government decided to involve Japanese companies. Exxon entered the project in the early 1990s. The history of Sakhalin-2 began in 1991, when the Soviet government announced a tender for the preparation of a feasibility study for the development of the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields. The competition was won by a consortium of Western companies, which was later joined by Shell and Mitsubishi. Finally, the development of the Kharyaginskoye field began in 1999. Total was engaged to develop two of the six production facilities at the field. All three agreements were signed by the Russian government a few months before the adoption of the PSA Law in December 1995.

Notably, the three PSAs provided for legal protection against any subsequent legislative restrictions that could worsen the position of foreign investors. The agreements were signed on terms that placed them outside Russian jurisdiction. In the mid-1990s, such an "extraterritorial" status of projects did not bother the government Russia. Oil production was falling in the country, and there was a catastrophic lack of investment in new projects. With an average oil price in 1995 of 18 dollars. per barrel and the imperfection of tax legislation, which could change in an unpredictable way at any moment, the agreements became the only way to attract multibillion-dollar investments from Western companies. After the adoption of the PSA Law, the government selected more than 20 projects for their development, now in accordance with the PSA norms that have entered into force.

Love in cold weather
However, further implementation of the PSA regime has stalled. The government has been unable to agree, either internally or with stakeholders, on the legal and regulatory framework needed to implement projects in accordance with the law that has just been passed. And by the beginning of the 2000s, the general position in the industry: oil prices began to rise, which increased the profitability of investments in mining projects and reduced the attractiveness of PSA for foreign investors. The owners of the growing Russian companies were also not interested in attracting foreign companies on the terms of production sharing. The first such deal was the purchase of BP in 1997, 10 percent. shares of the company "SIDANCO" from the structures of Vladimir Potanin. In 2003, BP merged its Russian assets with TNK and effectively acquired about half of TNK's shares from the Alfa-Access-Renova consortium. In 2004, ConocoPhillips acquired a 7.6% stake from the state. shares of LUKOIL, and subsequently bought additional shares from Vagit Alekperov and other Russian shareholders of the company. Khodorkovsky himself in 2002-2003 was close to selling a large stake in Yukos to ExxonMobil, but for obvious reasons the deal did not take place.

It is worth noting that in the early 2000s, some Western companies were ready to directly invest in oil and gas projects in Russia without PSA, that is, under the standard tax regime, and even without large Russian partners. Thus, in the mid-1990s, Shell expected to develop the Salymskoye field in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug on the terms of a PSA, but later agreed to start working under the normal tax regime and made its first investments in 2004. In 2003, the American company Marathon began operating in Western Siberia, which acquired the Khanty-Mansiysk oil corporation».

Error correction
As oil prices soared and Western companies became more interested in investing in the Russian oil sector, there was growing dissatisfaction in the government with respect to the three PSAs signed in the first half of the 1990s. The main complaints were related to the fact that the projects were becoming more and more costly. Shell suffered the most from government pressure on PSA operators, largest shareholder"Sakhalin-2". In 2005 and 2006, the project was literally bombarded with various inspections, which revealed not only overestimation of costs, but also a violation of environmental legislation. The then head of Rosprirodnadzor, Oleg Mitvol, estimated the environmental damage from Shell's activities on Sakhalin at $50 billion, an amount comparable to the damage from Hurricane Katrina. At the end of 2006, the shareholders of Sakhalin-2 sold 50 percent. plus one share in the company operator of the project to Gazprom, after which all environmental claims were removed.

The development of the Kharyaginskoye field by Total was also accompanied by constant conflict with state structures. Early 2000s tax authorities disputed Total's costs every year and refused to approve the cost estimate for the project. The French company in 2003 even filed a lawsuit against the Russian government in the Stockholm Arbitration, demanding reimbursement of the costs incurred by it. The conflict continued until Total and another foreign participant in the project, Statoil, agreed in 2009 to transfer 20 percent. in the project of the state "Zarubezhneft".

In order to sell gas to end consumers in Russia, ExxonMobil must supply them with gas through pipelines controlled by Gazprom. Access to these pipes is also essential for a US company if it wants to sell its gas outside of Russia, to China or Korea. Over the past few years, ExxonMobil and Gazprom have been unable to agree on the price of gas from Sakhalin-1. Nevertheless, ExxonMobil succeeded in the main preservation of control over the project. One can only guess what arguments convinced the Russian leadership to abandon attempts to use force on ExxonMobil, similar to what was carried out against Sakhalin-2.

One way or another, the development of PSA in Russia has stalled. To date, the share of PSA operators accounts for only 3.2 percent. of total oil production and 3.6 percent. of the total gas production in Russia. This production volume is comparable to that of an average Russian company such as Bashneft or RussNeft. PSA projects in Russia play a much more modest role than in resource-rich CIS countries such as Kazakhstan and most non-CIS countries where production sharing is applied.

Oil and gas production from Sakhalin projects will grow, but the persistent allergy to PSA among the Russian political leadership is too strongly associated with the loss of state control in the "dashing nineties." In 2008, speaking of the PSA, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would not allow "the colonial use of its resources." Foreign companies are invited to work in Russia under the standard tax regime. The trouble is that the development of the oil and gas industry under this regime has no prospects.

tax dead end
Producers in Russia pay the same taxes as other companies on value added, profits, property, and social contributions. In addition, oil companies pay a mineral extraction tax (MET) and, if they export their oil, an export duty. The MET is calculated according to a formula approved in 2002: the tax amount depends on the current oil price and the ruble/dollar exchange rate. At the price of the Urals brand of 100 dollars. per barrel and the rate of 29 rubles per dollar, the producer must pay the state about 18 dollars. from every barrel of oil produced. However, this tax is not as terrible for oil companies as the export duty, which is calculated on a progressive scale: the higher the price of oil, the higher the duty rate. Since August 2004, the export duty rate for oil prices above $25. per barrel is 65 percent.

Thus, if other taxes are taken into account, high prices for oil, the tax burden on exporters exceeds 90 percent. Current tax system was established in the middle of the 2000s, when the task was to withdraw excess profits from oil companies and fill the Stabilization Fund. The high tax burden did not bankrupt the oil companies, but made investments in new fields unprofitable. It is significant that large Russian companies such as LUKOIL and TNK-BP have stepped up their search for projects outside of Russia since the early 2000s, largely due to the unfavorable tax climate.

AT last years the government tried to regulate the tax regime, for example, by setting preferential severance tax rates for old depleted fields. Since October 2011, the marginal rate of export duty on oil has been reduced from 65 to 60 percent, at the same time, however, export duties on oil products have been significantly increased. Despite these cosmetic indulgences, the development of large new projects under the current tax regime remains unprofitable. Moreover, the important oil projects that have been carried out in Russia in recent years have become possible only thanks to the political influence of companies that have secured special tax breaks for themselves. These projects include the Filanovsky field in the northern Caspian, which is being developed by LUKOIL, and the Vankor field, Rosneft's largest project in Eastern Siberia; both companies received from the state the right, secured by special government orders, not to pay export duties on oil from these projects at the initial stage of their development. It should be noted that Rosneft's benefits for the Vankor field expired in May 2011 and were not extended.

arctic craze
In recent years, against the backdrop of a tightening of the tax regime, the state began to show a growing interest in the development of new promising oil and gas areas, primarily on the Arctic shelf. The development of Arctic projects is possible only with the participation of foreign companies; the only such project implemented by Gazprom, the development of the Prirazlomnoye field on the shelf of the Pechora Sea, has shown in practice that without foreigners arctic projects Russian companies cannot be moved. The long-suffering project stretched for 16 years. The platform for the development of the field was built at the defense enterprises of the north of Russia, primarily at the Sevmash plant. At the same time, the field development scheme was revised several times, and the cost of the project was constantly growing. As a result, it many times exceeded the initial calculations and amounted to almost 4 billion dollars, which casts doubt on the payback of the project. Characteristically, Gazprom Neft Shelf, the division of Gazprom that is developing Prirazlomnoye, still advocates using the PSA regime for the project.

So, the development of the Arctic shelf is possible only in partnership with foreign, primarily Western, companies that have the necessary technological and financial resources. At the end of the "zero" years, the Russian leadership decided to start full-scale development of the Arctic. The following scheme was chosen: the government issues licenses to state-owned companies Gazprom and Rosneft, which then attract foreign partners to develop fields, transferring minority stakes to them. Issuing licenses proved to be a simple matter. Already in 2010, the licensing agency Rosnedra under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology issued six licenses for the development of offshore fields to Rosneft and two to Gazprom. This year, Rosnedra plans to issue about 15 more licenses, and a total of several dozen will be issued. At the same time, a more difficult task, the development of a clear strategy for the development of the shelf and the tax regime, is mired in bureaucracy.

The government has not yet approved the state program for the development of the shelf. The division of roles between state-owned companies remains unclear: initially it was assumed that Gazprom and Rosneft would create a joint company as an operator of offshore projects, then they would develop fields separately: Rosneft oil, Gazprom gas. The division of "spheres of influence" between state-owned companies, however, did not take place. Firstly, many license areas are unexplored, so it is impossible to definitively divide them into oil and gas. Secondly, in the absence of clear political guidelines, Rosneft and Gazprom began to compete for new offshore licenses, while Rosneft lays claim to gas-bearing areas in the Barents Sea.

Partnership with many unknowns
The result is a paradoxical situation. For the first time since the mid-1990s, the state is interested in attracting foreign oil and gas companies to projects in Russia. However, since there is no clear strategy and tax regime, foreigners are invited not only to deal with competing state-owned companies, but also to enter projects whose profitability cannot be calculated. At the same time, state-owned companies prefer not to invest their own funds in the exploration of licensed areas, offering foreign partners to pay themselves for the pleasure of working on the Russian shelf. In other words, the following offer is made to foreign companies: you take on the technological and financial risks of the project, and if you are lucky and you find oil or gas, then we will agree on a tax regime. And if they don’t find it, it means that they were unlucky and the funds were wasted.

Some foreign companies seem ready to start working even under such conditions. Over the past year, Rosneft has signed several offshore development agreements: with Chevron and ExxonMobil for areas in the Black Sea, with BP for areas in the Kara Sea, and with ExxonMobil for the same areas. However, the signed agreements do not mean that Western companies intend to seriously invest in offshore projects. Rather, they seek to “stake out” their participation in these projects and, spending a minimum of money, agree on the conditions for further work. In addition, two of the three agreements signed by Rosneft have already expired: Chevron left the project to study Shatsky Shaft in the Black Sea, citing unfavorable geological factors, and the Rosneft deal with BP was torpedoed by the Russian partners of the British company.

The deal with ExxonMobil, announced at the end of August 2011, involves seismic exploration and drilling of exploration wells in the Kara Sea. However, the tax regime for further field development will be determined in the future, and until then the American company is unlikely to invest in the project amounts close to those announced by representatives of Rosneft and Russian government. Rosneft is now actively looking for additional offshore exploration and development partners and is likely to find them, but the lack of a clear tax regime will make these projects much more difficult to implement.

A clear example of these difficulties is the project to develop the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea. This giant field, located 600 kilometers from the coast, was discovered in 1988. In the 1990s, it was controlled by joint ventures between Gazprom and Rosneft; in 2004, Rosneft ceded its share in the project to Gazprom. Sluggish negotiations with potential foreign partners interested in the development of Shtokman have continued since the early 1990s. In the mid-2000s, Gazprom intensified the negotiation process with Western companies, but the Russian gas monopoly was very selective in choosing partners, demanding the most favorable conditions for itself. In 2006, Gazprom said that the proposals received from Western companies did not satisfy him. It was decided to leave control over the field in the hands of Gazprom, and to attract Western companies exclusively as contractors.

As a result of a long trade, which took place with the participation of top officials of the state, in 2007 Gazprom signed agreements with two contractors, Statoil and Total, which received 24% respectively. and 25 per cent. in the project operator. However, the development of the deposit has not yet begun. In 2008, a global financial crisis, which led to a sharp decline in gas demand in Europe. Meanwhile, in the United States, another potential consumer of gas from Shtokman, shale gas production has risen sharply and gas purchases from abroad have decreased. Thus, the gas from the Shtokman field, inevitably expensive, turned out to be uncompetitive even before it began to be produced.

After several years of negotiations with Western companies, in the summer of 2011 the government finally decided to give the operator of the field property tax breaks, but this belated decision alone cannot ensure the profitability of the Shtokman project. Unless additional and larger tax incentives are provided, an investment decision on the field is unlikely to be made. Thus, the unfavorable tax regime remains one of the main factors hindering the start of field development.

At the same time, neither Gazprom nor its Western partners can afford to officially abandon the project: too much effort has been spent on reaching existing agreements, and, especially for Gazprom, keeping Shtokman afloat is a matter of prestige. Instead, companies regularly state that they are still committed to the project, but the investment decision and, accordingly, the start of production is periodically delayed by a year or two.

They can if they want
Although the Shtokman project has been shelved, France's Total recently acquired a 20 percent stake in another major gas project. The project for the development of the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye field and the construction of a plant for the production of liquefied natural gas known as Yamal LNG. This project demonstrates that in certain circumstances the government is able to provide oil and gas companies with the most favorable treatment in a short time, including on tax issues.

The Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye field is located in the north of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. In the late 2000s, Yamal LNG, which owns the license for the field, was resold several times and in 2009 came under the control of NOVATEK, Russia's largest private gas company.

Despite the fact that in the official strategy of Gazprom, the development of the Yuzhno-Tambeyskoye field was planned for the 2020s, Novatek decided to speed up the project. The launch of the first stage of the LNG plant with a capacity of 5.5 million tons per year is planned to be carried out in 2016, and two more stages in 2017 and 2018. At the same time, the reaction of the state to the project private company differed sharply from the usual bureaucratic red tape. Over the past year, the Yamal LNG project has received unprecedented government support. The government has promised the private company Novatek a 12-year MET tax break. In recent tenders organized by Rosnedra, Novatek received licenses for several large deposits in Yamal, thereby increasing the resource base of the project. In addition, Novatek may receive government subsidies for the purchase of LNG tankers for the development of these fields. The crown of generosity was the provision of an export channel to Novatek, in fact, bypassing Gazprom.

State support for Novatek chronologically coincided with the appearance of Gennady Timchenko, a co-owner of the Gunvor oil trader and an acquaintance of Vladimir Putin, among its shareholders. Timchenko himself denies any personal reason for his success in the Russian commodity business. However, after Timchenko's purchase of a stake in Novatek in 2009, according to press reports, now Timchenko and Leonid Mikhelson, the company's chairman of the board, own a block of its shares close to a controlling 10, the share price has increased several times. Unprecedented hitherto state support for private gas producer, obviously, was reflected in the rapid growth of the company's value.

Strategy and risk
For twenty years, foreign companies in Russia have experienced both state love and state wrath. The rise of the oligarchs in the 1990s put an end to the PSA regime, but opened the way for Western companies that wanted to invest in the capital of Russian oil and gas structures. The rise of state capitalism in the Putin era forced foreign companies to seek partnerships with Rosneft and Gazprom. But the achievement of this goal was difficult not only because of the ambitions Russian state companies but also because of excessive tax pressure on the oil industry. At the end of the 2000s, the political cycle in the oil and gas sector went into a second round. As in the 1990s, those private companies whose owners have enlisted the support of state leaders are in the best position.

Under these conditions, there are two possibilities for foreign companies. The first is the development of cooperation with Gazprom and Rosneft. In the foreseeable future, these two state-owned companies will be able to cooperate with foreigners in megaprojects, such as the development of the Arctic shelf. In exchange, state-owned companies will demand investments, technologies, and assets outside of Russia. In addition, foreign companies will be expected to assist, primarily Gazprom, in the implementation of its pipeline projects in Europe. For example, it seems likely that Germany's Wintershall and Italy's Eni entered into Gazprom's South Stream project in large part to facilitate their access to fields in Russia.

The second opportunity for foreign companies is cooperation with private Russian companies. As recent practice shows, it is companies like Novatek that can achieve tax preferences for their projects faster and more efficiently than the seemingly almighty Gazprom. Total has joined two significant gas projects, Shtokman in partnership with Gazprom and Yamal LNG in cooperation with Novatek. It is likely that Yamal LNG will be sold faster than Shtokman, in any case, over the past year, Novatek has received an unprecedented state support, and Shtokman stood still.

The other side of the coin in cooperation with private companies is the dependence on their owners, or rather, on their political connections, which allow them to woo the state. There have been many ups and downs in the history of the Russian oil and gas sector over the past 20 years. Yukos, the country's largest private oil and gas company, was liquidated in just two years. Structures that worked closely with Gazprom in the 1990s and received assets from the gas monopoly on favorable terms, for example, Itera and Stroytransgaz, lost support in the 2000s and were forced to return most assets of Gazprom. More recently, Mikhail Gutseriev, who created from scratch one of the largest oil companies, RussNeft, was prosecuted and emigrated to London in 2007, selling RussNeft to the structures of Oleg Deripaska. But by the middle of 2010, all charges against Gutseriev were dropped, he arrived in Russia and, as if nothing had happened, returned to the leadership of RussNeft.

Just like 10-15 years ago, foreign companies are forced to rely on the political influence of their partners. Cooperation with state-owned companies is more politically secure and opens access to significant projects, but the implementation of these projects can be delayed for years. Betting on private companies, whose owners can take advantage of their closeness to the top political leadership, promises momentary favor from the state, but does not guarantee long-term support for projects, especially in the event of a change in political leadership or the exit of their Russian shareholders from projects.

13:08 — REGNUM Iran is starting to select foreign companies that plan to take part in major local oil and gas projects. In particular, in the development of hydrocarbon deposits. This became known from a message posted on the website of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

Acceptance of applications from foreign oil producers began on Monday, October 17, and will last until November 19 this year. NIOC invites investors interested in the exploration and production of black gold to participate in the pre-qualification. The company will publish the final list of selected organizations on December 7th. However, so far the IRI has not announced a specific list of projects in question.

After the lifting in January of this year of Western sanctions against Iran, imposed for the country's nuclear program, Iran is trying to increase oil production and market share to pre-sanction levels. At first, the Iranian authorities said they would increase production to the target of 4 million barrels per day by June of this year, then by September. The deadline has now been pushed back to 2019. It became clear that without financial investment foreign companies Iran itself can not cope. Therefore, in order to increase the attractiveness of their oil and gas fields Tehran in August of this year approved new model oil contracts for foreign investors (IPC). According to the Iranian plan, the country's oil and gas industry needs about $150 billion in investment to increase production by a million barrels per day by 2020. Thus, over the next two years, Iran intends to sign contracts worth $25 billion with foreign companies.

IPC provides for more flexible conditions for the activities of foreign companies compared to previous contracts. Details of the contracts have not yet been disclosed. But it is known that now foreign investors will be able to enter into contracts for up to 20 years, which will allow companies to at least recover their costs. The old contracts had a one-time payment and were only valid for five years.

The Iranian National Oil Company already signed the first contract on the new model in October, but not with foreign company, but the local Setad Ejraye Farman Emam. The American media call this company part of the conglomerate of the Iranian leader Ali Khamenei. Under the terms of the contract, it is planned to improve oil recovery methods and increase oil production at the Kupal field as part of the development of the second phase of the Yaran field.

Previously IA REGNUM reported that Norwegian, Dutch, British companies at the end of August this year have already announced that they are interested in joint work with Tehran in oil industry, and asked to give them the opportunity to explore the territory in the Caspian Sea. True, Deputy Director General of the National Iranian Oil Company Gholam-Reza Manuchehri did not specify which companies in question. However, according to Manouchehri, Tehran has already invited foreign investors to take part in the exploration and development of four hydrocarbon projects in the Caspian Sea at the same time. In particular, the "Sardar-e Jangal" field.

As for Russian-Iranian cooperation in the oil industry, in August the Russian Ambassador to Tehran Levan Jagharyan said that Russian oil companies are interested in Iranian oil projects. Basically, of course, we are talking about mining projects, but participation in the field of oil refining and petrochemistry is also possible. Moreover, the option of creating a consortium of Russian oil companies to work in Iran is also allowed, Dzhagaryan said.

Lukoil has previously stated its desire to work in Iran. According to the Russian ambassador, the company is considering participation in projects to develop two fields near the city of Ahvaz in the west of Iran. It is possible that Lukoil will return to the Anaran project, where the company worked before the imposition of sanctions. Memorandums of cooperation between Gazprom Neft and Gazprom with Iranian oil and gas companies NIOC and NIGC in the field of oil and gas field development. Interest in participating in Iranian projects was also expressed by Zarubezhneft and Tatneft.

Investment activities of Russian and foreign oil and gas companies

Investment activity of Russian and foreign oil and gas companies

Lazareva Anna Igorevna

postgraduate student of the Department of Economics and Management

in the oil and gas industry,

"Ufa State Oil Technical University"

[email protected]

Annotation.This article presents the results of an analysis of the investment activities of Russian oil and gas companies such asRosneft, Lukoil, Gazpromneft, Tatneft, Surgutneftegaz in comparison with a foreign company"total". During the study, it can be concluded that,

Abstract.This article presents the results of the analysis of the investment activities of Russian oil and gas companies such as "Rosneft", "Lukoil", "Gazpromneft", "Tatneft", and "Surgutneftegaz" in comparison with the foreign company "Total". In the course of the study, it can be concluded that, despite the active investment policy of Russian oil companies, the leader of the Russian market, PJSC "NK Rosneft" inferior to the foreign company "Total" in total investment by 2-3 times.

Keywords:investment activity, oil and gas company,Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazpromneft, Tatneft, Surgutneftegaz,"total".

keywords:investment activities, oil and gas company, Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazpromneft, Tatneft, Surgutneftegaz, Total.

Introduction

The influence of energy factors on the development of the world and national economies, the system of international economic and geopolitical relations is constantly increasing as the world GDP grows and energy consumption increases. According to forecasts, the needs of the world economy for energy resources in the next 30 years may increase by almost 60% compared to the beginning of the 21st century, which requires further development of the oil and gas industry, both in the world and in Russia. .

Development management of oil and gas companies is a set of activities, methods and means related to the purposeful regulation of the movement of monetary, property and intellectual values invested in the enterprise in order to achieve the chosen goals.

The basis for the development of the enterprise are investments. To meet the growing demand for hydrocarbons, the main actors of the oil and gas industry - international and national oil and gas companies - need to develop a clear, forward-looking investment strategy that involves attracting large-scale capital investments in the exploration, production, transportation and processing of hydrocarbons, and also aimed at increasing the return on these investment. Choice this object The research is dictated by the role of oil and gas companies in the world market of energy carriers and refined products, the importance of their activities in maintaining the global and domestic fuel balance, and the related need to regulate the investment process and improve the efficiency of investment programs in modern conditions.

An analysis of the investment activity of leading oil and gas companies corresponds to the current need for an in-depth study of the above process, especially in the context of price instability in the world hydrocarbon markets and taking into account political instability in the regions of their production, affecting both the development of the industry and the process of making investment decisions. The need for a thorough study of this issue is also associated with the constant increase in the role of the oil and gas industry in the energy sector of the world economy, the continuation of the process of transnationalization in this industry, the permanent growth of its influence on the competitiveness of national economies, their energy and economic security.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the investment activities of Russian and foreign oil and gas companies such asRosneft, Lukoil, Gazpromneft, Tatneft, Surgutneftegaz and"total".

Main section

The investment process is defined as a sequence of stages, actions and operations for the implementation of investment activities. The ultimate goal of investment activity is to make a profit, create added value and increase the market value of the business and company. In relation to the oil and gas sector, the objectives of investment activity are the growth of proven reserves of oil and gas, an increase in the volume of sales (production) of hydrocarbons, the optimization of production indicators (increasing the oil recovery factor and the coefficient of recovery or regeneration of reserves), maintaining and expanding the market niche, reducing unit costs for extraction and transportation of raw materials. To this it must be added that the importance of the investment activities of oil and gas companies is due to the need to ensure uninterrupted supplies of energy to consumers.

Oil and gas enterprises are multi-purpose systems that combine production, financial, economic, social, marketing higher and other goals related to the solution of problems that lead to strategically important change pits . To carry out effective investment activity, it is necessary to solve the problem of choice priority investment areas, those. submultiple stvo investment projects having sufficient investment potential and ensuring the achievement of strategic development goals, and to implement investment design choice data for the implementation of options.

At the beginning of the XX I in. for oil and gas The industry, together with other extractive industries, accounts for the largest share of foreign and domestic direct investment. renewed interest in oil and gas industry partly reflects the structural shift that is taking place in almost all of the world. out commodity markets. It is characterized by rising demand for minerals from Asian markets, coupled with strong demand in developed countries, leading to higher prices for minerals. In this context, it is worth noting that the global th markets for mineral raw materials are characterized by an uneven geographical distribution of reserves, production and consumption. For example, some developing countries are countries with transitive economies (Indonesia, Algeria, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, Kazakhs tan, etc.), they are net exporters of hydrocarbons, while other developing countries (China, India, Turkey, Ukraine, etc.), as well as developed countries (Germany, France, Italy, etc.) are net importers . Such imbalances cause concern regarding the security of supplies on the part of importers and regarding access to markets - on the part of exporters. And this is natural, given the importance of the supply of hydrocarbon raw materials for sustainable economic development countries. In such a sieve Applications by oil and gas companies can be beneficial to both the host country and the home country. For countries that do not have the necessary capacity to fully convert their natural resources into commercial goods, oil and gas companies and can act as a source of the necessary capital, knowledge and entry into the markets, and for home countries - a kind of "bridge" to provide access to foreign supplies. It should also be emphasized here that the policy of oil and gas companies and state TV is formed in the context of volatility in commodity markets with a tendency to increase prices, which supports an increase in the cost of exploiting new hydrocarbon deposits.

In the oil and gas industry, international oil and gas companies remain the largest largest corporations in terms of foreign assets. At the same time, from the point of view of the scale of production, since 2005 the national oil and gas companies of developing countries and countries with transitional economies are beginning to outstrip international ones. To such corporations wells are owned by Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabia), Gazprom (Russia), NIOC (Iran) and others. And although in recent years the development of national oil and gas companies has been characterized by significant dynamism, combined with control over most of the proven reserves of natural gas rya and its production, the degree of internationalization in comparison with international oil and gas companies remains quite low. Meanwhile, some companies from developing countries and countries with economies in transition are expanding their overseas interests and are rapidly becoming global players. These companies include: CNPC, Sinopec (China), Lukoil (Russia), ONGC (India), Petrobras (Brazil), Petronas (Malaysia) and others. CNPC (China) and Petronas (Malaysia) are involved in oil and gas production in more than 10 foreign countries.

The increase in investment flows in the global oil and gas industry has been observed over the past decade - after a period of minimal investment in the 1990s. As noted above, the active process of increasing investment volumes with on the part of national oil and gas companies began in 2005 and brought them to a leading position in terms of production.

Consider the investment activities of vertically integrated companies such as Rosneft [6], Lukoil [5], Gazpromneft [ 2],"Tatneft" [7], Surgutneftegaz [ 4].

1. PJSC NK Rosneft is the leader of the Russian oil industry and one of the largest public oil and gas companies in the world. The investment program of PJSC NK Rosneft has been formed in conservative scenario parameters. In 2016, the total investment amounted to USD 10,966 million (Table 1).

Table 1 - The volume of investments of PJSC "NK Rosneft" in 2014-2016, million dollars

Name	2014	2015	2016	Change 2015/2014	Change 2016/2015
Upstream	10 146	7 957	9 266	2 189	1 309
Downstream	4 476	2 026	1 316	2 450
Other
TOTAL:	14 921	10 362	10 966	4 559

Compared to 2015, the volume of investments increased by 6%, mainly due to the Upstream sector. This growthdue to the fulfillment of strategic goals for the growth of hydrocarbon production by increasing the pace of production drilling and field development, as well as the start of the active phase of the development of new and large oil and gas projects.At the same time, investments in the Downstream sector in 2016 decreased by 35%.

According to structureinvestments of PJSC NK Rosneft for 2016the main share of 85% is occupied by the “Upstream” sector.

2. Gazprom Neft PJSC and its subsidiaries are a vertically integrated oil company (VIOC), whose main activities are the exploration, development, production and sale of oil and gas, as well as the production and marketing of petroleum products.

In 2016, the total investment amounted to USD 5,973 million. Compared to 2015, the total investment decreased by 2%. As can be seen, the main shift in 2016 towards the processing block was an increase of 15% (Table 2).

Table 2 - The volume of investments of PJSC Gazprom Neft in 2014-2016, million dollars

Name	2014	2015	2016	Change 2015/2014	Change 2016/2015
Upstream	5 819	4 530	3 863	1 289
Downstream	1265
Other	2 022		1 218	1 231
TOTAL:	9 106	6 079	5 973	3 027

Investments in the Upstream segment decreased by $667 million, or 17%. In 2016, the sector occupied the main share in the total investment volume - 65%.

It should be noted that tocapital expenditures for mature fields remained at the level of the previous year and amounted to $1,753 million. Costs for new projects decreased by 5% and amounted to $1,887 million. This was due to a decrease in activity on foreign projects. Refining costs increased by 41% due to continued implementation of modernization projects at the Omsk and Moscow refineries.

3. OAO Surgutneftegaz– one of largest enterprises oil industry in Russia. It accounts for about 13% of the country's oil production and 25% of the gas produced by Russian oil companies.In 2016, the total investment amounted to USD 3,384 million. Compared to 2015, the total investment decreased by 7%. As can be seen, the main shift in 2016 towards the processing unit was an increase of 10% (Table 3).

Table 3 - The volume of investments of OJSC “Surgutneftegas” in 2014-2016, million dollars

Name	2014	2015	2016	Change 2015/2014	Change 2016/2015
Upstream	4 926	3 397	3 106	1 529
Downstream
Other
TOTAL:	5 172	3 653	3 384	1 518

According to the structureinvestments of OJSC “Surgutneftegas”, investmentsThe Upstream segment annually accounts for more than 90% of the total investment.However, in 2016, the volume of investments in the oil and gas production sector decreased by 9% and amounted to USD 3,106 million. Of this amount, 89.4% or USD 2,777 million fell on Western Siberia, 10.2% or $317 million - to Eastern Siberia and 0.4% or $12 million - to the Timan-Pechora oil and gas province.

4. PJSC "Lukoil" - one of the largest international vertically integrated companies, providing 2.2% of world oil production. PJSC Lukoil implements oil and gas exploration and production projects in 12 countries around the world.In 2016, the total investment amounted to USD 7,601 million (Table 4).

Table 4 - The volume of investments of PJSC "Lukoil" in 2014-2016, million dollars

Name	2014	2015	2016	Change 2015/2014	Change 2016/2015
Upstream	12 185	8 041	6 582	4 144	1 459
Downstream	3 071	1 524		1 547
Other
TOTAL:	16 082	10 003	7 601	6 078	2 403

Compared to 2015, the total volume of investments decreased by 24%. This abbreviationof capital expenditures is due to the completion of the main refinery modernization program and the reduction of investments in international projects.

Approximately 80% of annual capital investments are in mining and only 10% in refining. This is explained by the fact that Lukoil has practically completed the refinery modernization program and there is a need to maintain the level of oil production, since it has been falling every year since 2009 due to the depletion of fields in Western Siberia.

In the Downstream segment, capital expenditures at the Group's Russian refineries in 2016 amounted to USD 416 million, which is 49% less than in 2015. The decrease is due to the end of the main investment cycle for the modernization of oil refining capacities.

5. PJSC TATNEFT - one of the largest domestic oil companies operating as a vertically integrated Group. The Company accounts for about 8% of oil produced in the Russian Federation and over 80% of oilcommon on the territory of Tatarstan.

In 2016, the total investment amounted to $1,445 million (Table 5).

Table 5 - The volume of investments of PJSC TATNEFT in 2014-2016, million dollars

Name	2014	2015	2016	Change 2015/2014	Change 2016/2015
Upstream
Downstream
Other
TOTAL:	1 815	1 601	1 445

As can be seen, the main shift in 2016 towards the refining block was an increase of 12%. However, s a significant share of investment funds was directed to the exploration and production of oil and gas - about 805 million dollars, as well as to the construction of the Complex of oil refineries and petrochemical plants (more than 536 million dollars). At the same time andInvestments in the Upstream segment annually account for about half of the total investment.

It should be noted that investment PJSC TATNEFT in 2016 was carried out in accordance with the strategic development plans and current priorities in addressing production tasks. Thus, $440 million was invested in exploration and production within the Republic of Tatarstan, and $304 million was invested in the development of extra-viscous oil fields. The remaining funds, about $61 million, were directed to exploration and production in the Russian Federation, as well as foreign projects.

It should be noted that the oil and gas industry in Russia is extremely capital intensive, so the period of return on invested capital is longer than in many other industries. This is due to a number of reasons, namely:

- significant time and money spent on negotiations with the owner of potential hydrocarbon deposits on prospecting and exploration work and conditions for future production;

- direct exploration work may be difficult due to unfavorable climatic, geological, technological, socio-political and other conditions;

- search for highly qualified work force to ensure all links in the value chain - from the exploration of hydrocarbon deposits to the stage of selling processed products to the end consumer;

- significant costs of time and money at the initial stage of production associated with the difficulties of transporting production equipment (drilling platforms, drill strings, etc.), rather long commissioning works (there is always a possibility of a possible partial change in structures or their modification in accordance with modern conditions at the place of extraction);

- solving the problems of efficient transportation from the place of production to the place of processing and from the place of processing to the place of sale (construction or modernization of the tanker fleet and the fleet of gas carriers; construction or use of existing oil loading terminals and terminals for transportation liquefied gas; construction of gas and oil pipelines, pumping stations, as well as the necessary infrastructure);

- construction or modernization of capacities for storage and processing of hydrocarbon raw materials;

- creation of a wholesale, small wholesale and retail trade and consumer network for the sale of processed products;

- high level of risks typical for the oil and gas industry as a whole.

Let's compare the investment activities of Russian oil companies with those of foreign ones. For comparison, let's take one of the leaders in the distribution of fuel in Western Europe and Africa TNK "Total" . This company was chosen for comparison, becauseit is the fourth largest in the world after Royal Dutch Shell, BP and ExxonMobil.

Yes, s and in 2016, the total investment amounted to 20,530 million dollars (Table 6).

Table 6 - The volume of investments "Total" 2014-2016, million dollars

Name	2014	2015	2016	Change 2015/2014	Change 2016/2015
Upstream	26 520	24 270	16 035	2 250	8 235
Downstream	3 840	3 684	4 355
Other
TOTAL:	30 509	28 033	20 530	2 476	7 503

The 27% decline in investment compared to 2015 signifies the completion and launch of nine major growth projects in 2015 and five in 2016. The reduction was also the result of a successful capital efficiency program in response to the fall in Brent oil prices.

Investments in the Upstream segment annually, like those of Russian companies, account for more than 80% of the total investment.

Next, we present the indicator (volume of investments) in comparable conditions, since all companies differ both in terms of production and financial indicators. As a comparison, let's take the volume of oil equivalent production (Table 7).

Table 7 – Amount of investments per 1 ton of oil produced for 2014-2016, USD/t

From Table 7, we can conclude that in 2016 the leaders among the considered oil companies were Gazprom Neft PJSC and Lukoil PJSC, whose investments amounted to $100 and $92 per 1 ton of oil produced. However, only Rosneft has increased this indicator in 2016 by 6%, while other companies showed a decline in this indicator. Based on the data obtained earlier, the predominant share (more than 50%) is annually occupied by the Upstream sector. Although the amount of investments in the Downstream sector is increasing, the share remains small, no more than 20%.

In the "Downstream" sector The dynamics of the output of petroleum products across all companies in 2016 changed insignificantly (the percentage of change was no more than 3%). At the same time, considering the structure of oil products, we can conclude that the share of motor gasoline in the considered Russian companies is 20%, diesel fuel - 32%, fuel oil and vacuum gas oil - 29%. While at " Total

Thus, it turns out that oil refineries (refineries)produce more heavy distillates, which are at the lower end of the price range, this is due to the fact that developed countries operate complex refineries that produce mainly gasoline (catalytic cracking) and middle distillates ( heat treatment and hydrocracking). At Russian refineries, the process of vacuum distillation of fuel oil is usually complemented by catalytic reforming for the production of gasoline and basic hydrotreating for the production of diesel fuel.

Conclusion

After analyzing the investment activities of oil companies in Russia and abroad, we can draw the following conclusions:

The size of the annual investments of Russian companies per 1 ton of oil produced corresponds to the level of a foreign company " Total »- $59/ton in 2016. However, in the reporting year, Gazprom Neft PJSC and Lukoil PJSC invested $100 and $92 per 1 ton of oil production. At the same time, only Rosneft increased this indicator in 2016 by 6%, while the rest of the companies showed a decline.

The predominant share (more than 50%) is annually occupied by the sector " Upstream ". Although the amount of investment in the sector " Downstream » increases, but the share remains small, no more than 20%.

The structure of oil products output over the past 3 years was as follows: the share of motor gasoline in the considered Russian companies is 20%, diesel fuel - 32%, fuel oil and vacuum gas oil - 29%. While at " Total » these figures were: 28%, 45% and less than 5%, respectively.

The average depth of refining in the reporting year for Russian companies was 77%, “ Total »- 97%. The output of light oil products is 66% and 83%, respectively.

Capital investments in the Oil Refining and Petrochemicals segment are characterized by the following features: in Russia, most projects are aimed atreducing the content of sulfur compounds in commercial petroleum products or obtaining a component of high-octane gasoline, light gas oil, etc.

In 2016, Russian refineries completed the construction and commissioning of catalytic cracking, delayed coking, hydrotreating, etc. units. Only at OJSC “Surgutneftegas” in 2016, for the first time in Russia, automatic system management technological process. In turn, the company Total » pursues other goals, which significantly distinguishes it from the activities of Russian companies, namely: taking advantage of various types of raw materials - the company plans to launch new programs to develop various technologies for the production of liquid fuels, monomers and intermediate products from gas; asset value maximization. Company " Total » develops experience and technologies to increase the value of assets. Efforts are mainly focused on programs aimed at flexibility and accessibility of facilities. Advanced input material and process modeling helps departments overcome processing limitations and work while exploiting those limitations in real time. And the new opportunities offered digital technology, are being studied to pave the way for a "factory of the future" that will provide an even safer working environment and increased productivity, consuming less energy and reducing waste;

Thus, the investment of foreign and Russian oil companies is different. Perhaps the reason for the low efficiency of the use of investments lies in the fact that the investment policy of Russian oil companies is aimed at exploiting existing fields and modernizing existing funds. Preference is given to those investment projects that have short term payback. They do not seek to develop innovative products or renewable energy sources. These circumstances indicate that at the enterprises of the domestic oil complex, due attention is not paid to the justification of the investment strategy, the evaluation of the effectiveness of investment projects, and the increase in the level of investment attractiveness for the implementation of innovative projects. .

Based on the results obtained, it can be concluded that in the current realities, it is preferable for oil companies to invest in oil refining and petrochemistry.It should also be noted that,Despite the active investment policy of Russian oil companies, the leader in terms of total investment Russian market PJSC "NK Rosneft" is inferior to the foreign company "Total" by 2-3 times.

Bibliographic list

1. World natural gas market: the latest trends / Ruk. ed. count S. V. Zhukov. - M.: IMEMO RAN, 2009. - 107 p.

2.5.8. Saifullina L. D. Management of the development of an enterprise based on the modeling of investment activity: dissertation of a candidate of economic sciences: 08.00.05 / L. D. Saifullina. - Ufa, 2006. - 168 p.

9. Cherepovitsyn A.E. Conceptual approaches to the development of an innovation-oriented strategy for the development of the oil and gas complex: monograph / A.E. Cherepovitsyn. - St. Petersburg: SPGGI, 2008. - 212 p.

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